

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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FOI/PA# 21-cv-558

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- Page 17 ~ b7E - 1;
- Page 18 ~ b7E - 1;
- Page 19 ~ b7E - 1;
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- Page 30 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 31 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 33 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 1,4; b7A - 1; b7C - 1,4; b7E - 5,9;
- Page 34 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 1,4,5,6; b7A - 1; b7C - 1,4,5,6; b7E - 5,10,13;
- Page 35 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 1,4,5,6; b7A - 1; b7C - 1,4,5,6; b7E - 5,10,13;
- Page 36 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 1,4; b7A - 1; b7C - 1,4; b7E - 5;
- Page 37 ~ b5 - 1; b7A - 1;
- Page 38 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 4; b7C - 4; b7E - 1;

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**From:** Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fw: Detailed overview FBI's Planning, Coordination, and Response to U.S. Capitol Breach - January 6 only (U//LES) for your review  
**To:** Floris, Nikki L. (CD) (FBI); Benavides, Bradley S. (CD) (FBI); Levine, Jesse (CD) (FBI); [redacted] b6 -1  
[redacted] b7C -1  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 10:03 AM (UTC-05:00) b7E -1,2,5  
**Attached:** Overview US Capitol coordination DRAFT 01102021 U//LES.docx

Folks, Attached is an overview document that outlines the FBI's planning, coordination, and response to the US Capitol siege last week. From my read of this [redacted] we have nothing to add to this document. The only exception is [redacted] on the red side. I spoke with [redacted] this morning and she asked to include them [redacted] if you are aware of anything else we've done that would be responsive to this please advise.

I suspect this is going to be a weekend of multiple emails. Thanks in advance for getting back to me on them.

Alan

**From:** [redacted] b6 -1  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 16, 2021 9:54 AM b7C -1  
**To:** Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] b7E -3,5  
**Subject:** Fw: Detailed overview FBI's Planning, Coordination, and Response to U.S. Capitol Breach - January 6 only (U//LES) for your review

Hi Sir,

As discussed, please find attached the overall high level document that I am continuing to modify. I can incorporate the information if it's sent in an email next week or attached to this document, whatever is easier. If it become S//NF, I can move it to FBINET and receive information there.

Thank you,  
[redacted]



Confidentiality Statement: This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The message, along with any attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling [redacted]

On Jan 16, 2021 9:38 AM, "Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted]  
[redacted] From my read of the attached document that doesn't appear to be the kind of thing that is already in this document. [redacted]  
[redacted] has done to

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** [Redacted] - January 16, 2021  
**To:**  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 10:32 AM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -5

[Redacted]


b7E -1,5

**All information and inquiries should be directed to** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]


b7E -1,3,5

[Redacted]

b7E -1,5



V/r



**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fw: OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 16 January  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:25 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPS 2021 Inauguration Daily Sitrep-20210116\_TLP-AMBER.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5



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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 16, 2021 06:29  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 16 January

b7E -3,5

Good morning PSCs,


Please see attached the OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep for 16 January, which will be posted on both the InfraGard and DSAC portals this morning.

Please reach out to our unit with any questions or comments on this report.

Many thanks,



FBI | Office of Private Sector



**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** WFO AM SITREP  
**To:** Thompson, Regina E. (VSD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:34 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** WFO Sitrep .docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Happy Saturday Regina,

Attached is the WFO morning SITREP for your review and approval.

Please let us know if there are questions.

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

**From:** No title defined  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:36 AM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2,5




*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

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To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:



**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
(FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:39 AM (UTC-05:00)

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:35 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**



**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol b6 -1  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [REDACTED] b7C -1  
[REDACTED] b7E -1,5  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:39 AM (UTC-05:00)

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV> b7E -1,2,5  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:35 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

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**From:** The Washington Post  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - [MARKETING] The Post Most: Off-duty police were part of the Capitol mob. Now police are turning in their own.  
**To:** Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:53 AM (UTC-05:00)




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
*(Liv Radin/Sipa USA/AP)*

## **Off-duty police were part of the Capitol mob. Now police are turning in their own.**

There's been a notable break in the so-called "blue wall of silence," an aspect of police culture that encourages officers to ignore misconduct by their peers.

By Kimberly Kindy, Kim Bellware and Mark Berman • [Read more »](#)

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## **Tipsters, tech-savvy kids, pharmacy hopping: How Americans are landing coronavirus vaccines**

By Fenit Nirappil, Karin Brulliard and Sarah Fowler • [Read more »](#)

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## **State capitols brace for right-wing violence; D.C. locks down ahead of inauguration**

**Live updates** • By Derek Hawkins and Tim Craig • [Read more »](#)

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## Pushed to the edge by the Capitol riot, people are reporting their family and friends to the FBI

By Hannah Knowles and Paulina Villegas • [Read more »](#)

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## A former president Trump won't 'need to know.' Cut off his intelligence.

Opinion • By Susan M. Gordon • [Read more »](#)

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
## Capitol Police intelligence report warned three days before attack that 'Congress itself' could be targeted

Exclusive • By Carol D. Leonnig • [Read more »](#)

## Democrats wrestle with length of Trump trial

By Seung Min Kim • [Read more »](#)

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## **A Md. town seethes after one of its own announces he joined the U.S. Capitol's mob**

By John Woodrow Cox, Hannah Natanson and Julie Tate • [Read more »](#)

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## **Fact check: Biden's claim about employment of 'mom and pop' businesses**

**Analysis** • By Glenn Kessler • [Read more »](#)

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# Trump leaves behind a Republican Party both broken and still in his grip

**Analysis** • By Dan Balz • [Read more »](#)

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## Acting defense secretary: 'I cannot wait to leave this job, believe me'


By Paul Sonne • [Read more »](#)

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## My family, like the country, split over race. Like the country, we can heal.

**Perspective** • By Robert Klemko • [Read more »](#)

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## **In Trump's last days, a spree of environmental rollbacks**

By Juliet Eilperin and Dino Grandoni • [Read more »](#)

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## **Pillow salesman apparently has some ideas about declaring martial law**

**Analysis** • By Philip Bump • [Read more »](#)

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## **Before he stormed the Capitol, ex-W.Va. lawmaker harassed women at an abortion clinic**


By Samantha Schmidt and Caroline Kitchener • [Read more »](#)

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## **The U.S. sent Central American asylum seekers to Guatemala to seek refuge. None were granted asylum, report says.**

By Kevin Sieff and Mary Beth Sheridan • [Read more »](#)

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## **7 crispy recipes that celebrate panko, the best breadcrumbs around**

By Becky Krystal • [Read more »](#)


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## **Finished ‘Bridgerton’? Here are 13 other period dramas to binge next.**

**Perspective** • By Bethonie Butler • [Read more »](#)

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## **Weekend reads**



(Brad Barker/Getty for Comedy Central)

## The top Trump impersonators are asking

### themselves: What now?

In South Bend, Ind., Pete Buttigieg challenged a decades-old

assumption that streets are for cars above all else

By Michael Cavanaugh • [Read more »](#)

By Ian Duncan • [Read more »](#)

## India launches what could be the world's largest vaccination campaign. But it's unclear if one of the vaccines works.

By Joanna Slater and Niha Masih • [Read more »](#)





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**From:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** [redacted] Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:57 AM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Alex, I'll take people I would not invite to Passover dinner for a 1000.

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 10:40 AM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

-  
----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:35 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

b7E -1,2,5

[redacted]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

.....  
To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[redacted]

**From:** No title defined  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 12:15 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2,5

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 31 (MJ)

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To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]

**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI) [REDACTED] b6 -1  
[REDACTED] b7C -1  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 12:17 PM (UTC-05:00) b7E -1,5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 11:15 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI) [REDACTED] b6 -1  
[REDACTED] b7C -1  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 12:17 PM (UTC-05:00) b7E -1,5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV> b7E -1,2,5  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 11:15 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 31 (MJ)

.....  
To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 12:19 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Copy

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 11:16 AM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 11:15 AM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

b7E -1,2,5

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 31 (MJ)

---

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]

**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 12:59 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

I will call you about the below in about an hour if you have time

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:56 AM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Cc:**

From: Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: [REDACTED]  
Sent: January 16, 2021 1:00 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

I will call you about the below in about an hour if you have time

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 10:56 AM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[REDACTED] Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Cc:  
Alex, I'll take people I would not invite to Passover dinner for a 1000.

On Jan 16, 2021 10:40 AM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 10:35 AM  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
Cc:

b7E -1,2,5

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]



From: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
Sent: January 16, 2021 1:01 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Sure I'm available any time.

[redacted]

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 11:59 AM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
I will call you about the below in about an hour if you have time

b7E -3

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 10:56 AM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted] "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted]

Cc:  
Alex, I'll take people I would not invite to Passover dinner for a 1000.

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 10:40 AM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 10:35 AM  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
To: DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
Cc:

b7E -1,2,5

[redacted]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

.....  
To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[redacted]

FBI(21cv558)-6728

**From:** No title defined  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 1:09 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2,5

[REDACTED]

*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*


DISTRO: 2, 6, 31 (MJ)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]

**From:** No title defined  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 1:26 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2,5



*Information provided is for situational awareness in the interest of public safety. LA-SAFE recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected right of Americans to peacefully assemble.*

DIS: 2, 6, 31 (MM)

---

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:



**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - State & Nationwide Protest Update  
**To:** Jess Anderson  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:09 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** SIAC SITREP Special Events and Demonstrations - Update 62 - 1600 hrs 13 January - SIAC 2021 - 7.pdf

b6 -6  
b7C -6

Law Enforcement Partners,

There have been no significant updates since our briefing last night. The next briefing will be held tomorrow, Sunday, January 17 at 4:00 pm. My assistant will be sending out a calendar appointment and Zoom link for that briefing. Please do not share this link outside of this group. We have been able to raise the amount of participants allowed, so there shouldn't be any problems logging on.

Respectfully,  
Commissioner Jess Anderson

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** **Jess Anderson** <jessanderson@utah.gov>  
**Date:** Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 8:57 PM  
**Subject:** State & Nationwide Protest Update  
**To:**

Chiefs, Sheriffs, & Law Enforcement Administrators,

b7E -1

In an effort to share information I would like to give you a quick update on the State's plan for known upcoming protests and potential civil unrest. We are aware of multiple groups planning to protest at our State's Capitol this Sunday, January 17th. There is a general call for individuals attending these protests to come armed. There is also [REDACTED] At this time we have no known calls for violence specific to Utah but will be prepared for worst case scenarios.

This Sunday DPS will have officers from across the state protecting the Capitol. These officers will comprise uniform patrols, our Public Protection Unit, our SERT team, etc. The Governor has also authorized the use of the Utah Air & Army National Guard units, which will be utilized. The Utah Division of Natural Resources (DNR), West Jordan PD, West Valley PD and Salt Lake City PD are also providing officers or making units available if the need arises. As you can imagine we are not releasing our personnel numbers or capabilities to the public, as not to tip our hand or tactics to those that may choose to conduct themselves in an illegal manner.

In addition to Sunday's events, we also plan to increase our staffing as the Utah Legislative Session starts on Tuesday, January 19th. There are known plans for protesting at the legislative session from several different groups. The current plan is for the legislative session to kick off working from a virtual platform. DPS will increase staffing and have contingency plans should the legislature decide to move to an in-person session.

As we all know the U.S. Presidential Inauguration on January 20th also presents a potential reason for these groups to protest. The Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC) is monitoring for protests, threats of violence, and any intel that indicates a law enforcement response will be needed.

DPS and UHP have received numerous calls from many of you offering your support and resources. We sincerely appreciate your willingness to step into this volatile situation. In an effort to provide real-time information we will be inviting each of you to a virtual briefing starting tomorrow at 1710 hours and daily thereafter until further notice. The link to this briefing is attached and an additional calendar invite with links to each of these briefings will be sent to this group. Information shared in this platform will contain law enforcement sensitive information and should not be shared outside your command staff.

Attached is a PDF of the most recent SIAC SITREP relating to the above mentioned events.

FBI(21cv558)-6807

Please do not hesitate to contact myself [redacted], or Colonel Rapich (801 556-5854) should you have any concerns, intel, or questions.

b6 -6  
b7C -6

Respectfully,  
Commissioner Jess Anderson

**ZOOM LINK:**

Topic: EOC Capitol Protests Briefing

Time: Jan 15, 2021 05:10 PM Mountain Time

Join Zoom Meeting

[redacted]

b7E -3

Meeting ID: [redacted]

Passcode: [redacted]

One tap mobile

[redacted]

--

**Jess L. Anderson**  
Commissioner



**Utah Department of Public Safety**  
Office 801-965-4062

4501 South 2700 West Box 141775

Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1775

[jessanderson@utah.gov](mailto:jessanderson@utah.gov)

[redacted]

--

**Jess L. Anderson**  
Commissioner



**Utah Department of Public Safety**  
Office 801-965-4062

4501 South 2700 West Box 141775

Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1775

[jessanderson@utah.gov](mailto:jessanderson@utah.gov)

[redacted]

From: Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
Subject: FW: NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/15/2021  
To: [REDACTED]  
Sent: January 16, 2021 2:28 PM (UTC-05:00)  
Attached: OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 15.pdf

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED]  
Attached is last night's version and you all should be on distro for future publications, which will come just as the below from SIOC. If you do not get one.... Lets link up again so I can address.

If you have a moment today I have an quick idea to run by you.

Jill

From: SIOC [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 11:14 PM  
To: [REDACTED] SIOC\_CRITICAL\_INCIDENT\_HQ  
[REDACTED]  
Cc: SIOC [REDACTED]  
Subject: NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/15/2021

b7E -3,5

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

---

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

*The below message is sent on behalf of Assistant Director George Beach II:*

Good evening,

Please find attached the 15 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests.

Please note that this document is Unclassified//~~Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

As a reminder, if you respond to this message, please do not "Reply All."

---

**National Crisis Coordination Center | FBIHQ, SIOC, Room 5590 | [REDACTED]**

---

b7E -3

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WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION**

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**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

FBI(21cv558)-6820

**From:** No title defined  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:42 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1, 5

[Redacted]

Distro: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[Redacted]

**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
(FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:46 PM (UTC-05:00)

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 1:42 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**



**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:46 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 1:42 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**

b7E -1,5

[REDACTED]

Distro: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:

[REDACTED]

**From:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:48 PM (UTC-05:00)

Did we have any threat information related to this event?

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 1:45 PM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

b7E -3

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 1:42 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**  
[redacted]

b7E -1,5

Distro: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:  
[redacted]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:48 PM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1, 5

Thanks....I actually subscribed today and got the message direct. I will take it as a small victory.

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 1:45 PM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

b7E -3

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 1:42 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**  
[REDACTED]

b7E -1, 5

Distro: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:  
[REDACTED]

**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:49 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2

Not to my knowledge. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-

On Jan 16, 2021 1:47 PM, "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

b7E -3

**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 2:50 PM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -1,2

Not to my knowledge. [REDACTED]

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 1:47 PM, "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:  
Did we have any threat information related to this event?

b7E -3

-  
On Jan 16, 2021 1:45 PM, "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

b7E -3

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Louisiana Fusion Center <LaFusion.Center@LA.GOV>  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 1:42 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FINAL UPDATE: EBR / Stop the Steal Protest at the Capitol  
**To:** DPS-LA-SAFE-31@LISTSERV.DOA.LA.GOV  
**Cc:**  
[REDACTED]

b7E -1,5

Distro: 2, 6, 31 (NL)

.....  
To unsubscribe from the DPS-LA-SAFE-31 list, click the following link:  
[REDACTED]

FBI(21cv558)-6843

**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: New Orleans Command Post Report: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity 01\_15\_21  
**To:** Schneider, Michael H. (DN) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 4:53 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** 01\_15\_2021\_Inauguration\_SITREP\_v1.docx

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 7:20 AM  
**Subject:** Re: New Orleans Command Post Report: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity 01\_15\_21  
**To:** "Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)" [Redacted] "Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI)" [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

**Cc:** [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Good Morning,

Although I provided the SharePoint last night. I meant to attach the document as well to my email. Please see attached.

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 15, 2021 11:16 PM  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI) [Redacted] Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI) [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

**Cc:** [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Subject:** New Orleans Command Post Report: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity 01\_15\_21

Good Evening,

Please excuse the late email, but this communication is an effort to ensure ALL have the most up to date information regarding the New Orleans Command Post and actions taken on January 15, 2021. This report will be

From: [redacted]  
Subject: PVCA Survey  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI); Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); [redacted]  
Sent: January 16, 2021 5:18 PM (UTC-05:00)  
All,

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

If we decide to add a short section at the end of our SITREP dedicated to the LE partner survey effort, we can use something like this (edits welcome!). The goal is to also attach the survey to the email when we send the SITREP:

**Law Enforcement Partner Survey**

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1, 3, 5

We can then highlight a few data points, or just indicate that the survey results are attached.

We can discuss later! For reference, this is the bullet we buried in last night's SITREP with no questions asked from [redacted]

[redacted]

Thoughts???

[redacted]

From: SIOC  
Subject: NC3 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 1630 16 JAN 2021  
To: [REDACTED] HQ-DIV22-SIOC-DD-ADD-EADS  
Cc: [REDACTED] SIOC  
Sent: January 16, 2021 6:24 PM (UTC-05:00)  
Attached: Executive Update - 1630 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 16 JANUARY 2021.pdf

b7E -5

~~UNCLASSIFIED//LES~~

---

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER

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SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION

**SOURCE OF INFORMATION:** FBI Critical Incident Response Group Division (CIRG)

**DETAILS:** Please see attached NC3 Executive Update.

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PRIOR AUTHORIZATION

---

Strategic Information & Operations Center | FBIHQ, Room 5712 | [REDACTED]

Emergency Action Specialist: [REDACTED] Watch Commander: SSA [REDACTED]

---

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** WFO Evening SITREP 1/16/21  
**To:** Thompson, Regina E. (VSD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 6:34 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** WFO Sitrep .docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

Good evening Regina,

Attached is the evening sitrep for your review and approval.

Let us know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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prohibited. Please notify the sender by a separate e-mail and delete this message and any attachments. Any  
misuse of unauthorized disclosure can result in both civil and criminal penalties.

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: NC3 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 1630 16 JAN 2021  
**To:** Hwang, Sandra I. (CTD) (DET); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b3 -1  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b6 -1  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 7:08 PM (UTC-05:00) b7C -1  
**Attached:** Executive Update - 1630 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 16 JANUARY 2021.pdf b7E -1,5

This just reminded me that I want to know more on the [redacted] portion brought up at the 4pm. I am sure you can't reply on this, but please pass to all of us on Red.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** SIOC [redacted] b7E -3,5  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 6:24 PM  
**Subject:** NC3 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 1630 16 JAN 2021  
**To:** [redacted] HQ-DIV22-SIOC-DD-ADD-EADS [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] SIOC [redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//LES~~

---

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

---

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

**SOURCE OF INFORMATION:** FBI Critical Incident Response Group Division (CIRG)

**DETAILS:** Please see attached NC3 Executive Update.

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PRIOR AUTHORIZATION

---

**Strategic Information & Operations Center | FBIHQ, Room 5712** [redacted] b6 -1  
**Emergency Action Specialist:** [redacted] | **Watch Commander: SSA** [redacted] b7C -1  
b7E -3

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~~UNCLASSIFIED//LES~~

From: [redacted]  
Subject: NC3 SITREP and SLTT Survey  
To: Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted]  
Sent: January 16, 2021 8:23 PM (UTC-05:00)  
Attached: GREEN\_S\_L\_Survey.pdf



b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hello,

Below is the information the NC3 SITREP included regarding the OPE SLTT survey. Please review and advise if you think we should move forward and include the survey report, attached again for your review.

**(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES**

b5 -1  
b7E -1,2



b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**From:** Martinez, Alberto  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - OCIAC: Inauguration SitRep - 16 January  
**To:**  
**Cc:** Martinez, Alberto  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 8:51 PM (UTC-05:00)

Executives,

Below are brief bullets of interest as we head into inauguration week.

b7E -1,2,5

- **OCIAC along with our federal partners have no specific threats to the County at this time**

[REDACTED]

**Online/social media sentiment to avoid DC and state capitals; opens opportunities for potential local demonstrations**

- OCIAC and OCSD Mutual Aid Bureau hosting HSIN chat room for information sharing on events for Orange County and potential public safety impacts; continue to encourage your agency representatives to participate
- <5 events planned for this week; spontaneous events expected between now and Wednesday

- **Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR)**

[REDACTED]

- **No specific identified threats to Orange County CIKR;** patrol checks encouraged at local government affiliated facilities and associated private sector companies

- **OCIAC support to FBI**

- FBI inundated with reports of individuals suspected of entering the U.S. Capitol grounds [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I am confident in our relationships with our federal partners to share that we are all working closely to ensure the safety of our County. Please reach out if you have any questions. Thank you.

Alberto Martinez  
Director  
Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC)  
Orange County Sheriff's Department  
Desk: [REDACTED]  
E-mail: [REDACTED]

b6 -6  
b7C -6

Submit a Tip or Lead at: [www.OCIAC.ca.gov](http://www.OCIAC.ca.gov)

"A SAFE AND SECURE ORANGE COUNTY AND HOMELAND"

FBI(21cv558)-6877

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** SITREP for 01.16.21  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI); [Redacted] Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

**Cc:**

[Redacted]

**Sent:** January 16, 2021 10:24 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** 01\_16\_2021\_Inauguration\_SITREP\_v1\_FINAL.docx  
All--

Please see attached the FINAL SITREP for 16 January 2021.

Thank you,

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** OPE SITREP - Draft  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 10:26 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_CLEAN\_Jan 16 JM.docx  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Please find attached the draft OPE SITREP. We would like to get this out as soon as possible, so please call with any questions: [redacted]

Thank you!!

[redacted]

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT CHANNELS WITHOUT FBI HQ APPROVAL.



# (U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 16 JANUARY 2021

*(U//~~LES~~) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 16 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

(U) The information used (U//~~LES~~) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond those entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES can not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Participants are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

(U//~~LES~~) Under FBI policy and federal law, no law enforcement activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. ("Privacy Act of 1974, section (c)(7)")

(U//~~LES~~) DRAC appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity. The FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not manifestly interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutional, recognized rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation.

[Redacted]

b7E -1

(U//~~LES~~) Within the legal and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing assignments. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal law enforcement, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources or assets, induce notification into the FBI, interest of intended target.

(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity, if it related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or law enforcement activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

## (U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary


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~~(U//FOUO)~~ THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

~~(U//LES)~~ With the recent threats and civil disturbance at the United States Capitol targeting members of Congress, state, local, and tribal law enforcement jurisdictions are requested to maintain operational awareness of their respective Congressional Representative's district offices and residences for any types of threats or potential criminal activity:

b7E -1

### (U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021



b7E -1,2

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ As of 16 January, the number of National Guard personnel in Washington, DC exceeds 9,500. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

### (U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 1:00 on 16 January, the FBI has received more than 160,707 digital media tips.



b7E -1,2,4



**(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021**

## (U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

*(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness -- past ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours)*

[Redacted]

b7E -1

### *(U) Past Ongoing in the last 12 - 24 Hours*

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

### *(U) Planned in the next 12 - 24 Hours*

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

## (U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

[Redacted]

b7E -1

### *(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location*

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b7E -1,2

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

\* [Redacted]

b7E -1,2

*(U) Threat To Life*

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.


\* [Redacted]

b7E -1,2,4

(U) OTHER

\* [Redacted]


b7E -1,2



b7E -1,2

(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

b7E -1,2,3



**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fw: OPE SITREP - Draft  
**To:** Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 10:34 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_CLEAN\_Jan 16 JM.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Are there sensitivities to including the survey questions in our SITREP?

[redacted]

---

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 16, 2021 10:26 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); [redacted]; Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Subject:** OPE SITREP - Draft

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]

Please find attached the draft OPE SITREP. We would like to get this out as soon as possible, so please call with any questions: [redacted]

Thank you!!

[redacted]

From: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
To: [REDACTED]  
Sent: January 16, 2021 11:37 PM (UTC-05:00)  
Attached: OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf, SLTT\_SURVEY\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening,

Please find attached the 15 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. Also attached is the 16 January report reflecting responses to the State and Local survey, which is highlighted in the SITREP.

Please note that this document is ~~Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

Thank you.

[REDACTED]

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FOI/PA  
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Page 110 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1,2,5;  
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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fw: FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** SIOC  
**Cc:** Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI); Hurley, James B. Jr. (OPE) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:39 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf, SLTT\_SURVEY\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening,

On behalf of OPE AD George P. Beach, please provide the below verbiage and attached OPE SITREP to the following SIOC distribution lists:

- [REDACTED]
- SIOC\_CRITICAL\_INCIDENT\_HQ

Thank you.

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 16, 2021 11:36 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. Also attached is the 16 January report reflecting responses to the State and Local survey, which is highlighted in the SITREP.

Please note that this document is ~~Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

Thank you.

[REDACTED]

**From:** SIOC  
**Subject:** NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/16/2021  
**To:** SIOC\_CRITICAL\_INCIDENT\_HQ; [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** SIOC  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:47 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf, SLTT\_SURVEY\_Jan 16.pdf

b7E -5

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

---

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

*The below message is sent on behalf of Assistant Director George Beach II:*

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests.

Please note that this document is Unclassified//~~Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

---

**National Crisis Coordination Center | FBIHQ, SIOC, Room 5590 | [REDACTED]**

---

b7E -3

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**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

**From:** Bryan Vorndran  
**Subject:** Fwd: FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:48 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:36 PM  
**Subject:** FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:**

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. Also attached is the 16 January report reflecting responses to the State and Local survey, which is highlighted in the SITREP.

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Thank you.

[REDACTED]

**From:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:48 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:36 PM  
**Subject:** FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. Also attached is the 16 January report reflecting responses to the State and Local survey, which is highlighted in the SITREP.

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Thank you.

[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/16/2021  
**To:** Vorndran, Bryan A. (NO) (FBI); Veltri, Jeffrey B. (NO) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 16, 2021 11:55 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf, SLTT\_SURVEY\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

**From:** SIOC [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 16, 2021 10:47 PM  
**To:** SIOC CRITICAL INCIDENT HQ [redacted]  
**Cc:** SIOC [redacted]  
**Subject:** NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/16/2021

b7E -3,5

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

*The below message is sent on behalf of Assistant Director George Beach II:*

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests.

Please note that this document is Unclassified//~~Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//~~LES~~)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

**National Crisis Coordination Center | FBIHQ, SIOC, Room 5590 |** [redacted]

b7E -3

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WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION**

This message and any attachments are for situational awareness and may be confidential/legally privileged. If you received this in error, please delete, do not disseminate further, and notify SIOC immediately.

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** NCITF: January 16 SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests.  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 12:13 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** SLTT\_SURVEY\_Jan 16.pdf, OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf

b7E -5

Trusted partners,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. Also attached is the 16 January report reflecting responses to the State and Local survey, which is highlighted in the SITREP.

Please note that this document is ~~Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

Sincerely,

National Counterintelligence Task Force  
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Room [redacted]  
&

b7E -5,13


[redacted]

From: [REDACTED]  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - [DC NEWS] NBCNEWS.COM - FBI probing if foreign governments, groups funded extremists who helped execute Capitol attack  
To: DC-news  
Sent: January 17, 2021 6:09 AM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -4  
b7C -4

# FBI probing if foreign governments, groups funded extremists who helped execute Capitol attack

As part of the investigation, the FBI is examining payments of \$500,000 in bitcoin to key figures and groups in the alt-right before the Jan. 6 riot.



Supporters of President Donald Trump gather at the west entrance of the Capitol during a riot outside of the Capitol building on Jan. 6, 2021. *Stephanie Keith / Reuters*

Jan. 16, 2021, 6:10 PM EST  
By Ken Dilanian

WASHINGTON — The FBI is investigating whether foreign governments, organizations or individuals provided financial support to extremists who helped plan and execute the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, one current and one former FBI official told NBC News

FBI(21cv558)-6996



As part of the investigation, the bureau is examining payments of \$500,000 in bitcoin, apparently by a French national, to key figures and groups in the alt-right before the riot, the sources said. Those payments were documented and posted on the web this week by a company that analyzes cryptocurrency transfers. Payments of bitcoin, a cryptocurrency, can be traced because they are documented on a public ledger.

Separately, a joint threat assessment issued this week by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and various other federal D.C.-area police agencies noted that since the Jan. 6 riot, "Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence actors have seized the opportunity to amplify narratives in furtherance of their policy interest amid the presidential transition."

Russian state and proxy media outlets "have amplified themes related to the violent and chaotic nature of the Capitol Hill incident: impeachment of President Trump, and social media censorship," the unclassified intelligence report said. "In at least one instance, a Russian proxy claimed that ANTIFA members disguised themselves as supporters of President Trump, and were responsible for storming the Capitol building."

Chinese media, meanwhile, "have seized the story to denigrate U.S. democratic governance, casting the United States as broad decline — and to justify China's crackdown on protestors in Hong Kong."

The examination of possible foreign influence related to the Capitol riot, which involves the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, comes after years of what current and former FBI officials say is mounting evidence that Russia and other foreign adversaries have secretly supported political extremists on the far right and far left.

Law enforcement officials and terrorism experts say there has long been "a mutual affection between Western white supremacists and the Russian government," as two scholars put it in a February paper on the JustSecurity web site.

Some senators were concerned enough about the issue that they inserted a requirement in the 2021 defense bill that the Pentagon "report to Congress on the extent of Russian support for 'racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups and networks in Europe and the United States' — and what can be done to counter it."

The current FBI official told NBC News that the bureau did not necessarily suspect Russian involvement in the bitcoin transfers, but appear to have been made by a French computer programmer who died by suicide on Dec. 8 after triggering the transfers, according to French media.

But the cryptocurrency payments prompted the FBI to examine whether any of the money was used to fund illegal acts, which, it raises the possibility of money laundering and conspiracy charges, the FBI official said.

On Dec. 8, Chainalysis reported, the donor sent 28.15 BTC — worth about \$522,000 at the time of transfer — to 22 separate addresses, many of which belong to far-right activists.

The Chainalysis blog post, first highlighted by Yahoo News, said far-right podcaster Nick Fuentes received the most money, 13.5 BTC worth approximately \$250,000.

Fuentes, who spoke at pro-Trump rallies last year in Michigan and Washington, D.C., told the ProPublica news organization that he was at the "Stop the Steal" rally on Wednesday but didn't follow the mob into the Capitol.

One group of Fuentes' supporters, which calls itself the Groyper Army, was filmed running through the Capitol carrying a large flag with the America First logo, ProPublica reported.

"We're looking at and treating this just like a significant international counterterrorism or counterintelligence operation," Michael Sherwin, the U.S. attorney in D.C., said at a news briefing last week.

"We're looking at everything: Money, travel records, looking at disposition, movement, communication records."

[Redacted]

SFSAFBI

Secretary, Washington, D.C. Chapter

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -3

To update your email address, to switch to the [Daily Summary format](#), or to contact the list administrator, please email [Redacted]

To view the archives for this list, click [Redacted]

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**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Question on OT  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E., Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 6:38 AM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Morning Jill,

FYI the field, via HRD (and me), has been requesting a special case code for all that is ongoing. I know the initial reaction was to limit it to HQ, but curious about your thoughts on expanding it. Strategically I think there might also be value in separately capturing all the OT if ever asked how many resources it took to do this.

Best,  
Kristyn

-

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Korneski, Douglas M. (ME) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 10:23 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Question on OT  
To: "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

b7A -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

Hey, Krystyn. I'm one of the SACs that reached out to Ralph (I wasn't sure who was handling OT issues).

Understand as of now OT for Capitol riot case is only for NCR, however, this is obviously a national crisis, with

[redacted]

Anyway, realize there's always red tape, so may not be doable, but any thought and consideration to the limited expansion of OT for other FOs specifically supporting WFO in their AORs would be appreciated.

Thanks,  
Doug

-

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Tursi, Ralph (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Jan 16, 2021 6:49 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Question on OT  
To: "Korneski, Douglas M. (ME) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

b7E -3

Hey Doug, FYI on the below, Kristyn should be able to provide more information. Hope this helps and let me know if you need anything additional.

Thanks and all the best - Ralph

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

b7E -3,5

Date: Jan 16, 2021 6:06 PM

Subject: Question on OT

To: "Tursi, Ralph (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

Cc: "Evans, Spencer L. (HRD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

Hi Ralph,

So sorry for the delay! Right now [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] That being said  
a) send them my way, and b) I'll double tap on trying to see if we can get ADD approval more broadly. Yesterday it didn't seem hopeful since they [REDACTED] but today is another day!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

On Jan 16, 2021 4:25 PM, "Tursi, Ralph (CD) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:

b7E -3,5

Hi Kristyn and hope all is well. We've received a few questions in HRD as to whether OT is authorized for Field Offices [REDACTED] I assume that CTD would make the call on that, and from HRD's perspective we're good with whatever you all decide. Should I send folks your way on these questions or is there a better POC in CTD?

Really appreciate the help during a busy time for you and your team.

Thanks and all the best - Ralph

-

**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 17 January  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 7:06 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPS 2021 Inauguration Daily Sitrep-20210117\_TLP-AMBER.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good Morning PSCs,


Please see attached the OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep for 17 January, which will be posted on both the InfraGard and DSAC portals this morning.

Please reach out to our unit with any questions or comments on this report.

Many thanks,

[redacted]

[redacted]



## OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep - 17 January 2021

*This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate private sector and safety personnel. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. References in this product to any specific commercial product, process or service or the use of any corporate name herein is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an endorsement, recommendation, or disparagement of that product, process, service or corporation on behalf of the FBI.*

### ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021


The FBI, in close coordination with its federal, state, and local partners, continues to monitor and respond to events related to the violence associated with lawful protests.


As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.

For further information on the unlawful entry into the United States Capitol Building and assault on federal law enforcement personnel on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C. please visit: <https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/capitol-violence>. This site includes images of numerous persons of interest; when reporting a tip on any of these individuals, please reference the photograph number and AFO.

On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 16 January, the FBI has received more than 160,747 digital media tips.

b7E -1,13





 Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.





b7E -1,2,4,13





## National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

### Past/Ongoing Flashpoints and Responses


On 13 January, the House of Representatives impeached President Trump. As of 16 January, there is no indication of violent activity in direct response to the impeachment.

On 12 January, the U.S. Coast Guard sent a bulletin titled, "Security Zone for the 59th Presidential Inauguration and its associated activities -- January 13-25, 2021" dated 1/1/2021: The Coast Guard will enforce three temporary security zones in the National Capital Region for the 59th Presidential Inauguration, beginning at 8 a.m., on January 13 and ending 8 a.m., January 25, 2021. Click on the link for the press release and bulletin: [Coast Guard to establish, enforce multiple security zones for the 59th Presidential Inauguration \(govdelivery.com\)](#)

On 15 January, FBI Director Christopher Wray and FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director Jill Sanborn joined leaders from the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and the National Guard on 14 January 2021, at FEMA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., to brief Vice President Mike Pence on inauguration security efforts. Visit [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov) or click here: [FBI Director Christopher Wray's Remarks at Briefing on Inauguration Security --- FBI](#)

On 15 January, according to the U.S. Secret Service, public information offices from across government representing numerous public safety and law enforcement entities at the federal, state and local levels began full virtual staffing of the National Special Security Event Joint Information Center (NSSE JIC) in support of the 59th Presidential inauguration. The NSSE JIC stood-up operations and staffing on 13 January. It will be staffed by a public affairs representative from many of the agencies participating in the design and implementation of the inaugural security plan. The public affairs representatives will ensure consistent messaging to the media and the public (see [Public Safety and Law Enforcement Agencies Stand Up National Special Security Event Virtual Joint Information Center for the 59th Presidential Inauguration | United States Secret Service](#)).

### Potential Flashpoints





b7E -1,2





b7D -5  
b7E -1,2








Other

The FBI continues to monitor the situation around the country and will share any available and pertinent information for private industry on the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC) and InfraGard (IG) member portals (see respective link to DSAC (www.dsac.gov) and InfraGard (www.infragard.org) for the products detailed below):







b7E -1,5

OPS's [redacted] disseminated this report; please direct any requests and questions to your FBI Private Sector Coordinator at your local FBI Field Office:

<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>.

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 Limited disclosure, restricted to participants' organizations.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, yet carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.	Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing; these must be adhered to.
 Limited disclosure, restricted to the community.	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. TLP:GREEN information may not be released outside of the community.
 Disclosure is not limited.	Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.	Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.


**From:** The Washington Post  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - [MARKETING] The Week in Ideas: I got covid-19 because my GOP colleagues refuse to wear masks  
**To:** Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 7:16 AM (UTC-05:00)



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Opinions you may have missed.

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By Fred Hiatt  
\* Email

Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Democratic member of Congress from New Jersey, was

FBI(21cv558)-7015


taking every possible precaution while still representing her constituents.

Seventy-five years old and a recent chemotherapy patient, Watson Coleman understood the risks she faced in the pandemic. She voted by proxy when she could and kept as much distance from colleagues when she couldn't.

Then came the Jan. 6 incursion into the Capitol. Watson Coleman found herself under threat not only from the Trump-incited mob but from Republican representatives who refused to wear masks.

In an essay that I found remarkable for its dignified, controlled fury, Watson Coleman tells what happened next. Rather than naming names or scoring points, the congresswoman points to the lesson she hopes people will draw from her story.

Thank you for reading, and please try to stay safe.




## **I'm 75. I had cancer. I got covid-19 because my GOP colleagues dismiss facts.**

I feel like I have a mild cold. But even more than that, I am angry.

By Bonnie Watson Coleman • [Read more »](#)





## **The one thing Floridians agree on: Don't mess with our manatees**

Our beloved marine mammals are sweet and harmless — and it's totally wrong to deface them.


By Dave Barry • [Read more »](#)



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
## **A former president Trump won't 'need to know.' Cut off his intelligence.**

Trump's intelligence briefings should stop once he leaves office.

By Susan M. Gordon • [Read more »](#)








## **Vogue's Kamala Harris cover shows that diminishing powerful Black women is still in fashion**

Vogue's print cover choices still matter, which is why its misstep on Vice President-elect Kamala Harris was so hurtful.

By Karen Attiah • [Read more »](#)





## **What is Arizona's GOP doing to recover from defeat? Attacking Cindy McCain.**

The self-destructive madness shows the lasting damage Trump has done to the party.


By Dana Milbank • [Read more »](#)



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


## **My college tried to stop me from speaking about religion. Now, we'll meet in the Supreme Court.**

The fight has been long, but it's worth letting public institutions know they can't flout the Constitution.

By Chike Uzuegbunam • [Read more »](#)






## **This is what it looks like when the mob turns on you**

The Trump mob looks like America because it is America.

By Kate Woodsome • [Read more »](#)





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### How

### Dark unfolded, from inside Trump's rally to the riot

Signs of the violence to come were evident hours before thousands of Trump loyalists besieged the Capitol.

**Video** • By Joy Sharon Yi and Kate Woodsome • [Read more »](#)





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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - [Intelligence Products] OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep 17 January 2021  
**To:** Sullivan, Michael (IB) (FBI)  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 7:27 AM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

A new File has been posted by [REDACTED] in the Intelligence Products community.

## OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep 17 January 2021

### Summary

**TLP:AMBER**

**Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Office of Private Sector  
OPS Inauguration Daily SitRep  
17 January 2021**

*This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate private sector and safety personnel. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. References in this product to any specific commercial product, process or service or the use of any corporate name herein is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an endorsement, recommendation, or disparagement of that product, process, service or corporation on behalf of the FBI.*

### **ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021**


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b7E -1,13



[REDACTED] Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the

FBI(21cv558)-7028



Presidential Inauguration.

## **National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021 Past/Ongoing Flashpoints and Responses**

On 13 January, the House of Representatives impeached President Trump. As of 16 January, there is no indication of violent activity in direct response to the impeachment.


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On 15 January, FBI Director Christopher Wray and FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director Jill Sanborn joined leaders from the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and the National Guard on 14 January 2021, at FEMA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., to brief Vice President Mike Pence on inauguration security efforts. Visit [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov) or click here: <https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-director-christopher-wrays-remarks-at-briefing-on-inauguration-security>.

On 15 January, according to the U.S. Secret Service, public information offices from across government representing numerous public safety and law enforcement entities at the federal, state and local levels began full virtual staffing of the National Special Security Event Joint Information Center (NSSE JIC) in support of the 59th Presidential Inauguration. The NSSE JIC stood-up operations and staffing on 13 January. It will be staffed by a public affairs representative from many of the agencies participating in the design and implementation of the inaugural security plan. The public affairs representatives will ensure consistent messaging to the media and the public (see <https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2021/01/public-safety-and-law-enforcement-agencies-stand-national-special>).

### **Potential Flashpoints**

b7D -5  
b7E -1,2





**Other**

The FBI continues to monitor the situation around the country and will share any available and pertinent information for private industry on the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC) and InfraGard (IG) member portals (see respective link to DSAC ([www.dsac.gov](http://www.dsac.gov)) and InfraGard ([www.infragard.org](http://www.infragard.org)) for the products detailed below): b7E -1,5



OPS's [redacted] disseminated this report; please direct any requests and questions to your FBI Private Sector Coordinator at your local FBI Field Office: <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>.

*Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing: these must be adhered to.*

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b7E -3

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** [Redacted] - January 17, 2021  
**To:**  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 7:36 AM (UTC-05:00)

b7E -5

[Redacted]

b7E -1,5


All information and inquiries should be directed to [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b7E -1,3,5


[Redacted]

b7E -1,5

b7E -1



V/r



b7E -3,5

**From:** SIOC  
**Subject:** NC3 EXECUTIVE UPDATE 0700 17 JAN 2021  
**To:** [REDACTED] HQ-DIV22-SIOC-DD-ADD-EADS  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 7:55 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** Executive Overnight Update - 0700 17 January 2021.pdf

b7E -5

**UNCLASSIFIED//LES**

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

---

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

**SOURCE OF INFORMATION:** FBI Critical Incident Response Group Division (CIRG)

**DETAILS:** Please see attached NC3 Executive Update.

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**Strategic Information & Operations Center | FBIHQ, Room 5712** [REDACTED]

Emergency Action Specialist: [REDACTED] Watch Commander: SSA [REDACTED]

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b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3


The FBI Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) produced this message and any attachments for situational awareness which may be subject to change. This material may be confidential/legally privileged. If you believe you received this in error, please delete, do not disseminate further, and notify SIOC immediately.

**UNCLASSIFIED//LES**

From: SIOC  
Subject: CIRG'S DAILY SITREP  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: SIOC  
Sent: January 17, 2021 7:55 AM (UTC-05:00)  
Attached: [REDACTED]

b7E -1,5

UNCLASSIFIED//~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~



b7E -5

Sunday, January 17, 2021

SIOC On-Duty Watch Commanders

[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

b7E -5,13

PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION PLANNING

[REDACTED]

CIRG OVERNIGHT UPDATES

- [REDACTED] support efforts for Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity (PVCA) in the National Capital Region. [REDACTED]
- The NC3 will serve in a supportive role and will be comprised of FBIHQ Divisions as well as federal, state, and local partners.
- [REDACTED]


b7E -5,8

CURRENT FIELD OFFICE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

b7E -1,2,5,8,9

[REDACTED]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,4,5,8,9



DAILY POLICY ENGAGEMENTS

■ NSTR

FIELD OFFICE RESOURCE DEPLOYMENTS

b7E -1,2,5,8,13



b3 -1  
b7E -1,2,5,8,9

CIRG RESOURCE DEPLOYMENTS/TDYS

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5,8,13

ROUTINE OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS


b7E -5

PENDING

b7A -1  
b7E -5,8

■ Please see the attached [redacted] pending requests.





CIRG TRAINING



SPECIAL EVENTS



[Redacted]

b7E -5,8

FIELD OFFICE/LEGAT STATUS

■ **FBI NO** The Lake Charles RA remains closed due to damage from Hurricane Laura. All personnel are safe and accounted for. FBI New Orleans will provide updates on any additional closures.

b7E -5

[Redacted]

LEO LINE OF DUTY DEATHS

■ NSTR

SIOC FACILITY EVENTS

■ NSTR

CIRG PERSONNEL COVID REPORTING

[Redacted]

On behalf of the [Redacted] Watch Desk, the COVID-19 SITREP will only be provided Monday-Friday.

Johns Hopkins University  
Coronavirus Resource Center:  
[Johns Hopkins University CSSE](#)  
[COVID-19 Global Cases](#)

b7E -5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E -1

**FBI NEWS BRIEFING**

The FBI News Briefing document is not produced on weekends.

[FBI News](#)

**WEATHER FOR TODAY**

**NCR** – Increasing clouds, with a high/low of 48°/32°

There are no active watches, warnings or advisories.

**Richmond, VA** – Sunny with a high/low of 52°/30°

There are no active watches, warnings or advisories.

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**Strategic Information & Operations Center | FBIHQ, Room 5712 |** [REDACTED]

**Emergency Action Specialist** [REDACTED] | **Watch Commander: SSA** [REDACTED]

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -3

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~~UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

**From:** Jill Sanborn  
**Subject:** Fwd: NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/16/2021  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 8:03 AM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** OPE\_SITREP\_FINAL\_Jan 16.pdf

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -3

[REDACTED]

Good Morning. Just wanted to confirm you received from SIOC.... double checking they added you.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** SIOC [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 11:47 PM  
**Subject:** NC3 DAILY SITREP 01/16/2021  
**To:** SIOC CRITICAL INCIDENT HO

b7E -3,5

[REDACTED]

**Cc:** SIOC [REDACTED]

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

---

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**  
**STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER**

---

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION**

*The below message is sent on behalf of Assistant Director George Beach II:*

Good evening,

Please find attached the 16 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests.

Please note that this document is Unclassified//~~Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//~~LES~~)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your

FBI(21cv558)-7082

trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

---

**National Crisis Coordination Center | FBIHQ, SIOC, Room 5590 |** [REDACTED]

b7E -3

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**UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~**

**From:**  
**Subject:** Fwd: Question on OT  
**To:** Kelly; Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Reddan; Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b6 -1  
Gilhooly; Brian T. (CTD) (FBI) b7C -1  
**Sent:** January 17, 2021 8:07 AM (UTC-05:00) b7E -5

Good Morning.  
Can you remind me if we did so for Portland this summer/fall?

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted]

On Jan 17, 2021 6:38 AM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Morning Jill,

b7E -3

FYI the field, via HRD (and me), has been requesting a special case code for all that is ongoing. I know the initial reaction was to limit it to HQ, but curious about your thoughts on expanding it. Strategically I think there might also be value in separately capturing all the OT if ever asked how many resources it took to do this.

Best,  
Kristyn

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Korneski, Douglas M. (ME) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 16, 2021 10:23 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: Question on OT  
**To:** "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7A -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

Hey, Krystyn. I'm one of the SACs that reached out to Ralph (I wasn't sure who was handling OT issues).

Understand as of now OT for Capitol riot case is only for NCR, however, this is obviously a national crisis, with

[redacted]

Anyway, realize there's always red tape, so may not be doable, but any thought and consideration to the limited expansion of OT for other FOs specifically supporting WFO in their AORs would be appreciated.

Thanks,  
Doug

-

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [REDACTED]  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - China Articles - January 17, 2021  
To: [REDACTED]  
Sent: January 17, 2021 8:33 AM (UTC-05:00)

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Friends,

Below is this week's issue of articles and reports on the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the PRC's assurances to the WHO and the rest of the world that there was no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of COVID-19 (see the [WHO's Tweet](#) from January 14, 2020, #7). A year later, as the WHO tried to send a team of international investigators to the PRC (a team that the PRC pre-approved over months of negotiation), that team was denied entry at the last minute when the PRC Government refused to issue their visas. Beijing relented and granted access late this week, when the WHO took the rare step of criticizing the PRC Government publicly.

Thanks for reading!

[REDACTED]

## MUST READ

1. [The Hong Kong government is investigating the possibility of prosecuting Danish parliamentary politicians and demanding their extradition - DANISH](#)  
Claus Blok Thomsen  
Politiken, January 8, 2021
2. [How America Can Shore Up Asian Order](#)  
Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi  
Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2021
3. [China worked to prevent India from chairing key UNSC terrorism-related body](#)  
Sachin Parahar  
Times of India, January 12, 2021
4. ['Our souls are dead': how I survived a Chinese 're-education' camp for Uighurs](#)  
Gulbahar Haitiwaji and Rozenn Morgat  
The Guardian, January 12, 2021
5. [How to deal with China](#)  
The Economist, January 9, 2021

## Authoritarianism

6. [25 Days that Changed the World: How COVID-19 Slipped China's Grasp](#)  
Chris Buckley, David Kirkpatrick, Amy Qin and Javier Hernandez  
New York Times, December 30, 2020
7. [TWEET \(One Year Ago\) – Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) identified in #Wuhan. #China](#)  
World Health Organization, January 14, 2020

FBI(21cv558)-7112

8. [Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin](#)  
Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2021
9. [Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology](#)  
U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2021
10. [A Hong Kong Website Gets Blocked, Raising Censorship Fears](#)  
Paul Mozur and Aaron Krolik  
New York Times, January 9, 2021
11. [China: Global Resistance to Deepening Repression](#)  
Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021
12. [Beijing orders Chinese media to censor coverage of Alibaba probe](#)  
Yuan Yang  
Financial Times, January 7, 2021
13. [Mass arrests in Hong Kong on subversion charges](#)  
Jeremy Goldkorn  
SupChina, January 6, 2021
14. [53 Hong Kong democrats, activists arrested under security law over 2020 legislative primaries](#)  
Hong Kong Free Press, January 6, 2021
15. [China plans further Hong Kong crackdown after mass arrest -- sources](#)  
James Pomfret  
Reuters, January 11, 2021
16. [Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O'Brien](#)  
Robert C. O'Brien  
U.S. Executive Office of the President, January 11, 2021
17. [Hong Kong security law being used to 'eliminate dissent' say U.S., UK, Australia and Canada](#)  
The Guardian, January 10, 2021
18. [Chinese and Russian media partner to "tell each other's stories well"](#)  
Katja Drinhausen and Mayya Solonina  
MERICS, December 22, 2020
19. [Jack Ma was China's most vocal billionaire. Then he vanished](#)  
Barclay Bram  
Wired, January 13, 2021
20. [China Is Struggling to Get the World to Trust Its Vaccines](#)  
Iain Marlow, Faseeh Mangi, and Kari Soo Lindberg  
Bloomberg, December 28, 2020
21. [China is desperate to control the narrative of Covid-19's origin - whatever the cost](#)  
Sophia Yan  
Telegraph, January 6, 2021

## Environmental Harms



22. [The Darker Side of Going Solar](#)

Eli Lake

Bloomberg, January 11, 2021

23. [Chinese plunder Kavango trees](#)

The Nambian, January 11, 2021

24. ["Greening" China: An analysis of Beijing's sustainable development strategies](#)

Anna Holzmann and Nis Grünberg

MERICS, January 7, 2021

25. [Erik Solheim: China should apply stricter standards along the Belt and Road](#)

Gao Baiyu

China Dialogue, January 5, 2021

### **Foreign Interference and Coercion**

26. [Chinese Spies Tried to Create False 'Uyghur Terrorists' in Afghanistan](#)

Massimo Introvigne

Bitter Winter, January 14, 2021

27. [China's Communist Party targets Chinese abroad to rally support](#)

Jun Mai

South China Morning Post, January 7, 2021

28. [U.S. Eases Restrictions on Contact with Taiwan in Jab at China](#)

Stephen Cunningham

Bloomberg, January 10, 2021

29. [China Tries to Disrupt Tibetan Parliamentary Elections](#)

Marco Respinti

Bitter Winter, January 11, 2021

30. ['Wolf Culture': How Huawei controls its employees in Europe](#)

Daniel Laufer and Alexander Fanta

Netzpolitik, January 13, 2021

31. [Trump seeks scrutiny of Chinese funding at U.S. schools](#)

Stef W. Kight

Axios, January 11, 2021

### **Human Rights and Religious Persecution**

32. [Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang and the Government's Response: Foreign Secretary's Statement](#)

Dominic Raab, UK Foreign Secretary

UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, January 12, 2021

33. [Senior Conservatives call for reset of UK policy](#)

BBC, January 13, 2021

34. [The Darkness Deepens: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China, 2016-2020](#)

Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, January 13, 2021

35. [China denies coercive birth control measures in Xinjiang](#)

AP News, January 10, 2021

36. [China uses tourism to smother Xinjiang's culture](#)

The Economist, January 2, 2021

37. [Congress is moving to block goods made with the forced labour of Uyghurs](#)

The Economist, January 9, 2021

38. [Twitter deletes China embassy's Xinjiang 'emancipation' tweet](#)

BBC, January 10, 2021

39. [British MPs, Jewish Leaders Ask Twitter to Block Chinese Embassies' Accounts](#)

Daniela Bovolenta

Bitter Winter, January 12, 2021

40. [A tech employee's death has unleashed China's anger towards its work culture](#)

Jane Li

Quartz, January 5, 2021

41. [Pinduoduo Fires Worker for 'Malicious' Comments, Irks Internet](#)

Zhang Wanqing

Sixth Tone, January 12, 2021

42. [Britain set to outlaw Chinese imports with links to human rights abuse](#)

Harry Cole

The Sun, January 10, 2021

## **Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage**

43. [Taiwan manufacturers quit China over trade tensions and rising costs](#)

Kathrin Hille

Financial Times, January 10, 2021

44. [New economic deals and their geopolitical implications for Europe](#)

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein

GIS, January 6, 2021

45. [EU will not ask China to sign forced labor ban before ratifying investment deal, says French minister](#)

Jakob Hanke Vela

Politico, January 12, 2021

46. [After Pressure, New York Stock Exchange Will Delist 3 Chinese Firms](#)

Alan Rappeport

New York Times, January 6, 2021

47. [Taiwan's Trade Policies Strategies and Constraints](#)

Vinod K. Aggarwal

National Bureau of Asian Research, January 6, 2021

48. [Analysis: China splits Atlantic with game-changing EU investment deal](#)

Katsuji Nakazawa

Nikkei Asia, January 7, 2021

49. [China tried to punish European states for Huawei bans by adding eleventh-hour rule to EU investment deal](#)

## Cyber and Information Technology

50. [Financial Technology is China's Trojan Horse](#)

Nadia Schadlow and Richard King  
Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2021

51. [Huawei patent mentions use of Uighur-spotting tech](#)

Leo Kelion  
BBC, January 13, 2021

52. AUDIO – [WeChat Becomes a Powerful Surveillance Tool Everywhere in China](#)

Jing Yand and Amanda Lewellyn  
Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2021

53. [Chinese bids on Pacific cable raise alarm in US and Australia](#)

Fumi Matsumoto  
Nikkei Asia, January 3, 2021

## Military and Security Threats

54. [Will hold our ground along LAC: Gen. Naravane](#)

Dinakar Peri  
The Hindu, January 12, 2021

55. [Gen. Vance calls for grand strategy to confront China and Russia](#)

Robert Fife  
The Globe and Mail, January 11, 2021

56. [Defence chief warns attacks online could lead to real war](#)

Fiona Hamilton  
Times of London, January 11, 2021

57. [Davidson: INDPACOM Priorities Will Help Accomplish CNO's NAVPLAN](#)

Mallory Shelbourne  
USNI, January 12, 2021

58. [Protecting and Preserving a Free and Open South China Sea](#)

Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State, January 14, 2021

59. [At War Online: South Korea and China](#)

Troy Strangarone  
The Diplomat, December 24, 2020

60. [Trouble Finding Partners: Barriers to China's Overseas Basing](#)

Toshi Yoshihara  
The Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2021

## One Belt, One Road Strategy

61. VIDEO – [How China's Flagship Belt and Road Project Stalled Out](#)

Bloomberg, January 14, 2021

62. [China sends Africa a signal that Belt and Road Initiative is still open for business](#)  
Jevanas Nyabiage  
South China Morning Post, January 10, 2021

63. [What Does a New White Paper Tell Us About China's International Aid?](#)  
Zhang Chao and Tang Yuxuan  
The Diplomat, January 13, 2021

64. [China's Foreign Minister Revives Belt and Road on 5-Country Africa Tour](#)  
Eleanor Albert  
The Diplomat, January 12, 2021

### Opinion Pieces

65. [The Guardian view on Hong Kong's crackdown: an assault on political opposition](#)  
The Guardian, January 6, 2021

66. [Biden Will Inherit Healthy Indo-Pacific Alliances](#)  
Derek Grossman  
RAND, January 11, 2021

67. [Declassification of secret document reveals US strategy in the Indo-Pacific](#)  
Rory Medcalf  
The Strategist, January 13, 2021

68. [Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge](#)  
Martijn Rasser and Megan Lambeth  
Center for a New American Security, January 13, 2021

69. [China in 2021: agenda setting, anniversaries, and potential for conflict](#)  
Valarie Tan  
MERICS, December 10, 2020

70. [Matthew Pottinger exits, but his China strategy is here to stay](#)  
Josh Rogin  
The Washington Post, January 7, 2021

71. ['China's rulers aren't those we partnered with a decade ago'](#)  
Tom Tugendhat  
Mail on Sunday, January 9, 2021

72. [Xi and Putin are exploiting the West's political decadence](#)  
Matthew Syed  
Times of London, January 10, 2021

73. [The Undoing of China's Economic Miracle](#)  
Michael Schuman  
The Atlantic, January 11, 2021

\*\*\*\*\*

## MUST READ

### 1. [The Hong Kong government is investigating the possibility of prosecuting Danish parliamentary politicians and demanding their extradition](#)

Claus Blok Thomsen

Politiken, January 8, 2021

<https://politiken.dk/udland/art8057793/Hongkongs-regering-unders%C3%88ger-muligheden-for-at-retsforf%C3%88lge-danske-folketingspolitikere-og-kr%C3%A6ve-dem-udleveret>

- A major conflict between Denmark on the one hand and Hong Kong and China on the other hand may be close to breaking out, because the Hong Kong local government is now openly saying that it is investigating the possibilities of prosecuting more Danish politicians and activists.
- The pro-Chinese local government in Hong Kong is very upset that in December last year, politician and pro-democracy activist Ted Hui managed to escape from Hong Kong to Denmark. In Hong Kong, he was accused of nine different offenses in connection with activities against the Chinese government, and he only managed to escape from Hong Kong because the two parliamentary politicians Uffe Elbæk and Katarina Ammitzbøll from the Free Greens and the Conservatives, respectively, helped him cheat police in Hong Kong. The two politicians issued an invitation and a fake meeting program, so it looked like Ted Hui was going to Denmark to talk about the environment and sustainability. Thus, the police did not discover that his intention was to go into exile.
- ...

### 2. [How America Can Shore Up Asian Order](#)

Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi

Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2021

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order>

- Throughout the half century of Asia's unprecedented rise, Henry Kissinger has been a pivotal figure, orchestrating the United States' opening to China in the early 1970s and then going on to author tomes on Chinese strategy and world order. But at this transitional moment in Asia, Kissinger's most relevant observations may be found in a more surprising place: a doctoral dissertation on nineteenth-century Europe that struggled to find a publisher when Kissinger wrote it, years before his rise to prominence.
- That book, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22*, explored how two European statesmen—one British, the other Austrian—worked to bolster fraying relations among leading continental states at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Their efforts laid the groundwork for the continent's so-called long peace—100 years of calm and prosperity between 1815 and World War I. The book's insights have special resonance for today's Indo-Pacific, with its intensifying great-power politics and strained regional order.
- The key implication today of *A World Restored* is not that the Indo-Pacific requires its own version of Europe's great-power condominium or a modern U.S.-Chinese concert. It is instead that regional orders work best when they sustain both balance and legitimacy and that Washington should work to advance both in Asia. Kissinger argues that it was Lord Castlereagh's focus on balance combined with Klemens von Metternich's focus on the order's legitimacy in the eyes of member states that established a stable system.
- A strategy for the Indo-Pacific today would benefit from incorporating three lessons from this episode of European history: the need for a balance of power; the need for an order that the region's states recognize as legitimate; and the need for an allied and partner coalition to address China's challenge to both. Such an approach can ensure that the Indo-Pacific's future is characterized by balance and twenty-first-century

openness rather than hegemony and nineteenth-century spheres of influence.

- ...

3. [China worked to prevent India from chairing key UNSC terrorism-related body](#)

Sachin Parahar

Times of India, January 12, 2021

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-worked-to-prevent-india-from-chairing-key-unscterrorism-related-body/articleshow/80219149.cms>

- Perhaps still smarting under the designation of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as global terrorist, China tried to block India's leadership of key terrorism-related UNSC subsidiary committees, according to diplomatic sources.

- ...

4. ['Our souls are dead': how I survived a Chinese 're-education' camp for Uighurs](#)

Gulbahar Haitiwaji and Rozenn Morgat

The Guardian, January 12, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji>

- After 10 years living in France, I returned to China to sign some papers and I was locked up. For the next two years, I was systematically dehumanised, humiliated and brainwashed
- The man on the phone said he worked for the oil company, "In accounting, actually". His voice was unfamiliar to me. At first, I couldn't make sense of what he was calling about. It was November 2016, and I had been on unpaid leave from the company since I left China and moved to France 10 years earlier. There was static on the line; I had a hard time hearing him.
- "You must come back to Karamay to sign documents concerning your forthcoming retirement, Madame Haitiwaji," he said. Karamay was the city in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang where I'd worked for the oil company for more than 20 years.
- "In that case, I'd like to grant power of attorney," I said. "A friend of mine in Karamay takes care of my administrative affairs. Why should I come back for some paperwork? Why go all that way for such a trifle? Why now?"
- The man had no answers for me. He simply said he would call me back in two days after looking into the possibility of letting my friend act on my behalf.
- My husband, Kerim, had left Xinjiang in 2002 to look for work. He tried first in Kazakhstan, but came back disillusioned after a year. Then in Norway. Then France, where he had applied for asylum. Once he was settled there, our two girls and I would join him.
- Kerim had always known he would leave Xinjiang. The idea had taken root even before we were hired by the oil company. We had met as students in Urumqi, the largest city in Xinjiang province, and, as new graduates, had begun looking for work. This was in 1988. In the job ads in the newspapers, there was often a little phrase in small print: No Uighurs. This never left him. While I tried to overlook the evidence of discrimination that followed us everywhere, with Kerim, it became an obsession.
- After graduation, we were offered jobs as engineers at the oil company in Karamay. We were lucky. But

then there was the red envelope episode. At lunar new year, when the boss handed out the annual bonuses, the red envelopes given to Uighur workers contained less than those given to our colleagues who belonged to China's dominant ethnic group, the Han. Soon after, all the Uighurs were transferred out of the central office and moved to the outskirts of town. A small group objected, but I didn't dare. A few months later, when a senior position came up, Kerim applied. He had the right qualifications and the seniority. There was no reason he shouldn't get the position. But the post went to an employee who belonged to a Han worker who didn't even have an engineering degree. One night in 2000, Kerim came home and announced that he had quit. "I've had enough," he said.

- What my husband was experiencing was all too familiar. Since 1955, when communist China annexed Xinjiang as an "autonomous region", we Uighurs have been seen as a thorn in the side of the Middle Kingdom. Xinjiang is a strategic corridor and far too valuable for China's ruling Communist party to risk losing control of it. The party has invested too much in the "new silk road", the infrastructure project designed to link China to Europe via central Asia, of which our region is an important axis. Xinjiang is essential to President Xi Jinping's great plan – that is, a peaceful Xinjiang, open for business, cleansed of its separatist tendencies and its ethnic tensions. In short, Xinjiang without Uighurs.

- My daughters and I fled to France to join my husband in May 2006, just before Xinjiang entered an unprecedented period of repression. My daughters, 13 and 8 at the time, were given refugee status, as was their father. In seeking asylum, my husband had made a clean break with the past. Obtaining a French passport in effect stripped him of his Chinese nationality. For me, the prospect of turning in my passport held a terrible implication: I would never be able to return to Xinjiang. How could I ever say goodbye to my roots, to the loved ones I'd left behind – my parents, my brothers and sisters, their children? I imagined my mother, getting on in years, dying alone in her village in the northern mountains. Giving up my Chinese nationality meant giving up on her, too. I couldn't bring myself to do it. So instead, I'd applied for a residence permit that was renewable every 10 years.

- After the phone call, my head was buzzing with questions as I looked around the quiet living room of our apartment in Boulogne. Why did that man want me to go back to Karamay? Was it a ploy so the police could interrogate me? Nothing like this had happened to any of the other Uighurs I knew in France.

- The man called back two days later. "Granting power of attorney will not be possible, Madame Haitiwaji. You must come to Karamay in person." I gave in. After all, it was only a matter of a few documents.

- "Fine. I'll be there as soon as I can," I said.

- When I hung up, a shiver ran down my spine. I dreaded going back to Xinjiang. Kerim had been doing his best to reassure me for two days now, but I had a bad feeling about it. At this time of year, Karamay city was in the grip of a brutal winter. Gusts of icy wind howled down the avenues, between the shops, houses and apartment buildings. A few bundled-up figures braved the elements, hugging the walls, but on the whole, there was not a soul to be seen. But what I feared most of all were the ever-stricter measures regulating Xinjiang. Anyone who set foot outside their home could be arrested for no reason at all.

- That wasn't new, but the despotism had become more pronounced since the Urumqi riots in 2009, an explosion of violence between the city's Uighur and Han populations, which left 197 people dead. The event marked a turning point in the recent history of the region. Later, the Chinese Communist party would blame the entire ethnic group for these horrible acts, justifying its repressive policies by claiming that Uighur households were a hotbed of radical Islam and separatism.

- The summer of 2016 saw the entrance of a significant new player in the long struggle between our ethnic group and the Communist party. Chen Quanguo, who had made his reputation imposing draconian surveillance measures in Tibet, was named head of Xinjiang province. With his arrival, the repression of Uighurs escalated dramatically. Thousands were sent to "schools" built almost overnight on the edge of desert settlements. These were known as "transformation through education" camps. Detainees were sent there to be brainwashed –

and worse.

- I didn't want to go back, but all the same, I decided Kerim was right: there was no reason for me to worry. The trip would only take a few weeks. "They'll definitely pull you in for questioning, but don't panic. That's completely normal," he reassured me.
- A few days after I landed in China, on the morning of 30 November 2016, I went to the oil company office in Karamay to sign the vaunted documents related to my upcoming retirement. In the office with its flaking walls sat the accountant, a sour-voiced Han, and his secretary, hunched behind a screen.
- The next stage took place in Kunlun police station, a 10-minute drive from the company head office. On the way, I prepared my answers to the questions I was likely to be asked. I tried to steel myself. After leaving my belongings at the front desk, I was led to a narrow, soulless room: the interrogation room. I'd never been in one before. A table separated the policemen's two chairs from my own. The quiet hum of the heater, the poorly cleaned whiteboard, the pallid lighting: these set the scene. We discussed the reasons I left for France, my jobs at a bakery and a cafeteria in the business district of Paris, La Défense.
- Then one of the officers shoved a photo under my nose. It made my blood boil. It was a face I knew as well as my own – those full cheeks, that slender nose. It was my daughter Gulhumar. She was posing in front of the Place du Trocadéro in Paris, bundled up in her black coat, the one I'd given her. In the photo, she was smiling, a miniature East Turkestan flag in her hand, a flag the Chinese government had banned. To Uighurs, that flag symbolises the region's independence movement. The occasion was one of the demonstrations organised by the French branch of the World Uighur Congress, which represents Uighurs in exile and speaks out against Chinese repression in Xinjiang.
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##### 5. [How to deal with China](#)

The Economist, January 9, 2021

<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/01/09/how-to-deal-with-china>

- The world's democracies desperately need a coherent approach to dealing with China. It is the 21st century's ascendant power, but also an autocracy that mistrusts free markets and abuses human rights. However, recent events show how ineffective Western policy has become. On December 30th the European Union agreed on an investment pact with China that secured puny gains and gave China a diplomatic coup. The eu did so despite doubts among Joe Biden's team (see article). New York's stock exchange banned several Chinese firms' shares, only to change its mind twice in a few days. Congress has so far failed to pass a bill to protect Uyghurs from forced labour (see article).
- As the West stumbles, China is busy cracking down at home and expanding its influence abroad. On January 6th more than 50 democracy activists were arrested in Hong Kong (see article). In November China signed a trade pact with 14 Asian countries, including American allies such as Japan and Singapore. It continues to threaten Australia with its thuggish diplomacy and a partial trade embargo.
- The pattern of Chinese assertiveness and Western disarray has become all too familiar. All democracies are struggling to reconcile the conflicting objectives of doing business with a huge and vibrant economy, and protecting national security and human rights (see Chaguan). The Trump administration skewered Western complacency about China's state-led model, but then detonated the global trading system without proposing an alternative. Rich countries have failed to act together, reducing their clout. America's negotiators identified structural reforms that China should enact, and that other Western powers might have supported, but in the end President Donald Trump won only small concessions in the "phase one" trade agreement struck with China in January 2020. Western policy has become a muddle of deals, rebukes, ad hoc bans and tariffs. The system of rules that has been the backbone of global commerce for decades—featuring open trade and capital markets,



and impartial legal systems—thrived because it was predictable. Not any more.

- China is exploiting the disarray even as its economy comes roaring back from the pandemic: year-on-year growth was 4.9% in the most recent quarter. Beijing's rulers expect Mr Biden's administration to be preoccupied with America's troubles at home, not least covid-19. Europe has welcomed Mr Biden's conciliatory noises, but worries that his policies are laced with protectionism, including "Buy American" clauses and ambiguity over whether tariffs will be removed. Faced with an introspective superpower, the eu decided to speed up its long-standing effort to strike an investment deal with China. When it acts in isolation, however, it doesn't have much sway. The new deal features assurances over Chinese state meddling in industry that will be tricky to enforce and platitudes on human rights that China will ignore.
- What might a coherent policy look like? It has to start by acknowledging China's power. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is too big and interconnected to contain. It accounts for 18% of world gdp. It is the largest merchandise trading partner of 64 countries, including Germany (see article). America's tally is just 38. Chinese capital markets are becoming important, too. Foreigners now own up to 10% of all government bonds. Yet for all China's size and sophistication, relations will remain riven with mistrust. It is hard for outsiders to tell if private firms are acting independently of the Communist Party. And it is foolhardy to rely on Chinese government promises, whether on subsidies for industry or the rule of law in Hong Kong. The result is that in some domains the West should seek to confront China (human rights), while in others it should compete (most areas of trade) or co-operate (health and climate change).
- The sheer complexity of trading without trust amplifies the need for the West to act in unison to maximise its influence. Together, America, Europe and other democracies still account for over half of world gdp. In order to limit the perimeter of trade tensions, they should define sensitive industries, such as technology and defence. In these areas they should subject Chinese participation in Western markets to much tighter scrutiny and restrictions. In other industries trade can flourish unhindered. Democracies should draw up a common framework for human rights, including verifying that supply chains are ethical and penalising people and firms involved in abuses. Finally, any new alliance to deal with China has to have predictable rules and enforcement. It cannot be run from the White House on the fly.
- Even before Europe's snub this was a daunting task for the incoming Biden administration, on a par with the creation of nato or the world trading system after the second world war. And unlike back then, America's prestige has been battered. Yet public opinion in the rich world is now wary of China. Mr Trump failed to deal with it partly because of his incompetence and contempt for allies. Mr Biden will take office on January 20th on a wave of global goodwill. It should be possible to create a grouping of democracies, for example an enlarged g7, that will act on China. There is still a chance to reassert the values of open societies and free markets, but it will not last for ever. Faced with an assertive autocracy, dithering and division are not enough.

## Authoritarianism

### 6. [25 Days that Changed the World: How COVID-19 Slipped China's Grasp](#)

Chris Buckley, David Kirkpatrick, Amy Qin and Javier Hernandez  
New York Times, December 30, 2020

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html>

- Beijing acted against the coronavirus with stunning force, as its official narratives recount. But not before a political logjam had allowed a local outbreak to kindle a global pandemic.
- The most famous doctor in China was on an urgent mission.
- Celebrated as the hero who helped uncover the SARS epidemic 17 years ago, Dr. Zhong Nanshan, now 84, was under orders to rush to Wuhan, a city in central China, and investigate a strange new coronavirus. His

assistant photographed the doctor on the night train, eyes closed in thought, an image that would later rocket around China and burnish Dr. Zhong's reputation as the nation's medic riding to the rescue.

- China's official history now portrays Dr. Zhong's trip as the cinematic turning point in an ultimately triumphant war against Covid-19, when he discovered the virus was spreading dangerously and sped to Beijing to sound the alarm. Four days later, on Jan. 23, China's leader, Xi Jinping, sealed off Wuhan.
- That lockdown was the first decisive step in saving China. But in a pandemic that has since claimed more than 1.7 million lives, it came too late to prevent the virus from spilling into the rest of the world.
- The first alarm had actually sounded 25 days earlier, exactly a year ago, last Dec. 30. Even before then, Chinese doctors and scientists had been pushing for answers, yet officials in Wuhan and Beijing concealed the extent of infections or refused to act on warnings.
- Politics stymied science, in a tension that would define the pandemic. China's delayed initial response unleashed the virus on the world and foreshadowed battles between scientists and political leaders over transparency, public health and economics that would play out across continents.
- This article — drawing on Chinese government documents, internal sources, interviews, research papers and books, including neglected or censored public accounts — examines those 25 days in China that changed the world.
- Chinese scientists and private laboratories identified the coronavirus and mapped its genes weeks before Beijing acknowledged the severity of the problem. Scientists were talking to their peers, trying to raise alarms — and in some cases, they did, if at a price.
- "We also spoke the truth," said Prof. Zhang Yongzhen, a leading virologist in Shanghai. "But nobody listened to us, and that's really tragic."
- As political hostilities erupted between China and the United States, scientists on both sides still leaned on global networks built up over decades and sought to share information — with top scientists recognizing early on that the virus was probably contagious among humans.
- On Jan. 8, the head of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, George F. Gao, became emotional after acknowledging that danger during a call with his American counterpart, Dr. Robert R. Redfield, according to two people familiar with Dr. Redfield's account of the call.
- Yet neither Dr. Redfield nor Dr. Gao, each constrained by politics, signaled a public alarm. In Beijing, top health officials had received ominous reports from doctors in Wuhan and had sent two expert teams to investigate. But they lacked the political clout to challenge Wuhan officials and held their tongues in public.
- To a degree, Dr. Zhong's trip to Wuhan was less medical than political. He already knew the virus was spreading between people; his real purpose was to break the logjam in China's opaque system of government.
- "There is certainly human-to-human transmission," Dr. Zhong wrote in a report that he drafted on the train before reaching Wuhan, according to a recent Chinese book written with his cooperation. "Remind the public not to go to Wuhan except for special reasons, reduce outings and avoid gatherings."
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7. TWEET (One Year Ago) – [Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) identified in #Wuhan. #China](#)  
World Health Organization, January 14, 2020

<https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1217043229427761152>

8. [Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19's Origin](#)

Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State

U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2021

<https://www.state.gov/ensuring-a-transparent-thorough-investigation-of-covid-19s-origin/>

- The United States has repeatedly called for a transparent and thorough investigation into the origin of COVID-19. Understanding the origin of this pandemic is essential for global public health, economic recovery, and international security.
- To assist the vital work of the World Health Organization (WHO) investigative team that arrived in China this week, the United States government is today sharing new information concerning the activities inside China's government laboratories in 2019.
- In particular, we urge the WHO to press the government of China to address the following:
  - Illnesses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV): The United States government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was "zero infection" among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
  - WIV Research on "RaTG13" and "gain of function": Starting in at least 2016, WIV researchers studied RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). Since the outbreak, the WIV has not been transparent nor consistent about its work with RaTG13 or other similar viruses, including possible "gain of function" experiments to enhance transmissibility or lethality.
  - Secret WIV Links to Military Research: Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China's military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
- The COVID-19 pandemic was avoidable. Any responsible country would have invited world health investigators to Wuhan within days of an outbreak. China instead refused offers of help – including from the United States – and punished brave Chinese doctors, scientists, and journalists who tried to alert the world to the dangers of the virus. Beijing continues today to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus, and the next one.
- The United States reiterates the importance of unfettered access to virus samples, lab records and personnel, eyewitnesses, and whistleblowers to ensure the credibility of the WHO's final report. Until the CCP allows a full and thorough accounting of what happened in Wuhan, it is only a matter of time until China births another pandemic and inflicts it on the Chinese people, and the world.

9. [Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology](#)

U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2021

<https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/>

- For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic's origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to

deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.

- The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
- The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.
- The CCP's deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19's origin that deserve greater scrutiny:

- 1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):

- The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli's public claim that there was "zero infection" among the WIV's staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
- Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.
- The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.

- 2. Research at the WIV:

- Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.
- The WIV has a published record of conducting "gain-of-function" research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including "RaTG13," which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
- WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV's work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.

- 3. Secret military activity at the WIV:

- Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United

States has publicly raised concerns about China's past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

- Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China's military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
  - The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.
- Today's revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19's origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.
  - As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus's origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.

10. [A Hong Kong Website Gets Blocked, Raising Censorship Fears](#)

Paul Mozur and Aaron Krolik

New York Times, January 9, 2021

<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/technology/hong-kong-website-blocked.html>

- Users of major mobile carriers can no longer access a service that detailed the personal information of police officers, a possible sign that the city is turning to tactics used in mainland China.
- Hong Kong's biggest mobile telecom companies appear to have severed access to a website that listed the personal information of police officers, setting off fears that the authorities may use a new national security law to adopt censorship tactics widely used in mainland China.
- Users attempting to access the site, called HKChronicles, on their mobile devices first noticed the disruption on Wednesday evening, according to the site's owner, Naomi Chan, an 18-year-old high school student. Disruption came without any warning or explanation, she said.
- A New York Times analysis confirmed that the problem accessing the site comes from the telecom service providers. At least some people in Hong Kong were still able to reach the site through their home or office internet connections.
- The police in Hong Kong declined to comment on the disruption but insisted they had the power under the new national security law to block access to information online. In a statement, the police said they "can require service providers to take restrictive actions against messages posted on digital platforms, which likely constitute the offense of endangering national security or incite a national security offense."
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11. [China: Global Resistance to Deepening Repression](#)

Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/china-global-resistance-deepening-repression>

- Censoring Covid-19 News, Crushing Hong Kong's Freedoms
- The Chinese government's heightened repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang are emblematic of the worsening human rights situation under President Xi Jinping, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2021. These crackdowns, along with the authorities' initial coverup of Covid-19, which contributed to the global pandemic, have generated growing international mobilization against Beijing's rights record.
- Governments increasingly realize that Beijing's rights abuses at home have global consequences," said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. "That momentum should translate into support for independent investigations into Xinjiang, a new United Nations mandate to monitor human rights abuses, and an end to the Chinese government's impunity for serious violations."
- In the 761-page World Report 2021, its 31st edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In his introductory essay, Executive Director Kenneth Roth argues that the incoming United States administration should embed respect for human rights in its domestic and foreign policy, in a way that is more likely to survive future US administrations that might be less committed to human rights. Roth emphasizes that even as the Trump administration mostly abandoned the protection of human rights, other governments stepped forward to champion rights. The Biden administration should seek to join, not supplant, this new collective effort.
- The Chinese government's initial response to the coronavirus outbreak prioritized governmental control over transparency. The authorities initially withheld information from the public, under-reported cases, downplayed the severity of the infection, and dismissed the likelihood of transmission between humans.
- The authorities also detained people for "rumor-mongering," censored online discussions of the outbreak, and curbed media reporting. In some areas under lockdown, they failed to ensure appropriate access to medical care, food, and other necessities. Beijing also pressured the World Health Organization to delay declaring a global warning on the virus, and restricted international experts' access to investigate its origin.
- In Hong Kong, the Chinese government imposed the draconian and vaguely worded National Security Law on June 30, its most aggressive assault on human rights in the territory since the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. Hong Kong authorities also disqualified a dozen pro-democracy figures from the upcoming legislative election, postponed that election, and then drove most of the opposition out of the legislature. They raided a pro-democracy newspaper; prosecuted peaceful protesters, elected officials and journalists; and purged pro-democracy teachers and curtailed expression in schools.
- In Xinjiang, the Chinese government's efforts to erase the identity of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims persisted. While the authorities appeared to have shut down some political education camps and "released" detainees following global outrage, an untold number of Turkic Muslims remain in detention and prison. Some "released" Uyghur detainees are forced to work in factories inside and outside Xinjiang.
- Chinese authorities continue to silence human rights lawyers and activists, and tighten restrictions on the internet and the media, making it more difficult to obtain accurate information about China.
- An increasing number of governments, United Nations officials and rights experts, and civil society groups around the world, publicly expressed concerns about China's human rights violations in 2020; particularly in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. An unprecedented group of 50 UN human rights experts issued a joint statement, calling on states to "act collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human rights and abides by its international obligations."

12. [Beijing orders Chinese media to censor coverage of Alibaba probe](#)  
Yuan Yang

Financial Times, January 7, 2021

<https://www.ft.com/content/62fe82c5-b058-4dd0-bb15-e9428593f078>

- China's government has told the country's media to censor reporting on an antitrust probe into tech group Alibaba, whose founder Jack Ma has disappeared from public view as misfortunes mount for his business empire, according to people familiar with the matter.
- The move by authorities to exert control over the media coverage of the prominent group's woes shows that the issue has become a matter of national political sensitivity in China.
- Beijing has cracked down in recent months on Mr Ma's business empire. The \$37bn initial public offering of Alibaba's payments affiliate Ant Group was cancelled by authorities at the last minute in November, while the following month, competition regulators announced an anti-monopoly investigation into Alibaba.
- In his last public appearance in October, Mr Ma, one of the country's richest people, made a speech criticising China's state-owned banks and financial regulators.
- At the end of December, the Chinese government's propaganda arm directed media outlets to "strictly invoke" the official line on the antitrust investigation into Alibaba and to "not make changes or engage in extended analysis without permission".
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13. [Mass arrests in Hong Kong on subversion charges](#)

Jeremy Goldkorn

SupChina, January 6, 2021

<https://supchina.com/2021/01/06/mass-arrests-in-hong-kong-on-subversion-charges/>

- The Chinese central government is not slowing down its campaign to remake civil society in Hong Kong and tame dissenting voices: Today, police arrested 53 people under the new national security law on charges of trying to "overthrow" the government.
- Fifty-three pro-democracy politicians and activists were arrested today in the biggest show of force against dissent since China imposed a new national security law on Hong Kong on June 30, 2020, in reaction to ongoing protests against rule from Beijing.
- "About 1,000 police took part in morning raids on 72 premises across the city," according to the BBC. The arrested people had all "helped run an unofficial 'primary' to pick opposition candidates ahead of postponed 2020 elections," and are accused of trying to "overthrow" the government. The charge could result in punishments as severe as lifetime prison sentences.
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14. [53 Hong Kong democrats, activists arrested under security law over 2020 legislative primaries](#)

Hong Kong Free Press, January 6, 2021

<https://hongkongfp.com/2021/01/06/breaking-over-50-hong-kong-democrats-arrested-under-security-law-over-2020-legislative-primaries/>

- Police say 53 Hong Kong democrats and activists were arrested on Wednesday morning for alleged violations of the national security law.

- According to media reports and social media posts, the opposition figures were arrested over their organisation and participation in the primaries for the postponed 2020 Legislative Council Election last year.
- NowTV cited sources as saying that the arrests for alleged subversion came after candidates made an election pledge to veto government budgets.
- Former lawmakers Alvin Yeung, Andrew Wan, Au Nok-hin, Claudia Mo, Eddie Chu, Gary Fan, Helena Wong, James To, Jeremy Tam, Kwok Ka-ki, Lam Cheuk Ting, Raymond Chan, Roy Kwong and Wu Chi-wai were among those arrested, according to social media posts.
- Organiser of the primaries Benny Tai was also detained alongside district councillors Andrew Chiu, Andy Chui, Ben Chung, Clarisse Yeung, Fergus Leung, Calvin Ho, Kinda Li, Lawrence Lau, Lee Yue-shun, Lester Shum, Michael Pang, Ng Kin-wai, Ricky Or, Roy Tam, Sam Cheung, Shun Lee, Sze Tak-loy, Tat Cheng, Tiffany Yuen and Henry Wong Pak-yu.
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15. [China plans further Hong Kong crackdown after mass arrest ... sources](#)

James Pomfret

Reuters, January 11, 2021

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security-democracy/exclusive-china-plans-further-hong-kong-crackdown-after-mass-arrest-sources-idUSKBN29H0E8>

- The arrest of more than 50 democrats in Hong Kong last week intensifies a drive by Beijing to stifle any return of a populist challenge to Chinese rule and more measures are likely, according to two individuals with direct knowledge of China's plans.
- While stressing that plans haven't been finalised, the individuals said it was possible that Hong Kong elections - already postponed until September on coronavirus grounds - could face reforms that one person said were aimed at reducing the influence of democrats.
- Both individuals, who have extensive high-level experience in Hong Kong affairs and represent Beijing's interests, spoke on condition of anonymity.
- Beijing's involvement was "substantial" in driving and coordinating actions with the Hong Kong government, said one of the individuals, a senior Chinese official.
- He told Reuters the latest arrests were part of a wave of ongoing actions to silence activists and to "make sure Hong Kong doesn't slide back to what we saw 18 months ago," when massive demonstrations marked the boldest public revolt against China's leaders since the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing in 1989.
- China has been "too patient for too long, and needs to sort things out once and for all," he added, saying more tough moves would be rolled out for "at least a year".
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16. [Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O'Brien](#)

Robert C. O'Brien

U.S. Executive Office of the President, January 11, 2021



- In May 2020, the Trump Administration foresaw and declared the death of Hong Kong's free and open society at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Last week's politicized arrests of more than 50 people, former elected officials among them, for exercising their political rights guaranteed under the Basic Law, is the latest of many successive nails that Beijing has driven into the coffin of Hong Kong democracy.
- In May, the Administration demanded answers from Beijing about the origins of the virus and accused the World Health Organization of enabling a cover up by deferring to the CCP. Just as China ignored its international obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, it continues to do so with the International Health Regulations.
- The United States was the first major country with the courage and conviction to candidly acknowledge the true nature of the CCP regime. It is critical that nations around the world demand accountability from Beijing. The world cannot continue to pay heavy prices for its naiveté and complicity in Beijing's irresponsible and harmful practices – whether it is ending the rule of law in Hong Kong or not cooperating with health officials on the pandemic. The United States is examining further options to respond.

17. [Hong Kong security law being used to 'eliminate dissent' say US, UK, Australia and Canada](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/10/hong-kong-security-law-being-used-to-eliminate-dissent-say-us-uk-australia-and-canada)  
The Guardian, January 10, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/10/hong-kong-security-law-being-used-to-eliminate-dissent-say-us-uk-australia-and-canada>

- The foreign ministers of Australia, the United States, Britain and Canada have issued a joint statement expressing “serious concern” about the arrest of 55 democracy activists and supporters in Hong Kong last week.
- The arrests were by far the largest such action taken under a national security law (NSL) that China imposed on the semi-autonomous territory a little more than six months ago.
- “It is clear that the national security law is being used to eliminate dissent and opposing political views,” the four foreign ministers said on Sunday.
- The Chinese and Hong Kong governments say the law is needed to restore order in a city that was rocked in 2019 by months of often violent anti-government protests demanding greater democracy.
- Most of those arrested last week had taken part in an unofficial primary for a legislative election that was later postponed. Authorities allege the primary was part of a plot to take control of the legislature in order to paralyse government and force the city's leader to resign.
- The 55 have not been charged, and all but three have been released on bail pending further investigation. Convictions could disqualify them from running for office.
- The four foreign ministers said the next legislative election should include candidates representing a range of political opinions. Only half the city's legislature is elected by popular vote.
- “We call on the Hong Kong and Chinese central authorities to respect the legally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong without fear of arrest and detention,” they wrote.
- The statement was signed by Marise Payne of Australia, Francois-Philippe Champagne of Canada, Dominic Raab of the UK and Mike Pompeo of the US.

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18. Chinese and Russian media partner to “tell each other’s stories well”

Katja Drinhausen and Mayya Solonina

MERICS, December 22, 2020

<https://merics.org/en/opinion/chinese-and-russian-media-partner-tell-each-others-stories-well>

- Beijing and Moscow have built a framework for media cooperation. Mayya Solonina\* and Katja Drinhausen say the goal is to align narratives and shape perceptions at home and abroad.
- On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Moscow in October, China’s and Russia’s foreign ministers called for strengthening bilateral media cooperation. Shortly after that, media representatives from both countries vowed to “report major international events in a comprehensive, impartial and objective way, and stay firm in opposing and resisting false information intended to stigmatize other countries” – especially in times of Covid-19.
- This was the latest in a long line of steps in the field. Since 2015, China and Russia have held an annual Media Forum and in 2018 both countries’ state-affiliated media agreed to increase publication of material approved by the partner’s government. As part of the broadening strategic partnership between China and Russia, media from both countries have signed numerous cooperation agreements over the past years: People’s Daily, Xinhua, Global Times and China Media Corporation have joined hands variously with RT, Russia Channel One, TASS and Sputnik on the Russian side.
- Media-matchmaking serves to amplify viewpoints domestically and globally
- The aim of this media-matchmaking spree is to join forces and “tell each other’s stories well”, as Chinese state media have put it – to work together to promote each other’s viewpoints, values, interests. One objective is to strengthen the image of the partner domestically. But the pact also explicitly aims to shape perceptions and public discourse around the world, especially in the Global South. China Global Television Network (CGTN) reaches 85 million viewers worldwide and RT more than 350 million, to name just two outlets that offer content internationally.
- The underlying assumption is that as China and Russia become more powerful, they have to gain a stronger voice in international public opinion in order to challenge Western dominance over global values and governance.
- Collaboration takes many forms. Local reporters are meant to draft stories for the partner country. Media have pledged to pool international resources by exchanging or drafting content together and developing apps and platforms. Joint training and exchanges between key personnel are also meant to align narratives and presentation of current events and viewpoints by traditional and new media.

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19. Jack Ma was China’s most vocal billionaire. Then he vanished

Barclay Bram

Wired, January 13, 2021

<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/jack-ma-disappear-ant-group-ipo>

- Jack Ma is no stranger to taking risks. In October 2020 he was China’s wealthiest man, preparing to float Ant Group, a fintech company, in what was billed to be the largest IPO in the world. “Miracles happen,” he told

the assembled dignitaries, academics and political heavyweights who had gathered at the Bund Summit in Shanghai on October 24. At the time, Ant Group was prepared for a dual listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong. "This is the largest listing ever priced in the history of the entire human race, and the pricing happened in a place other than New York City," he said.

- But the listing never happened. That night was the last time that he was seen in public — since that speech, despite being one of the most high-profile people in the global tech sector, Ma has vanished.
- In the weeks before his disappearance, there were rumours circulating that regulators in China might be about to slam the brakes on Ant's listing. But if Ma's intention was to win over the audience — which included the vice president of China Wang Qishan (who had delivered the opening remarks of the summit), the head of the People's Bank of China, and all of the major players in Chinese finance — then the rest of his speech was a deft lesson in how to lose friends and alienate people. He described China's financial system as operating "with a pawnshop mentality" and that the regulatory environment was akin to trying to "use the way to manage a railway station to manage an airport".
- His comments were so brash that they reportedly caught the attention of Chinese president Xi Jinping. Retribution was swift. On November 2 Ma, alongside Ant's executive chairman Eric Jing and CEO Simon Hu, was summoned and interviewed by regulators. When this interview was made public by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange decided to halt Ant's IPO on November 3, just two days before it was supposed to go live.
- Alibaba Group, the tech giant that Ma founded and which launched his international reputation, had a 33 per cent share in Ant Group. Its stock price dropped seven per cent on the announcement. But that was not all — over the coming weeks the laws surrounding antitrust would be redrafted in China and Alibaba would be fined. And, all the while, Ma was nowhere to be found.
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## 20. China Is Struggling to Get the World to Trust Its Vaccines

Iain Marlow, Faseeh Mangi, and Kari Soo Lindberg

Bloomberg, December 28, 2020

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-12-28/china-s-struggling-to-get-the-world-to-trust-its-covid-vaccines>

- Of all the developing countries testing China's Covid-19 vaccines, few are friendlier to Beijing than Pakistan. In the years leading up to the pandemic, China financed nearly \$70 billion across the South Asian nation on roads, railways and power stations, and Pakistan now has two Chinese clinical trials underway, with even senior government officials being inoculated.
- Yet interviews with people in Karachi, the nation's biggest city -- as well as in other developing nations from Indonesia to Brazil, together with surveys and official comments -- show that China has failed to assure the millions of people who may have to rely on its vaccines.
- "I won't take it," said Farman Ali Shah, a motorcycle driver in Karachi for local ride-hailing app Bykea, as local shops closed early ahead of an 8 p.m. virus-induced curfew. "I don't trust it."
- That mistrust, and the reliance of dozens of poorer nations on China to inoculate their populations could set the stage for a major global political headache if citizens offered the Chinese vaccine feel they are being given an inferior product.
- ...

21. [China is desperate to control the narrative of Covid-19's origin - whatever the cost](#)

Sophia Yan

Telegraph, January 6, 2021

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/01/06/china-desperate-control-narrative-origins-virus-whatever-cost/>

- International experts from the World Health Organisation trying to investigate the origins of the coronavirus in China, a year after it first emerged in the central city of Wuhan, continue to run into roadblocks.
- The delay for the WHO mission – already plagued by politics and posturing – adds to persistent worries that China will whitewash and frustrate the investigation. Indeed, a two-person WHO team on a three-week mission last August, aimed at laying out plans for further study, sat through a 14-day quarantine upon arrival and never visited Wuhan.
- This comes as Beijing engages in a relentless propaganda campaign to distract from its cover-up and rewrite the narrative – all aimed at claiming the coronavirus originated outside China. Officials have seeded a number of conspiracy theories, including blaming the US military for infecting China. The most recent theory flouted is to label imported frozen seafood as the culprit.
- Foreign minister Wang Yi has gone so far as to claim the virus emerged in many countries, and that China was simply the first to spot it. “We raced to report the epidemic first,” he told state media.
- Mr Wang’s comments are a far cry from the experiences of doctors, including the late Li Wenliang and Ai Fen, both of whom were reprimanded by Chinese authorities after discovering coronavirus infections in December 2019 and seeking to warn colleagues.
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## Environmental Harms

22. [The Darker Side of Going Solar](#)

Eli Lake

Bloomberg, January 11, 2021

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-11/could-biden-s-green-new-deal-enrich-china-s-solar-industry>

- In an energy sector dominated for more than a century by polluters, the relatively small solar-power industry has been the good guy. Now it has a darker side.
- To be clear, using silicone cells to trap the sun’s rays and turn them into fuel is still better for the climate than burning fossil fuels. But this simple point is complicated by China’s efforts to dominate the market for the polysilicon used to make those cells.
- A new report from a geopolitical consulting firm called Horizon Advisory has found signs that major Chinese polysilicon manufacturers are using forced labor from the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang Province. According to a New York Times article about the report, the Chinese government denies the use of forced labor, which is not surprising since this government also denies the very existence of forced labor in China.
- Nonetheless, the report adds to growing concerns over the issue. Over the summer, the State Department released a report that highlighted the risks of forced labor in supply chains that run through Xinjiang or other

Chinese factories. In September, the House passed legislation that sought to block the import of any goods produced with forced labor in Xinjiang. And in October, the Solar Energy Industries Association said it would not tolerate suppliers that relied on forced labor from Xinjiang. (The association said it found last week's Times report "deeply troubling.")

- That's all promising. The problem is that almost all polysilicon in the world today is produced in China. And most industry analysts believe that half of all Chinese polysilicon is produced in Xinjiang province.
- According to John Smirnow, a vice president and general counsel at the Solar Energy Industries Association, a decade ago the U.S. sought to protect the U.S. solar industry by closing a loophole whereby Chinese manufacturers used Taiwanese cells in their finished solar panels. China retaliated by closing its market to U.S.-produced polysilicon. The result was that the U.S. industry was hobbled.
- "Over the past decade China has made considerable investment in its solar manufacturers," Smirnow said. "U.S. polysilicon companies have been the victim of the U.S.-China trade conflict and have unfairly been blocked from selling polysilicon to China."
- During the presidential campaign, President-elect Joe Biden promised to unveil a \$2 trillion initiative to create a new clean energy economy. A portion of that money will be for federal subsidies to purchase solar panels. Will Biden ignore the supply-chain risk posed by China on solar energy, or will he also invest in reviving U.S. companies that dominated the polysilicon market before the 2010s?
- One group that has an interest in this question will be a new lobbying association calling itself the American Clean Power Association. Its CEO, Heather Zichal, worked as legislative director for then-Senator John Kerry, who will be Biden's new climate czar. The new association is made up of some of the world's largest energy companies, including the world's largest solar wafer manufacturer, the Chinese firm LONGi. Another board member is NextEra Energy, which has purchased solar panels from JinkoSolar, which has subsidiaries in Xinjiang Province.
- Zichal declined to be interviewed for this column. But the association provided a statement that noted its support for the Biden administration's "recognition that both strong domestic deployment of clean energy resources and international collaboration are essential for the U.S. and the world to achieve the carbon reduction levels necessary to combat climate change." Notably, the statement also included this sentence: "American Clean Power is fundamentally opposed to forced labor practices and our members are committed to ethical operations." The statement made no mention of China.
- Biden's administration will soon have to explain how it plans to go green without enriching what are widely viewed as the instruments of Uighur repression. And even if no polysilicon was made with forced labor in China, it's still dangerous for the U.S. to be reliant on an adversary for a cleaner energy grid.
- The question is not so much whether the U.S. should subsidize more purchases of solar panels for public and private use. It's whether the U.S. government can also help revive American polysilicon manufacturers and encourage allies to find alternatives to China's solar-industry supply chain. If it does the former without the latter, it will be helping to solve a climate problem by exacerbating a human rights crisis.

23. [Chinese plunder Kavango trees](https://www.namibian.com.na/97862/read/Chinese-plunder-Kavango-trees)  
The Namibian, January 11, 2021

<https://www.namibian.com.na/97862/read/Chinese-plunder-Kavango-trees>

- The logs are from thousands of protected trees that have been illegally cut down on land leased as "settlement farms" to political elites and war ...

24. ["Greening" China: An analysis of Beijing's sustainable development strategies](#)

Anna Holzmann and Nis Grünberg

MERICS, January 7, 2021

<https://merics.org/en/report/greening-china-analysis-beijings-sustainable-development-strategies>

- Main findings and conclusions
- China's leadership acknowledges climate change and environmental degradation as real and pressing threats to long-term regime survival and economic prosperity. However, while a trend towards a concerted push for sustainability shows in national-level policies, the lack of forceful sectoral and local-level incentives leaves China with a mixed track record on sustainability.
- China's Covid-19 stimulus measures are more targeted at investing in carbon-heavy infrastructure for economic stability. However, the pandemic has not stopped Beijing's policy machinery for more sustainability and a greener economy.
- China's authorities pursue a non-disruptive and incremental green policymaking approach, always concerned about political stability and economic costs.
- Beijing's strategic bet for its sustainable future is on achieving state-guided and funded technological breakthroughs in, enabling a green transformation at home and global tech leadership in all areas, from renewables to environmental protection equipment.
- China's state-supported R&D efforts show first results in green technology innovation, but a large number of green tech patents (e.g., in wind power) does not necessarily translate into high-quality outcomes.
- The greening of China's manufacturing system is key for realizing a more sustainable economy. The transformation is making headways, but green growth and product performance are lagging.
- China's green ambitions will continue going forward: the forthcoming 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) is expected to drive decarbonization and indigenous tech innovation, however, without proposing overly ambitious climate actions.
- China's ambitions should be taken seriously: building on past successes (e.g., in wind, solar and e-mobility), China strives to assume global leadership in green technologies and sustainable solutions.
- China's green trajectory comes with opportunities and challenges for European actors. International cooperation for the greater good of mitigating global warming is urgently needed. At the same time, competition for green tech and manufacturing process must be carefully managed.
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25. [Erik Solheim: China should apply stricter standards along the Belt and Road](#)

Gao Baiyu

China Dialogue, January 5, 2021

<https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/erik-solheim-china-should-apply-stricter-standards-along-the-belt-and-road/>

- The former chief of the United Nations Environment Programme believes China should phase-out coal and apply higher standards in its overseas investments.

- Erik Solheim, senior advisor of the World Resources Institute (WRI) and former chief of UNEP, spent a good part of December 2020 in China, where he attended the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Initiative Green Development Institute and toured Zhejiang and Shenzhen to take the pulse of low-carbon development at the local level.
- Solheim says his visit to China occurred at a special moment: President Xi Jinping had committed the country to a 2060 carbon-neutrality target in September. President-elect Joe Biden is looking to make the US a global leader on climate action. And the European Union is in close conversation with China to align its ambitious Green New Deal with China's post-pandemic economic recovery efforts. "It's the most favourable moment now. I believe a lot can be achieved if China, the United States, Europe, Africa and other countries can work together," he said in an interview with China Dialogue in Beijing.
- During his tenure at UNEP, the agency jointly established an international coalition of organisations seeking to green the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE). The International Green Development Coalition on the Belt and Road was not without controversies at the time. In any case, Solheim has managed to maintain his focus on the issue in his new capacity as a senior advisor to WRI and China's central government on the country's flagship international development programme.
- One of the key outcomes of his visit was the unveiling of a proposed environmental classification system for Chinese overseas investment, the creation of which he oversaw as project leader. In the interview with China Dialogue, which has been lightly edited for clarity, Solheim advocates for stopping coal finance and applying stronger standards for Chinese projects along the Belt and Road.
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## Foreign Interference and Coercion

### 26. Chinese Spies Tried to Create False 'Uyghur Terrorists' in Afghanistan

Massimo Introvigne

Bitter Winter, January 14, 2021

<https://bitterwinter.org/chinese-spies-tried-to-create-false-uyghur-terrorists-in-afghanistan/>

- Ten Chinese agents were arrested and quietly expelled after trying to establish a false branch of the defunct East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
- Last week, a chartered plane left Kabul airport to an unknown destination in China. Aboard were ten Chinese nationals, who had been arrested in Afghanistan on December 10, some in the house of one Li Yangyang, believed to be a high-profile intelligence agent, where weapons, ammunitions, and drugs had also been found.
- Initially, the ten were accused of terrorism and of colluding with the Haqqani Network, a military arm of the Talibans. Afghanistan asked Chinese ambassador Wang Yu for a formal apology to have the agents expelled, and told him that without it, they will be tried by a local criminal court.
- The Afghans, however, had it wrong. As the investigation proceeded, it came out that the Chinese spies were not trying to support a real terrorist organization but to create a fake one. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) did exist in the past as a group of radical Uyghur Muslims, founded in 1989. What he did, or did not do, is another matter. The group consisted of small groups of Uyghur expatriates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. They fought together with the Talibans in different phases of the Afghan conflicts. In 2002, the United States listed ETIM as a terrorist organization connected with al-Qa'ida. In 2003, ETIM leader Hassan Makhdam was shot dead by the Pakistani Army. To his last day, he denied any connection with al-

Qa'ida, although he admitted he supported the Talibans.

- Not much was heard of ETIM in subsequent years. In 2008, something called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIM) started manifesting itself as yet another small-scale ally of the Talibans, with suspected al-Qa'ida connections. It issued threats against the 2008 Beijing Olympics, some of which might have been real, and others created by the Chinese intelligence, not followed by real-life attacks. In February 2010, its leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani was killed by a missile launched by a CIA UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) in Pakistan. China claimed that ETIM and TIM were one and the same, but others doubted it.
- Most scholars of terrorism believe there is no evidence that ETIM, or even TIM, was responsible for terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, although more than 200 were attributed to them by Chinese authorities. There were some terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, but ETIM or TIM did not claim responsibility for them. Some were real, others may have been invented by Chinese propaganda. In 2020, the U.S. eliminated ETIM from the list of terrorist organizations, claiming there was no evidence it still existed. The UN Security Council and several countries, on the other hand, still lists ETIM as a terrorist group.
- But, if ETIM no longer existed, its trademark was up for grab. It is believed the Chinese agents were in Afghanistan to create a false ETIM, hopefully attract some Uyghur expatriates, perform terrorist attacks, and blame the Uyghur community, thus justifying repression in Xinjiang.
- The plot was foiled by the Afghan intelligence, and to avoid problems with China the agents were quietly sent back home. But there is no reason to believe Beijing will not start such games again.

27. [China's Communist Party targets Chinese abroad to rally support](#)

Jun Mai

South China Morning Post, January 7, 2021

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3116686/chinas-communist-party-targets-chinese-abroad-rally-support>

- China's Communist Party has doubled down on its controversial "united front" efforts, with new guidelines to rally support for the country and party among Chinese citizens abroad.
- "[We must] strengthen guidance of thought and promote the love for the motherland, the Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics among overseas Chinese citizens and overseas students," one of the regulations released on Tuesday said.
- The document said work must be done to contain "Taiwan-independence forces" and better safeguard China's core interests among Chinese citizens overseas.
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28. [U.S. Eases Restrictions on Contact with Taiwan in Jab at China](#)

Stephen Cunningham

Bloomberg, January 10, 2021

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-09/u-s-to-end-restrictions-for-diplomats-regarding-taiwan-pompeo>

- The U.S. will remove decades-old, self-imposed restrictions on how its diplomats and other officials interact with Taiwan, a move that may inflame tensions with Beijing just a little over a week before President-elect Joe Biden is sworn in.



- “For several decades the State Department has created complex internal restrictions to regulate our diplomats, service members, and other officials’ interactions with their Taiwanese counterparts,” Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said in a statement Saturday in Washington. “No more.”
- The announcement was the latest in a series of moves by the Trump administration to reshape the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Donald Trump accepted a telephone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen weeks before taking office in January 2017, has said his support for the “One China” policy was contingent on getting better trade deals, announced arms sales, and sent senior officials to Taipei.
- “While the implications of the announcement are not yet clear, it seems the intent is to nudge unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations toward something more akin to official ties,” said Maggie Lewis, a law professor at Seton Hall Law School who has written extensively on Taiwan and China.
- China opposes meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials and has made no secret of its displeasure at improving ties between Washington and Taipei. The Chinese foreign ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment on the latest announcement.
- Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu said in a tweet that he was grateful to Pompeo for “lifting restrictions unnecessarily limiting our engagements.”
- “The closer partnership between Taiwan and the U.S. is firmly based on our shared values, common interests and unshakeable belief in freedom and democracy,” the minister said.
- Future Contacts
- Going forward, executive branch agencies should consider all “contact guidelines” concerning relations with Taiwan previously issued by the State Department to be null and void, Pompeo said.
- The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft is expected to visit Taiwan this week. That will be the first such visit since Taiwan was excluded from the UN in 1971, and she will meet with senior Taiwanese counterparts.
- China’s foreign ministry had earlier called Craft’s visit “a breach of the One China principle” and accused Pompeo of “staging a final show of madness” to “sabotage China-U.S. relations.”
- The announcement by Pompeo is one of a number the administration has launched or strengthened in the final days of its term, including an initiative to punish companies with close ties to the Chinese military.
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## 29. [China Tries to Disrupt Tibetan Parliamentary Elections](https://bitterwinter.org/china-tries-to-disrupt-tibetan-parliamentary-elections/)

Marco Respinti

Bitter Winter, January 11, 2021

<https://bitterwinter.org/china-tries-to-disrupt-tibetan-parliamentary-elections/>

- Tibetans abroad vote to elect the members of the Central Tibetan Administration. The CCP mobilizes its spies, and asks friendly governments to harass voters.
- In 2011, the Dalai Lama moved to transform the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) into a full-blown democratic government. Tibetans who are able to register and vote—currently, those residing abroad, hopefully one day those in Tibet too—elect 45 members of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE). The president

of the CTA, called Sikyong, is also elected directly by Tibetans abroad.

- The TPIE includes ten members from each of the old Tibetan provinces—U-Tsang, Dhotoe, and Dhomey—; two for each of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism—Gelug, Nyingma, Kagyu, and Sakya— and two for the pre-Buddhist Bön religious community; five from the diaspora outside India, Nepal, and Bhutan, i.e., from Europe, the Americas, Australia-New Zealand, and the Asian countries not part of the Indian subcontinent.
- The Sikyong can remain in charge for a maximum of two terms. This means that the current Sikyong, the highly respected Harvard scholar Lobsang Sangay, cannot seek a third term. Sangay will be remembered for his activity in the United States, which led to the passage and signature by President Trump of the Tibet Policy and Support Act (TPSA) and 2020. The TPSA provides inter alia that the United States will oppose any attempt by China and the CCP to choose the next Dalai Lama and claim he is the reincarnation of the current one, will impose sanctions on the Chinese officers involved, and will only accept a Dalai Lama recognized by the Tibetan Buddhist community and its elected political representatives.
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### 30. 'Wolf Culture': How Huawei controls its employees in Europe

Daniel Laufer and Alexander Fanta

Netzpolitik, January 13, 2021

<https://netzpolitik.org/2021/wolf-culture-how-huawei-controls-its-employees-in-europe/>

- Former employees accuse Huawei of discrimination. How massively the company interferes in their private lives and how it keeps its staff in line is revealed by internal documents and covert audio recordings that [netzpolitik.org](https://netzpolitik.org) and the media partners of The Signals Network have analysed.
- The journalist with the camera causes nervousness. Minutes after he appears in front of Huawei's European headquarters in Düsseldorf in mid-November, a stocky security guard and a female employee rush over. The street in front of the building is public space, but the company seems to feel its turf has been violated. „What do you want here?“, the woman asks. „Delete the photos.“
- Insights into the inner workings of the controversial Chinese mobile phone company are rare. Huawei has about 200,000 employees worldwide, and about 2,400 in Germany, according to the company. The European headquarters are in Düsseldorf. „We Are A Top Employer!“, a sign in the entrance area reads, beneath it orchids decorate the reception table. In the corridor hangs a photo of a hiking group posing and waving on a mountain peak.
- What voices tell us from inside, on the other hand, belies the impression of a friendly atmosphere. They tell of a technology company that seems to see its employees first and foremost as raw materials from which it wants to forge its own success. About a company that moves Chinese employees around like chess pieces, that fires employees at will and where a quasi-military esprit de corps prevails. In Germany, the company sometimes violates the spirit, perhaps even the letter, of labour law.
- This article is the result of months of investigation by [netzpolitik.org](https://netzpolitik.org) with media partners of The Signals Network including The Daily Telegraph (United Kingdom), El Mundo (Spain) and Republik (Switzerland). Documents we have seen show, how Huawei reaches into the lives of its employees in order to achieve its goals.
- We have spoken to people who have worked for the company in several European countries. Our sources come from China, but also from Germany, they worked for different subsidiaries and departments. Some ex-employees speak well of the corporation, while several interviewees make serious accusations. To protect our sources, we refrain in most cases from mentioning names and other details that could make them identifiable.

- Huawei's „wolf culture“
- Their accounts paint a picture of a company that is celebrated in public for its seemingly modern management philosophy, but at the same time pushes employees to their limits. Ex-employees speak of a toxic corporate culture that is promoted by the company's management. The enormous pressure to succeed also plays a role.
- Those who play along with all this are rewarded by Huawei with special payments linked to company shares. But what happens when workers refuse to put their lives entirely at the service of their employer is shown by internal emails and covert audio recordings obtained by [netzpolitik.org](http://netzpolitik.org) and its media partners, as well as court cases in several countries. The cases dealt with discrimination and dismissals that should never have happened under the law.
- Anyone who listens carefully to Huawei's founder Ren Zhengfei and pays attention to his uncompromising, war-like rhetoric will notice that Huawei makes no secret of its true corporate culture. Ren peppers his speeches with military metaphors and proudly calls his rough style of leadership „wolf culture“. In Europe, too, „wolf culture“ reigns.
- Top jobs probably only for staff from China
- Not everyone is equal in Huawei's tight hierarchy. Metaphorically speaking, the company has two floors and employees without Chinese roots can occupy only the lower floor — no matter where they are on the official organisation chart. The top level is reserved for expats, Chinese who are sent from the company headquarters in Shenzhen to subsidiaries all over the world.
- One ex-employee says there is effectively a glass ceiling for European workers. „When you walk through the corridors, it is very obvious that 99.9 per cent of the management is Chinese.“ That is probably an exaggeration, but it has a core of truth.
- Chinese dominance is reflected in the management level of the global group, which says it operates in 170 countries around the world. Of the 17 members of Huawei's board of directors, 17 are Chinese. The head of Huawei Germany is also Chinese, flanked by a German as Chief Technical Officer. Management positions held by locals appear to be little more than window dressing. „Every German manager had a shadow manager from China standing behind him“, says a former employee at the European headquarters.
- A Huawei spokesperson contradicts this account. He says that German managers are not shadowed by Chinese „supervisors“, nor is there a glass ceiling for non-Chinese. He states that just 59 per cent of the management are employees deployed from China.
- At the same time, the spokesperson says that in some departments there are „proven dual-head structures with a clear and sensible distribution of tasks“. According to him, it is the task of local managers to take care of local customers, market development and compliance with local law. The Chinese management, on the other hand, serves as an interface to the Chinese management level.
- What is clear is that, according to our investigation, different rules presumably apply at Huawei for non-Chinese. They have less access to information and are excluded from important internal decisions, our sources report. At meetings, management personnel sometimes switch to Chinese at crucial moments.
- In response to our questions, the company emphasises that the official working language in Europe is English and that, according to internal company rules, meetings between colleagues from different countries have to be held in English. However, several of our sources complained that expats English skills are sometimes poor.

- A „small Chinese embassy“ in Düsseldorf
- One source compares Huawei’s European headquarters in Düsseldorf to a „small Chinese embassy“ where Chinese employees have built up their own world. Ex-employees say that the areas of responsibility are often defined in such a way that there is little contact between employees from China and those from elsewhere. Chinese and non-Chinese at Huawei are a world apart, even outside of work.
- European employees rarely find out what is really going on in the company during the day at work, says a former German employee. However, Chinese colleagues occasionally ask in the evening if they want to have dinner together. „After a few beers, you find out what is going on in the company and what is not.“ Yet many Western employees did not want to get involved and preferred to go home.
- Trade unionist Ulrike Saaber from Europe’s largest industrial union IG Metall has established contacts with several former Huawei workers. She describes to [netzpolitik.org](http://netzpolitik.org) and its media partners the narrow world in which Chinese expats move. „The Chinese who have their roots and family in China, who only come here to work, they are totally isolated.“
- According to Saaber, Chinese expats have little knowledge of German laws and therefore hardly try to claim them for themselves. „It is often the case that these people are drawn together in their free time by representatives of their employer.“ There are informal meetings, he says, where the expats are „oriented“ along company lines. Upon request, Huawei says that joint leisure activities are organised independently by interested colleagues.
- Dominance of the „sea turtles“
- Year after year, Huawei sends young Chinese abroad. In China, the staff who are meant to earn their spurs away from home are called „sea turtles“. Their typical profile: young, male, well-educated. Our sources indicate there is a clear hierarchy in Huawei’s European operation. „Sea turtles“ clearly dominate.
- The junior staff are under pressure: hard working conditions and constant control by the company are part of everyday life, fostering the „wolf culture“ that company boss Ren likes to invoke.
- One such „sea turtle“ is Joe. Some five years ago, Huawei sends him to Switzerland. He falls in love with a European woman, she becomes pregnant. This is what Joe reports in a joint conversation with our media partner Republik.
- For a long time, Joe recounts, he tries to keep his girlfriend a secret, but his boss finds out. One day the man invites him to dinner. After Joe and him share a few beers, the superior asks the question: Is he planning to marry the woman?
- The company wants to transfer Joe, away from Switzerland. But Joe resists, so the company threatens him with dismissal. According to Joe, he fears for his safety. In mid-2018, he secretly records a video of a conversation with the HR manager. In making the recording, which [netzpolitik.org](http://netzpolitik.org) and our partners have seen, Joe hopes to prove how Huawei deals with employees who want a future outside of China.
- On the company website, Huawei promises to promote a caring environment that inspires a good work-life balance.
- In the video, Joe can be heard saying, „My wife is going to give birth to our baby so I will probably stay here.“ But the HR manager insists that Joe agrees to a transfer. „The company has the right to decide where you work and you should follow our instructions.“ Joe refuses. He leaves the company in spring 2019.

- An internal document with the unwieldy title „Assignment and Mobility Management Regulation“ demonstrates how Huawei has also determined parts of its employees’ private lives in Western Europe. „Those who’ve obtained residency in an EU country or whose spouses are permanent EU residents and those who have voluntarily applied for permanent residency in the EU must leave Europe as soon as possible“, the company writes in Chinese in the document. „If they don’t follow the order, the company will terminate their employment.“
- When asked, Huawei confirms in principle that such internal regulations existed. A spokesperson says that the company has no opinion on the private affairs of its employees. However, expats knew in advance about the conditions of their foreign assignment. If there are conflicts between these and the employee’s private life, „the employee must comply with Huawei’s international assignment policy and the international assignment agreement signed by the employee“.
- Days later, a spokesperson tells us that the regulation on residence permits is no longer valid — however, when asked, he did not want to say since when.
- „Please don’t tell anyone that I’m learning German“
- The consequence of the tough corporate policy is apparently a climate of fear. According to our Düsseldorf sources, the mistrust already starts when expats acquire knowledge of local languages. „Please don’t tell anyone that I’m learning German“, a Chinese employee is reported to have said to a former colleague who spoke to us.
- In Spain, a case landed in court in 2018 that shows how Huawei apparently wants to have a say in the family planning of its employees. The plaintiff is a woman who goes by the pseudonym Ana. She accuses the company of sexist discrimination. Ana is Chinese, an expat. For almost a decade she worked in a senior position in the group’s finance department. Huawei sends her to Spain, where she marries a local.
- When the woman wants to have a child, the trouble begins. Twice she suffers a miscarriage, twice she calls in sick afterwards. Huawei claims Ana’s work performance has declined and curbs her annual bonus, according to court documents. When she starts fertility treatment and calls in sick again, the company fires her.
- Ana sues the company and wins. The court rules that the dismissal was not legal. A spokesperson for Huawei tells [netzpolitik.org](http://netzpolitik.org) and its media partners that the Spanish judiciary has never ruled that the dismissal was due to discrimination against a pregnant woman.
- However, in a written submission to court, Ana’s lawyer makes serious allegations against Huawei: „This decision to penalise the employee in her remuneration as a consequence for her leaves of absence due to abortions suffered during her pregnancies presents itself no longer as a hint but as direct proof in fact — consequence, of discrimination based on sex, derived from her two frustrated attempts at maternity.“
- In the course of the proceedings, a pattern seems to emerge. A member of the workers’ council at Huawei’s subsidiary tells the court that she knows of at least five women who have become mothers and lost their jobs at Huawei. Three of them were Chinese.
- Those who resign must sell their shares
- There are reasons why Huawei can treat its employees like this and yet hardly anyone rebels. One is the way the company pays its Chinese employees.
- After working for Huawei for some time, they receive share certificates in the company, which formally is owned to 99 per cent by Huawei’s union. The shares are used to give employees a cut of the profits. According to the company, this is done to motivate them. For them, the model seems lucrative, but only as long as their

plans are aligned with those of Huawei.

- In fact, employees do not truly have a stake in the company: anyone who resigns or is fired is forced by the company to sell their shares back. According to a Huawei spokesperson, this is in line with „our long-established, generally known and contractually fixed rules in this area“. The only exceptions are for long-serving, older employees, who are allowed to keep their shares when they retire.
- The retirement age in China is 60 for men and 55 for women. At Huawei, however, according to our sources, it is common to end one’s career already in one’s mid-40s. When long-serving Chinese managers reach this age, they often cash out the value of their company shares and effectively retire.
- So if an expat decides against returning to China, they not only lose their job, but also this form of retirement provision. „Huawei is a company, not a prison: if you want to quit, you can quit. But this decision is not easy,“ says a source who worked for the European headquarters in Düsseldorf for more than five years, including in the human resources department.
- Strict rotation principle for expats
- The company is determined to prevent expats from putting down roots outside of China and obtaining residency rights in European countries, says a source who worked for the company for several years. „The internal atmosphere at the company is that if you marry a local person and get citizenship rights, then this is seen as a betrayal“, an ex-employee in London tells our media partner The Daily Telegraph.
- One method the company uses to enforce the loyalty of Chinese employees is the strict rotation principle. No expat can stay in the same country outside of China for more than five years. Several sources say that the company wants to prevent Chinese employees from developing close ties to their host country.
- Apparently, Huawei categorically refuses to compromise on this. „Upon the completion of a five continuous years assignment in a country, expatriates who are not interfacing with the customers will be relocated regardless of all factors“, Huawei’s guidelines, for Western Europe, state.
- In the internal document, the company makes clear what the rule is probably really about: control. „This regulation is hence established to warrant that the expatriates from China adhere to the Company’s arrangements.“
- For the group, „the principle of rotation is important and essential at many different levels“, a Huawei spokesperson said. The constant change of location allows the organisation to remain flexible, and employees can gain experience in different roles and countries.

### 31. Trump seeks scrutiny of Chinese funding at U.S. schools

Stef W. Kight

Axios, January 11, 2021

<https://www.axios.com/trump-chinese-funding-education-c34e3b73-0cc9-4e4c-ad30-fc183fa7f958.html?stream=top>

- The Trump administration is trying to push through a last-minute policy to heighten scrutiny of Chinese government funding in American education, according to multiple administration officials familiar with the rule.
- Why it matters: China's influence in U.S. classrooms — particularly through Confucius Institutes — has long concerned Republicans. The outgoing administration has been particularly outspoken, labeling them Chinese foreign missions last summer.

- Just last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged universities to take seriously concerns of China's influence through funding and student programs and has called for Confucius Institutes to close.
- The institutes teach Chinese language and culture classes on U.S. campuses. They have caused alarm because they are funded and staffed by the Chinese Ministry of Education, and in numerous cases they have censored curricula and events.
- ...

## Human Rights and Religious Persecution

### 32. Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang and the Government's Response: Foreign Secretary's Statement

Dominic Raab, UK Foreign Secretary

UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, January 12, 2021

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-on-the-situation-in-xinjiang-and-the-governments-response>

- Dominic Raab gave a statement to the House of Commons on the UK government's response to the human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, China.
- Mr Speaker, with your permission I would like to update the House on the situation in Xinjiang and the Government's response.
- The evidence of the scale and the severity of the human rights violations being perpetrated in Xinjiang against the Uyghur Muslims is now far-reaching, and it paints a truly harrowing picture.
- Violations include the extra-judicial detention of over a million Uyghurs and other minorities in political re-education camps. Extensive and invasive surveillance targeting minorities. Systematic restrictions on Uyghur culture, education and indeed the practice of Islam, and the widespread use of forced labour.
- The nature and conditions of detention violate basic standards of human rights, and at their worst amount to torture and inhumane and degrading treatment. Alongside widespread reports of the forced sterilisation of Uyghur women.
- These claims are supported now by a large, diverse and growing body of evidence. That includes:
  - first hand reports from diplomats who visit Xinjiang, the first hand testimony from victims who have fled the region
  - there is satellite imagery showing the scale of the internment camps, the presence of factories inside them, and the destruction of mosques
  - and there are also extensive and credible third party reports from NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, with the UN and other international experts also expressing their very serious concerns
- In reality, the Chinese authorities' own publicly-available documents also bear out a very similar picture. They show statistical data on birth control and on security spending and recruitment in Xinjiang. They contain extensive references to coercive social measures, dressed up as poverty alleviation programmes.
- There are leaks of classified and internal documents that have shown the guidance on how to run

internment camps, lists showing how and why people have been detained. Internment camps, arbitrary detention, political re-education, forced labour, torture and forced sterilisation. All on an industrial scale. It is truly horrific. Barbarism we had hoped lost to another era, being practised today, as we speak, in one of the leading members of the international community.

- Mr Speaker, we have a moral duty to respond.
- The UK has already played a leading role within the international community in the effort to shine a light on the appalling treatment of the Uyghurs, and to increase diplomatic pressure on China to stop and to remedy its actions.
- I have made my concerns over Xinjiang clear directly to China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
- We have led international joint statements on Xinjiang in the United Nations General Assembly Third Committee and the UN Human Rights Council. In the Third Committee, we brought the latest statement forward, together with Germany, in October of last year and it was supported by 39 countries.
- Now China's response is to deny, as a matter of fact, that any such human rights violations take place at all. They say it's lies.
- Mr Speaker, if there were any genuine dispute about the evidence, there would be a reasonably straightforward way to clear up any factual misunderstandings.
- Of course, China should be given the opportunity to rebut the various reports and claims. But the Chinese government refuses, point blank, to allow the access to Xinjiang required to verify the truth of the matter.
- We have repeatedly called for China to allow independent experts and UN officials, including the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, proper access to Xinjiang. Just as we in this country would allow access to our prisons, to our police custody and other parts of the justice system to independent bodies who will hold us to account for the commitments to respect human rights that we have made.
- Mr Speaker, China cannot simply refuse all access to those trusted third party bodies who could verify the facts, and at the same time, maintain a position of credible denial.
- And while this access is not forthcoming, the UK will continue to support further research to understand the scale and the nature of the human rights violations in Xinjiang.
- But we must do more, and we will.
- Xinjiang's position in the international supply chain network means that there is a real risk of businesses and public bodies around the world – whether it's inadvertently or otherwise – sourcing from suppliers which are complicit in the use of forced labour. Allowing those responsible for these violations to profit, or indeed making a profit themselves by supplying the authorities in Xinjiang.
- Mr Speaker, here in the UK, we must take action, to make sure that UK businesses are not part of the supply chains that lead to the gates of the internment camps in Xinjiang. And to make sure that the products of the human rights violations that take place in those camps don't end up on the shelves of supermarkets that we shop in here at home, week in week out.
- We have already engaged with businesses with links to Xinjiang, we've encouraged them to conduct appropriate due diligence.
- More widely, we have made our commitment to tackling forced labour crystal clear.



- And with the introduction of the Modern Slavery Act, the United Kingdom was the first country to require companies by law to report on how they are tackling forced labour in their supply chains.
- And today, I can announce a range of new measures to send a clear message that these violations of human rights are unacceptable, and at the same time to safeguard UK businesses and public bodies from any involvement or links with them.
- I have been working closely with my Rt Hon Friends the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for International Trade, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
- And our aim, put simply, is that no company that profits from forced labour in Xinjiang can do business in the UK, and no UK business is involved in their supply chains.
- Let me set out the 4 new steps we are now taking. First, today, the FCDO and DIT have issued new, robust and detailed guidance to UK businesses on the specific risks faced by companies with links to Xinjiang and underlining the challenges of conducting effective due diligence there.
- A minister-led campaign of business engagement will reinforce the need for UK businesses to take concerted action to address that particular and specific risk.
- Second, we are strengthening the operation of the Modern Slavery Act. The Home Office will introduce fines for businesses that do not comply with their transparency obligations.
- And the Home Secretary will introduce the necessary legislation, setting out the level of those fines, as soon as parliamentary time allows.
- Third, we announced last September that the transparency requirements that apply to UK businesses under the Modern Slavery Act will be extended to the public sector.
- The FCDO will now work with the Cabinet Office to provide guidance and support to UK government bodies to exclude suppliers, where there is sufficient evidence of human rights violations in any of their supply chains.
- Let me say that we in the United Kingdom – I think rightly – take pride in the overwhelming majority of British businesses that do business, do so with great integrity and professionalism right around the world. That’s their hallmark, it’s part of our USP as a Global Britain. It is precisely because of that, that any company profiting from forced labour will be barred from government procurement in this country.
- Fourth, the government will conduct an urgent review of export controls as they apply specifically geographically to the situation in Xinjiang, to make sure that we are doing everything that we can to prevent the export of any goods that could directly or indirectly contribute to human rights violations in that region.
- This package put together will help make sure that no British organisations, government or private sector, deliberately or inadvertently, are profiting from or contributing to human rights violations against the Uyghurs or other minorities in Xinjiang.
- Of course, I am sure the whole House would accept the overwhelming majority of British businesses wouldn’t dream of it.
- Today’s measures will make sure businesses are fully aware of those risks, it will help them to protect themselves, but it will also shine a light and penalise any reckless businesses that don’t take those obligations seriously.

- As ever, we act in coordination with our like-minded partners around the world and I welcome the fact that, later today, Foreign Minister Champagne will set out Canada's approach on these issues.
- I know Australia, the US, France, Germany and New Zealand are also considering the approaches they take. We will continue to work with all of our international partners.
- But the House should know that in the comprehensive scope of the package I am setting out today, the UK is again setting an example and leading the way.
- Mr Speaker, we want a positive and a constructive relationship with China. We will work tirelessly towards that end. But we won't sacrifice our values or our security.
- We will continue to speak up for what is right and we will back up our words with actions. Faithful to our values, determined as a truly Global Britain to be an even stronger force for good in the world, and I commend this statement to the House.

33. Senior Conservatives call for reset of UK policy

BBC, January 13, 2021

<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-55633763>

- Senior Conservatives have called for a "reset" in UK policy towards China, including sanctions against officials responsible for human rights abuses.
- The Conservative Human Rights Commission demanded a rethink in relations after hearing evidence of abuses from torture to slavery.
- It urged the UK to work with allies to respond to China's behaviour.
- Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has said the UK plays a "leading role" in highlighting abuses.
- The Commission made the recommendations in a new report endorsed by two former Conservative foreign secretaries, Lord Hague and Sir Malcolm Rifkind.
- It adds to growing internal pressure on the government from Conservative circles to harden its line on China.
- The Commission says it has heard first-hand evidence of human rights violations in China from dissidents, lawyers, and human rights campaigners.
- This included violations of media freedom, clampdowns on Uighur Muslims, modern day slavery, and the establishment of an "Orwellian surveillance state," it added.
- The group said this showed the need for a "comprehensive review" of China policy across UK government departments.
- It also called for the UK to diversify its supply chains to reduce "strategic dependency" on China and further efforts to highlight rights issues at the United Nations.
- Mr Raab announced fines on Tuesday for UK firms doing business in China if they cannot show that their products aren't linked to forced labour in the country's Xinjiang region.
- In December, the BBC revealed new evidence that China is forcing hundreds of thousands of Uighurs and

other minorities into hard, manual labour in the cotton fields of Xinjiang.

- MPs and peers are separately pushing for new laws to block trade deals with countries found guilty of genocide, something which for now the government is resisting.
- Mr Raab told MPs the idea was "well-meaning" but it would be wrong to "sub-contract" the issue of when to break off trade talks to the courts.
- The Conservative Human Rights Commission, established in 2005, aims to highlight human rights concerns and keep the issue high on the party's agenda.

34. [The Darkness Deepens: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China, 2016-2020](#)

Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, January 13, 2021

<https://conservativepartyhumanrightscommission.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CPHRC-China-Report.pdf>

35. [China denies coercive birth control measures in Xinjiang](#)

AP News, January 10, 2021

<https://apnews.com/article/international-news-race-and-ethnicity-beijing-birth-control-china-84b8a13dbbb3d9a24d25bd0db7ad746e>

- BEIJING (AP) — A Chinese official on Monday denied Beijing has imposed coercive birth control measures among Muslim minority women, following an outcry over a tweet by the Chinese Embassy in Washington claiming that government polices had freed women of the Uighur ethnic group from being “baby-making machines.”
- Xu Guixiang, a deputy spokesperson for the Xinjiang regional government, told reporters Monday that birth control decisions were made of the person’s own free will and that “no organization or individual can interfere.”
- “The growth rate of the Uighur population is not only higher than that of the whole Xinjiang population, but also higher than that of the minority population, and more significantly higher than that of the (Chinese majority) Han population,” Xu said. “As for the so-called forcing ethnic minority women in Xinjiang to wear IUDs, or undergo tubal ligations or abortions, it is even more malign.”
- An Associated Press investigation in June found that the Chinese government was forcing draconian birth control measures on Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including IUD fittings, contraceptives, and even abortions and sterilizations.
- ...

36. [China uses tourism to smother Xinjiang's culture](#)

The Economist, January 2, 2021

<https://www.economist.com/china/2021/01/02/china-uses-tourism-to-smother-xinjiangs-culture>

- The afaq khoja mausoleum in Kashgar is one of the holiest places in Xinjiang, a region in the far west of China. The site is politically charged, too. Several 19th-century uprisings against Chinese rule began with rebels making a pilgrimage to the shrine, and its tomb of Afaq Khoja, a divisive figure revered by some locals as a Sufi Muslim saint, and scorned by others as a traitor. It is beautiful, with stately domes and minarets rendered as exquisite as a jewel box by tiles of green, blue, yellow and brown. To one side lies an ancient cemetery fringed

with poplar trees. Its mud and brick tombs were capped with snow when Chaguan visited. As remote as it is lovely, the shrine lies closer to Baghdad than to Beijing.

- Not all Muslim sites are as protected. In recent years China has worked to stamp out any hint of religious fervour in Xinjiang. Perhaps a million of the region's ethnic-Uyghurs have been accused of radical Islamic thinking and sent to re-education camps. Domes and minarets, deemed an "Arabic" import, have been removed from many buildings. An analysis of satellite images published in September 2020 by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a research group, estimates that over 8,000 mosques have been destroyed. That is one-third of all those recorded in Xinjiang by a census in 2004. Xinjiang's government insists that it has never "forcibly demolished" religious sites, and has merely improved old mosques that were unsafe in earthquakes or heavy rain, or "poorly laid-out". The claim is not hard to disprove. In the oasis city of Hotan, Chaguan saw the bare ground where the small Gulluk Kowruk mosque stood, and visited the corner of Wenhua and Taibei Roads, from which a larger mosque has simply vanished.

- Officials have not demolished the Afaq Khoja shrine. Instead they are trying to neutralise its power as a place so sacred that pilgrims would collect dust from its grounds. Their tool: mass tourism by China's ethnic-Han majority. Their method is to link the site to Xiang Fei, or the "Fragrant Concubine". She was a Kashgar woman who, according to Chinese legend, enraptured the 18th-century Qianlong emperor with her mysterious natural scent, after being captured and delivered to his harem. Her story appeared in print in 1892 and inspired poems, operas and a television drama in the 1990s. Early accounts call Xiang Fei the wife (or daughter) of a descendant of Afaq Khoja. Drawing on Chinese traditions venerating chaste widows, they describe her resistance to the emperor, whom she planned to stab with tiny daggers hidden in her sleeves, and her death by execution. Anxious to promote ethnic unity, Communist-era writers insist that she loved the emperor and died of illness. For decades a sign has marked her supposed tomb at the Afaq Khoja shrine. Imperial archives record a simpler tale: a Kashgar woman who became the emperor's consort and is buried near Beijing, notes Rian Thum of Loyola University in New Orleans, in his book "The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History".

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### 37. Congress is moving to block goods made with the forced labour of Uyghurs

The Economist, January 9, 2021

<https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/01/09/congress-is-moving-to-block-goods-made-with-the-forced-labour-of-uyghurs>

- If a sportswear company like Nike or Adidas wants to know if any of the fabric in their socks or trainers is from Xinjiang, supplier of 20% of the world's cotton, forensic science can help. Oritain, a firm based in New Zealand, says it can analyse sample swatches of cotton to determine whether particular elements—including zinc, potassium and rare-earth metals like cerium—are present in the same proportions as in cotton grown from the soil of the north-west region of China. Such tests of provenance are becoming valuable, because evidence is mounting that textiles made with cotton from Xinjiang, and other goods with links to the region, are the fruit of the forced labour of Uyghurs. The Trump administration has already moved to stop some imports from Xinjiang into the American market, and in the coming months Congress is expected to give customs officials greater power to do so. Other countries may follow America's example.

- In the past four years China's ruling Communist Party has overseen the internment of more than 1m Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that is indigenous to Xinjiang, in mass detention centres. In December the bbc and the Centre for Global Policy in Washington reported that at least a half-million Uyghurs were being put to work in cotton fields, conscripted to do a job handled by machines in many parts of the world, under the auspices of "poverty alleviation". On December 28th BuzzFeed News reported, with the help of satellite imagery, the construction in the past few years of 21m square feet (nearly 2m square metres) of factory facilities on the grounds of more than 100 detention centres in Xinjiang.

- The revelations have done little to slow the flow of goods from Xinjiang. In 2019 exports from the province

totalled \$17.6bn, about the same as in 2017 (\$17.5bn), including more than \$300m in goods that went to the American market in each of those years. Goods manufactured elsewhere carry some trace of Xinjiang in their supply chain: in addition to cotton in textiles, for example, Xinjiang's tomatoes account for a significant fraction of the world's ketchup, and its rare-earth metals are used in technology products. Until last year, governments and industry leaders around the world said little to directly challenge China over allegations of forced labour. But that has begun to change.

- America is taking the lead. In March a bipartisan group of members of Congress introduced the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act, which would establish a presumption that all goods from Xinjiang are made with forced labour, blocking them at the border unless companies can prove otherwise. In July the Trump administration issued an advisory to American businesses about the risks of Uyghur forced labour in their supply chains.

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38. [Twitter deletes China embassy's Xinjiang 'emancipation' tweet](#)  
BBC, January 10, 2021

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55608089>

- Twitter has deleted a post from China's US embassy which claimed Uighur women had had their minds "emancipated" by their policies in Xinjiang.
- The post linked to an article by state-run media which claimed women were no longer "baby making machines" due to action on alleged religious extremism.
- Beijing is alleged to have forced many Uighur women to be sterilised or fitted with contraceptive devices, apparently to control population growth.
- China has denied the allegations.
- The Uighurs are a mostly Muslim minority group which lives mainly in Xinjiang province in northwestern China.
- The tweet, published on Thursday, also claimed that Uighur women were "more confident and independent" as a result of "reproductive health" being "promoted" to them.
- Over the weekend, the tweet was replaced with a message from the social media site which claimed the tweet "violated" Twitter's rules, without providing further details.
- The original tweet had linked to an article by China Daily, a state-run newspaper, which alleged the eradication of extremism in Xinjiang "had given Uighur women more autonomy when deciding whether to have children".
- The article referenced a report by the Xinjiang Development Research Centre which said: "The changes were not caused by 'forced sterilisation' of the Uyghur population, as repeatedly claimed by some western scholars and politicians."
- ...

39. [British MPs, Jewish Leaders Ask Twitter to Block Chinese Embassies' Accounts](#)

Daniela Bovolenta

Bitter Winter, January 12, 2021

<https://bitterwinter.org/british-mps-jewish-leaders-ask-twitter-to-block-chinese-embassies-accounts/>

- They argue that CCP “wolf warrior” diplomats are “not less violent and active in spreading fake news than Trump.”
- While legal experts and politicians debate the implications of a private company such as Twitter blocking the account of the President of the United States, in the United Kingdom a growing movement asks the social media to apply the same standard to Chinese Embassies.
- “Wolf warrior” Chinese diplomats in several countries liberally use Twitter to spread fake news about the CCP’s opponents, and disseminate hate speech against Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kong pro-democracy activists, and other dissidents.
- One case that created protests in the United Kingdom and beyond by women across the political spectrum was a tweet by the Chinese Embassy in Washington, answering revelations that Uyghur women are forcibly sterilized by posting a China Daily article claiming that, “in the process of eradicating extremism, the minds of Uyghur women in Xinjiang were emancipated and gender equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no longer baby-making machines.”
- Conservative British MP Nusrat Ghani asked Twitter to ban the accounts of Chinese diplomats, noting that in addition to offending Uyghur women, they consistently spread fake news, and hail violence perpetrated against Uyghurs, protesters in Hong Kong, Tibetans, and those persecuted for their religious or political ideas in China. These Embassy Twitter accounts also inspire violence and endanger the security of Uyghur and other critics of the CCP living abroad.
- Once Twitter has established the principle that it can censor high-level politicians, there is indeed no reason not to apply it to Embassies. MP Tom Tugendhat supported Ghani, noting that Twitter accounts by Chinese Embassies are used to claim that “ethnic cleansing is a form of gender equality.”
- The Jewish community in the UK has consistently raised its voice for the Uyghur cause. Both Board of Deputies of British Jews’ Vice President Edwin Shuker, and Mia Hasenson-Gross, Executive Director of Jewish human rights groups René Cassin, supported Ghani’s initiative. “The attempt by the Chinese Embassy in the US to present an alleged program of forced sterilization of Uyghur women as a humanitarian measure is both outrageous and disgusting,” Shuker said.
- Twitter can of course ignore these appeals—but, in this case, it would be difficult for the company to avoid being accused of inconsistency and double standards.

40. [A tech employee’s death has unleashed China’s anger towards its work culture](https://qz.com/1952432/a-tech-workers-death-has-unleashed-anger-in-china/)

Jane Li

Quartz, January 5, 2021

<https://qz.com/1952432/a-tech-workers-death-has-unleashed-anger-in-china/>

- China’s youngest e-commerce giant is at the center of a firestorm.
- Pinduoduo, a US-listed company known for its low-priced products, is facing a huge social media backlash after the death of one of its employees sparked heated online discussions about the brutal work culture in Chinese tech companies.
- Discontent against excessive working hours is not new in China, but the fury this time targets big companies in general, with some decrying the “evil nature” of the capitalists who they say devour people’s lives to achieve

corporate goals. This has further soured public sentiment towards Chinese big tech companies, whose influence is growing, prompting alarm and closer scrutiny in Beijing.

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41. [Pinduoduo Fires Worker for 'Malicious' Comments, Irks Internet](#)

Zhang Wanqing

Sixth Tone, January 12, 2021

<http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006690/pinduoduo-fires-worker-for-malicious-comments%2C-irks-internet>

- The staff member says the e-commerce giant dismissed him after he had commented critically about its work culture. Pinduoduo says he was let go for violating company rules.
- Pinduoduo, one of China's largest and fastest-growing online retailers, is again being scrutinized for how it treats its employees after firing a worker who had complained about what he perceived to be an oppressive corporate culture.
- The employee, who identified himself as Wang Taixu, said Pinduoduo asked him to resign and sign a nondisclosure agreement after he had posted a photo on Maimai, a LinkedIn-like platform, of an ambulance parked outside the company's Shanghai headquarters. Pinduoduo — which fired Wang after he refused to resign — said the photo included an anonymous message that read "Another brave warrior of Pinduoduo has fallen," referring to another recent case.
- That case, involving a Pinduoduo staff member who died suddenly while driving home after working past midnight, had raised concerns about excessive work hours at the company, with several former employees speaking out against what they described as unethical and illegal labor practices. Pinduoduo, for its part, has not commented on whether the employee's death was work-related.
- On Saturday, another employee who had joined the company in July killed himself while on leave, though the circumstances leading to his death are unclear. Pinduoduo said afterward that it would cooperate with police investigation.
- In a video Wang posted on Bilibili after he was fired, he criticized the company's compulsory overtime rules. Former Pinduoduo employees told Sixth Tone they are typically required to work at least 300 hours per month. According to Wang, some have logged as many as 380 hours for special projects.
- A Pinduoduo spokesperson told Sixth Tone that such claims are false.
- "If a company's way of solving a problem is not to solve the problem but to 'solve' the person who raised it, is that fair?" Wang said.
- As of Tuesday, his video had been viewed over 444,000 times, with many commending him for speaking out against so-called 996 culture — working from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week — that, despite being illegal, is often expected at Chinese startups and tech companies.
- Responding to the video Monday, Pinduoduo said Wang had not been fired for posting the ambulance photo, but for his "extreme comments made with obvious malice," which violated company rules. In its statement, Pinduoduo included screenshots of other Maimai comments attributed to Wang that read "I want Pinduoduo to die" and "Throw out Pinduoduo's ashes."
- The Pinduoduo spokesperson told Sixth Tone it learned Wang had posted the ambulance photo after speaking to people who were at the scene. They added that the person in the ambulance was an employee with

a stomach problem, and not a medical emergency.

- Meanwhile, Maimai issued a statement suggesting that, in accordance with its user privacy policy, it had not shared Wang's identity with Pinduoduo.

42. Britain set to outlaw Chinese imports with links to human rights abuse

Harry Cole

The Sun, January 10, 2021

<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/13704227/britain-bait-goods-slavery-china/amp/>

- BRITAIN is to square up to China — by outlawing imports with any links to human rights abuse.
- Dominic Raab will use the Modern Slavery Act to make firms root out items which are made using forced labour.
- The Foreign Secretary will also toughen up laws around exporting British goods or technology to China that could be used for repression. The plans will be outlined to MPs tomorrow.
- Britain's diplomatic ties with Beijing have been strained since claims China tried to cover up the Covid outbreak and following attacks on democracy campaigners in Hong Kong.
- The Foreign Office has spoken of "deeply troubling" evidence of Uyghur Muslims forced to produce cotton.
- There are fears the textile industry is doing too little due diligence on goods from Xinjiang Province where the Uyghurs are forced to live in "re-education camps".
- ...

### Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage

43. Taiwan manufacturers quit China over trade tensions and rising costs

Kathrin Hille

Financial Times, January 10, 2021

<https://www.ft.com/content/5b78a04d-e51d-45d8-b276-2bbf9b11bed2>

- Human resources executives at Hwa Meei Optical are working overtime. The Taiwanese sunglasses and goggles maker is looking to hire 30 workers, many of them urgently, for a new factory.
- Having based most of its production in China for more than two decades, Hwa Meei is now expanding at home. A new plant in Taiwan, opened earlier this year, will create 180 jobs and is part of a plan to expand the group's footprint in higher margin products.
- Hwa Meei is not an outlier. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese enterprises are bidding farewell to China because of rising costs and trade tensions between Washington and Beijing, marking a dramatic shift for Taiwan's corporate landscape with significant implications for global manufacturing.
- "I see a structural collapse among the ranks of Taiwanese-owned businesses in China," said Liu Jen, editor in chief at CRIF China Credit Information Service in Taipei.
- According to its survey, revenues grew at less than half of the 1,000 largest Taiwanese-owned enterprises



in China last year and their total net profits before taxes dropped by more than one-fifth to the lowest in nine years. "The era of cross-strait industrial co-prosperity is over," Mr Liu said.

- Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese companies have received approval for an accumulated \$191bn of investments in mainland China, where they were lured in part by cheaper operating costs. That makes the nation one of the biggest overseas investors in China, which is by far Taiwanese groups' largest destination for foreign direct investment.
- Their massive push into China has been both a blessing and a curse, analysts say.
- Many early movers made windfall profits and enjoyed massive growth. Revenue at Apple supplier Foxconn, which established its first factory in China in 1988, grew 65-fold to NT\$97.8bn (\$3.5bn) in the decade after its 1991 Taiwan stock market listing, and ballooned to NT\$5.3tn last year. "If it had not put manufacturing in China, the company would never have become the world's largest contract electronics manufacturer," said Mr Liu.
- Taiwanese executives say their large, low-cost neighbour was a natural choice for companies seeking to boost market share by expanding manufacturing while cutting costs. "This is what we have all been doing for the last 30 years, and it now is what we are best at," said the chief financial officer of a Taiwanese electronics company.
  - We have been content with leaving 95 per cent of profits to our customers. That is a slave mentality - CY Huang, investment banker
- On the other hand, the option to simply relocate production to China to reduce operating costs has meant many companies have shirked more sustainable ways of increasing competitiveness. "Because we speak the same language and in China the cost is low, they forgot to transform themselves — doing higher value-added [products], building their own brands," said CY Huang, a Taipei-based investment banker. "Now is a critical time for change."
- Taiwanese companies' default strategy has been undermined by Washington's trade war with Beijing and efforts to pry China out of global supply chains. Most of Taiwan's leading contract electronics manufacturers are now relocating parts of their supply chains to south-east Asia and India, as well as back home.
- Small and medium-sized enterprises in industries including textiles, shoes, furniture, car parts and machine tools — some of which had shifted almost their entire business to China in recent decades — have also come under pressure.
- Labour costs have risen and Beijing no longer offers incentives to these industries, which also must contend with tougher competition, intellectual property theft and China's increasingly authoritarian and nationalist policies.
- As a result, annual investment flows from Taiwan to China have been in decline since peaking in 2010, the year Beijing and Taipei signed a trade agreement. Last year, China-bound FDI more than halved. Since 2017, Taiwanese companies have been remitting more money home from the country than they sent there.
- Hota, a Taiwanese car parts maker and Tesla supplier that has focused production in China since 1999, is now expanding operations at home. The company is building a new plant in Chiayi, in south-western Taiwan, that will serve markets other than China from next year.
- "Overall, I have seen Taiwanese companies diversifying or de-emphasising mainland investment, and there are companies who cannot or will not invest there, but I think there are few examples of companies with operations there totally giving up," said Chris Ruffle, a veteran Taiwan investor. "The lure is now the huge

potential market and no longer the cheap labour force.”

- Some Taiwanese companies are exploring new strategies. Hota, for example, is investing in other car parts makers to diversify its business.
- Technology companies are also stepping up acquisitions. GlobalWafers, a manufacturer of silicon wafers used by chipmakers, in December agreed to acquire German rival Siltronic, strengthening its position in Europe.
- In June, component maker Yageo bought smaller US competitor Kemet in a deal that could make it less vulnerable to cyclical trends in the electronics industry.
- Mr Huang, the investment banker, said Taiwan’s corporate sector needs to broaden its traditional focus on contract manufacturing.
- “The China option has put us on this track of serving our master, and we have been doing that too well,” he said. “We have been content with leaving 95 per cent of profits to our customers. That is a slave mentality — what is left for Taiwan at the end of the day?”

#### 44. New economic deals and their geopolitical implications for Europe

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein

GIS, January 6, 2021

<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/new-economic-deals-and-their-geopolitical-implications-for-europe.3403.c.html>

- At the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021, several trade and investment agreements were concluded or came into effect that could benefit Europe and help it enhance its global competitiveness.
- ...
- **China deal**
- At the end of 2020, the EU and China concluded negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI). The deal was approved in principle after a video conference between Chinese President Xi Jinping, German Chancellor Angela Merkel (as Germany held the rotating EU presidency), European Council President Charles Michel, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and French President Emmanuel Macron. Final ratification may, however, take several weeks.
- China committed to giving European investors more access to its market. At least in theory, Europeans should find a level playing field to compete in China. Beijing should offer more transparency on subsidies, limit state-owned companies’ privileges and curb forced transfers of technology from Europe. It also committed to ratifying the relevant parts of the International Labour Organization’s fundamental conventions and to combating forced labor. On the other hand, the agreement also facilitated market access for Chinese businesses in the European Union.
- Though this all appears to be good news for European business, some crucial questions remain. Does Europe have the power to enforce compliance in China? Is it realistic to believe that Beijing will reduce the privileges of state-owned companies? Will the rules against forced labor not only be passed, but actually implemented?
  - Is it realistic to believe that Beijing will reduce the privileges of state-owned firms?
- Another key question is how the new U.S. administration will react. With tensions between Washington and

Beijing remaining high, President Xi sees an advantage in closer ties with Europe. A stronger Europe-China partnership is neither in Washington's interest nor will it improve Europe's transatlantic relations. Hoping to improve the transatlantic trade relations from the European position, the EU recently proposed "a new EU-U.S. agenda for global change" that includes measures to resolve trade "irritants."

- There is also the problem of Europe's stand on "values." Brussels suspended the EU trade agreement with South America's Mercosur (a free trade zone including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) due to concerns over deforestation in the Amazon. Are Beijing's human rights breaches, its mistreatment of Uighurs and Tibetans, its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and intimidation of Taiwan negligible compared to environmental issues in Brazil? Certainly, China is a more consequential trading partner than Mercosur, but will that convince the European Parliament to overlook its self-important commitment to values?
- Some European capitals also worry that the agreement was pushed through by the German presidency, and therefore primarily favors German-French interests. This is probably not the case, but President Macron's inclusion in the video conference with President Xi for no obvious reason fueled suspicion.
- ...

45. [EU will not ask China to sign forced labor ban before ratifying investment deal, says French minister](#)

Jakob Hanke Vela

Politico, January 12, 2021

<https://www.politico.eu/article/frances-riester-eu-will-not-ask-china-to-sign-forced-labor-ban-before-ratifying-investment-deal/>

- The European Union will not wait for Beijing to adopt a ban on forced labor before ratifying its investment agreement with China, France's junior minister for trade Franck Riester said Tuesday.
- "We will sign, the European Union will sign [the investment agreement] with the provision noted in the text, which is to make sustained and continuous efforts for ratification" of an International Labour Organisation convention banning forced labor, Riester said.
- Asked by POLITICO whether France would insist on China banning forced labor before voting in the Council to approve the deal, Riester said it would not, but would instead insist on a "calendar" for Beijing's reforms.
- ...

46. [After Pressure, New York Stock Exchange Will Delist 3 Chinese Firms](#)

Alan Rappeport

New York Times, January 6, 2021

<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/business/nyse-delist-china-companies.html>

- The New York Stock Exchange reversed course again on Wednesday, saying it will remove China's three major state-run telecommunications companies from the exchange.
- The decision followed a day of pressure from the Trump administration and Congress after the exchange had decided to let the companies — China Unicom, China Telecom and China Mobile — remain listed. That twist came a week after the exchange said the companies' shares would be delisted to comply with President Trump's executive order on China investments.
- The exchange said in a statement on Wednesday that it was complying with U.S. law after receiving "new specific guidance" from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

- The delisting is likely to further inflame tension between the United States and China in the final days of the Trump administration. The back-and-forth also reflected the lingering tensions within the administration about how hard a line to take against China. The Defense and State Departments have sought a more expansive reading of Mr. Trump's executive order to block Americans from investing in companies tied to the Chinese military.
- Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who had initially supported greater accommodation of Chinese companies, pushed on Tuesday for the companies to be delisted after Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, and Pentagon officials expressed anger that they would remain on the exchange. The Treasury secretary, who was traveling in Egypt on Tuesday, called Stacey Cunningham, president of the N.Y.S.E. Group, to voice his objection to the decision not to delist and issued updated guidance.
- ...

#### 47. Taiwan's Trade Policies Strategies and Constraints

Vinod K. Aggarwal

National Bureau of Asian Research, January 6, 2021

<https://www.nbr.org/publication/taiwans-trade-policies-strategies-and-constraints/>

- Over the last two decades, Taiwan's trade and investment with China has increased dramatically. At the same time, China has become more hostile toward Taiwan, raising concerns by Taiwanese leaders about the risks of this growing economic interdependence. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has sought to reduce this perceived excessive dependence on China.
- This commentary focuses on Taiwan's broader diversification strategies and in particular on its trade policy toward the United States. The first section looks at Taiwan's efforts to diversify its trade policy away from China and toward Southeast Asia, while also considering the steps Taiwan has taken to increase its competitive position in supply chains. I then focus on Taiwan's efforts to secure a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, particularly in the context of the incoming Biden administration.
- **DIVERSIFICATION AND UPGRADING**
  - The U.S.-China trade war has pushed Taiwan to diversify its trade policy away from China. This effort, of course, is not only due to the trade war. Prior to the Trump administration, Taiwan had already been strengthening its ties with South and Southeast Asia. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, for example, Taiwan created the New Southbound Policy in September 2016 "to diversify its economy and reduce reliance on China, its main trading partner." Prior to that shift, Taiwan's exports to China had risen rapidly, particularly from 2000 to 2010, before stabilizing and growing much more slowly and in some years even declining. Taiwan's exports and investments to Southeast Asia also rose significantly as a result of the New Southbound Policy.
  - In January 2019, Taiwan launched a reshoring effort in response to the U.S.-China tariff war. It encouraged firms to repatriate existing foreign investment as well as new investment to Taiwan. By September 2020, a year and a half after the reshoring initiative was released, Taiwanese companies had reinvested an additional \$38 billion in Taiwan under the government program.
  - The Covid-19 pandemic has complicated these reshoring efforts, as exports to China increased by 10.3% from January to May 2020 while exports to the countries under the New Southbound Policy dropped the most in the last ten years. This trend is likely driven by China's comparatively rapid recovery, so it remains to be seen how successful the effort will be.
  - Other shifts in Taiwan's trade and foreign policy include a focus on strategic industries, such as

semiconductors and information technology, in order to retain a central role in global supply chains following the U.S.-China trade war and the Covid-19 pandemic. Anticipating a transformation of global supply chains, President Tsai emphasized the development of six strategic industries in her May 2020 inaugural address. She seeks to forge closer international ties in these sectors and “transform Taiwan into a critical force in the global economy.” These industries include biotech and medical technology, national defense and strategic industries, and renewable energy technologies. This may fit well with the United States’ efforts to redirect its supply chains away from China in key industries.

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48. [Analysis: China splits Atlantic with game-changing EU investment deal](https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-China-splits-Atlantic-with-game-changing-EU-investment-deal)

Katsuji Nakazawa

Nikkei Asia, January 7, 2021

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-China-splits-Atlantic-with-game-changing-EU-investment-deal>

- TOKYO -- On the night of Dec. 30, almost all Chinese media outlets sent out alerts about an investment pact agreed to between China and the European Union. Notifications lit up hundreds of millions of smartphones.
- After more than six years of negotiations, Chinese President Xi Jinping and European leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, had reached a key milestone in relations. The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, or CAI, was sealed in a video meeting.
- What is exciting the Chinese is not the promised economic benefits of the long-awaited agreement, but the strategic victory it symbolizes.
- It draws directly from the 14th-century Chinese historical novel "Romance of the Three Kingdoms," in which the strategy of driving a wedge between enemy forces appears time and time again.
- In the novel, the countries conduct psychological warfare, take advantage of the weaknesses in an enemy alliance and seek to fish in troubled waters to win without fighting.
- In the case of the China-EU investment deal, the three kingdoms are not Wei, Shu and Wu but China, Europe and the U.S.
- ...

49. [China tried to punish European states for Huawei bans by adding eleventh-hour rule to EU investment deal](https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3116896/china-tries-to-punish-european-states-huawei-bans-adding)

Finbarr Bermingham

South China Morning Post, January 8, 2021

<https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3116896/china-tries-to-punish-european-states-huawei-bans-adding>

- At the eleventh hour of its painstakingly negotiated investment deal with the European Union, China tried to add a clause that would have frozen some of the benefits for EU states that restricted access for Huawei Technologies Co. and other Chinese telecoms firms, according to documents reviewed by the South China Morning Post.
- The insertion appeared in a draft negotiating text dated December 11, just weeks before the parties finalized their bilateral investment pact, but was struck-through by EU negotiators, suggesting it did not make the final agreement.

- The deal took seven years to negotiate and is aimed at offering European firms better market access and trading conditions in China. It was finalised on December 31 by China's President Xi Jinping, along with European leaders including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council President Charles Michel.
- ...

## Cyber and Information Technology

### 50. Financial Technology is China's Trojan Horse

Nadia Schadlow and Richard King

Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2021

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-01-13/financial-technology-chinas-trojan-horse>

- Popular Chinese Mobile Payment Apps Are Just the Tip of the Spear
- In one of his last acts as president, Donald Trump issued an executive order banning eight Chinese software applications, including Alipay, the world's largest mobile payment app. People in China, and increasingly in other countries, conduct all sorts of transactions over Alipay and WeChat Pay, another app banned by Trump's order—everything from paying electricity bills to buying food from street vendors to splurging at high-end boutiques.
- Trump's ban, issued on January 5, sought to address concerns that these popular Chinese apps might allow Beijing access to sensitive data about Americans. But China's emerging dominance in financial technology, also known as "fintech," poses an even more fundamental problem for the United States. Washington cannot trust that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will harness its growing influence in financial markets for the benefit of all. More likely, Beijing will use fintech to occupy the high ground in global commerce, bolster its surveillance state, and lay the groundwork to challenge the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency.
- THE TROJAN HORSE IN YOUR SMARTPHONE
- Mobile payment apps in China began as fun and easy ways to send "red envelope" holiday gifts to family and friends on the Lunar New Year, but they have quickly blossomed into an immense industry. Millions of Chinese consumers use digital payment technologies for everyday transactions. China's burgeoning middle class has leapfrogged credit cards and moved straight to digital payments, whose volume now exceeds \$42 trillion annually in China—nearly 150 times the volume of U.S. transactions on apps such as PayPal and Venmo.
- The rise of Chinese fintech companies threatens to strengthen the world's most pervasive surveillance state. The so-called data exhaust from billions of digital transactions supplements existing data from facial recognition, search histories, and social network connections, furnishing the CCP with GPS time and location stamps, transaction histories, travel logs, bank account details, and more. Together, this information allows Chinese authorities to closely monitor and control specific individuals and communities by reducing or canceling access to bank accounts, freezing travel routes, and denying entry to specific locations. Ominously, financial authorities in Hong Kong have recently begun asking banks to report transactions to help authorities identify pro-democracy activists.
- Officials outside China are understandably concerned about how Chinese authorities might harness data generated by users in their own countries. Alipay boasts users in more than 110 countries. Indian Member of Parliament Narendra Jadhav warned in 2018 that if Chinese fintech companies gained access to the financial data of millions of Indians and of Indian companies, it would expose India to "serious geopolitical risk." Similar

fears motivated Trump's January executive order banning Alipay, WeChat Pay, and other Chinese software applications.

- ...

51. [Huawei patent mentions use of Uighur-spotting tech](#)

Leo Kelion

BBC, January 13, 2021

<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55634388>

- A Huawei patent has been brought to light for a system that identifies people who appear to be of Uighur origin among images of pedestrians.
- The filing is one of several of its kind involving leading Chinese technology companies, discovered by a US research company and shared with BBC News.
- Huawei had previously said none of its technologies was designed to identify ethnic groups.
- It now plans to alter the patent.
- Forced-labour camps
- The company indicated this would involve asking the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) - the country's patent authority - for permission to delete the reference to Uighurs in the Chinese-language document.
- Uighur people belong to a mostly Muslim ethnic group that lives mainly in Xinjiang province, in north-western China.
- Government authorities are accused of using high-tech surveillance against them and detaining many in forced-labour camps, where children are sometimes separated from their parents.
- Beijing says the camps offer voluntary education and training.
- ...

52. AUDIO – [WeChat Becomes a Powerful Surveillance Tool Everywhere in China](#)

Jing Yang and Amanda Lewellyn

Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2021

<https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/tech-news-briefing/wechat-becomes-a-powerful-surveillance-tool-in-china/0f4f4447-6ba5-496f-9955-e71d8e5166e0>

- Messaging apps have become even more critical during the pandemic. We report that China is tightening its grip on the country's do-everything app, WeChat. Reporter Jing Yang joins host Amanda Lewellyn to explain what the government is doing and the impact on users.

53. [Chinese bids on Pacific cable raise alarm in US and Australia](#)

Fumi Matsumoto

Nikkei Asia, January 3, 2021

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Chinese-bids-on-Pacific-cable-raise-alarm-in-US-and->

## Australia

- SYDNEY -- Moves by Chinese corporations to buy into undersea cable projects and telecommunications companies in the Pacific islands have become a point of major concern for Australia and the U.S. over the possibility of spying.
- This region has long been the backyard of Canberra and Washington. But they increasingly find themselves fighting over influence with Beijing, which has strengthened its presence there by building infrastructure.
- The U.S. has warned Pacific island nations about security threats posed by a bid by China's Huawei Marine to build a \$72.6 million undersea cable linking the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati and Nauru, Reuters reported.
- Washington sent a diplomatic note to Micronesia in July expressing strategic concerns about the project as Huawei Marine and other Chinese companies are required to cooperate with Beijing's intelligence and security services, the report said, citing sources. It noted in a follow-up report that Republican senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio told Micronesia in a letter dated Sept. 18 that China could leverage its way into the project to wage "campaigns of espionage and geopolitical coercion."
- ...

## **Military and Security Threats**

### 54. Will hold our ground along LAC: Gen. Naravane

Dinakar Peri

The Hindu, January 12, 2021

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/high-alert-maintained-at-lac-army-chief-naravane/article33556360.ece?homepage=true>

- Army Chief sees collusive threat from China and Pakistan
- Army Chief Gen. Manoj Naravane on Tuesday asserted that the Army was ready to hold its ground as long as it took along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh to achieve the national objectives, and noted that a collusive threat from China and Pakistan existed and India must be ready for it.
- "Every summer, for training, a number of People's Liberation Army (PLA) units come to Tibet and go back once winter sets in. These traditional areas have been vacated. They are well in depth anything from 500-1500 km away from the border. We should not lay too much significance on these comings and goings. But we keep an eye on them as these are the forces that can be mobilised in 24-48 hours," he said at the Army's annual press conference in response to questions if China has withdrawn some troops from the depth areas.
- "There has been no reduction of troops in the friction areas or where we are in eyeball to eyeball situations," he stated.

### 55. Gen. Vance calls for grand strategy to confront China and Russia

Robert Fife

The Globe and Mail, January 11, 2021

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-gen-vance-calls-for-grand-strategy-to-confront-china-and-russia/>

- The world is becoming a more dangerous place, Canada's top military commander says, with the rise of



great-power competition from Russia and China and the uncertainty of American leadership to maintain alliances and shape new ones.

- General Jonathan Vance is soon retiring as Chief of the Defence Staff, but offered a stark assessment of the military challenges facing Canada and the world.
- “There is no way you can look at the global landscape and see [anything] other than increased indicators of danger and threats,” he warned in an interview with The Globe and Mail. “The level of real and actual danger will depend on how it is that nations around the world hold China to account, and the same can be said for Russia.”
- A former commander of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, Gen. Vance will be succeeded by Vice-Admiral Art McDonald, currently Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, in a change of command in mid-January.
- “What is interesting about this era is that nothing has come off the table,” Gen. Vance said, pointing to continuing violence in the Middle East, civil wars and border conflicts, terrorist attacks in Europe, a rise in political repression and climate change.
- President Donald Trump’s leadership and his undermining of U.S. allies, including withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia and even Germany, deeply troubled Western political leaders, he said. It makes it more difficult, Gen. Vance added, to design a grand strategy to deal with Beijing and Moscow.
- “I had absolutely detected the political angst. I have been in the rooms when there have been some odd moments,” he said. “We are dealing with certainty of emerging great-power competition and the unique position that the Western alliances have been in, where there was some uncertainty about where the U.S. was going to manage this and how they were going to manage this.”
- But Gen. Vance said the “U.S. military has stayed rock solid” in support of NATO and other Western alliances. He noted that the Pentagon gave Ottawa a heads-up on its plans to kill top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani so it could put in “force protection measures” in case of Iranian counterstrikes.
- President-elect Joe Biden has vowed to renew U.S. relationships with its allies to confront an increasingly belligerent China and retaliate against Russia, accused in the recent massive cyberattack against U.S. government and private-sector computer systems and of targeting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
- Gen. Vance said Western political leaders must develop a “grand strategy” to confront Chinese expansionism, including their militarization of islands in the South China Sea, a key shipping lane through which 30 per cent of the world’s trade passes.
- “You can’t look at this and say this is a nation that is operating by the standard rules of international behaviour. The same I think can be said to some degree with Russia with its posture in Crimea and the Black Sea,” he said.
- Gen. Vance declined to say whether Canada should join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad, a four-country alliance of the U.S., Australia, Japan and India aimed at containing China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad countries have held regular naval exercises but Canada has so far not asked to join the group.
- “Not my call. ... Those are things for Canada to decide and not for me to decide,” he said, but he added: “We don’t need to be part of the Quad to be able to train with all of those people and we do.”
- At this time, Gen. Vance said, there is no indication China will invade Taiwan, even though the People’s Liberation Army has stepped up cyberattacks and used its warplanes and navy to harass the self-governing island of 24 million almost on a daily basis.

- But he said the West needs to put plans in place to make sure Beijing understands that there will be consequences if it uses force against Taiwan.
- “What is important now is what will the rest of the world do about all of this. ... What might the political levers [be] to try to prevent that and what would be the military strategies to underpin that,” he said.
- Gen. Vance was more forthcoming about the cyberthreat from Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., saying for the first time that it should not be allowed into Canada’s next-generation 5G networks.
- Canada is the only member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance – which includes the U.S., Britain, Australia and New Zealand – that has not either banned or restricted Huawei from 5G.
- For the past two years, Ottawa has been conducting a cybersecurity review of Huawei’s 5G technology and there is no indication when a decision will be made on whether to bar the company from Canadian 5G networks.
- Gen. Vance said it would be wrong to allow a state-sponsored entity such as Huawei “which is entirely owned, operated and penetrated by the state” into Canada’s communications networks.
- He said he sleeps “absolutely” better at night knowing that major telecoms BCE, Rogers and Telus have announced that they will use secure suppliers, such as Finland’s Nokia, Ericsson from Sweden and South Korea’s Samsung, to supply 5G equipment
- From a military perspective, the general said Russia remains the greatest threat to Canada because of its proximity, particularly its massive buildup in the Arctic to take advantage of rapidly melting ice that will open those waters to shipping.
- Russia has built modern military bases equipped with thousands of troops and stationed modern fighter jets, advanced hypersonic cruise and intercontinental missiles, as well as having icebreakers and nuclear submarines in Arctic waters.
- “They are not building up the Arctic for nothing,” he said. “They are posturing themselves militarily to be adjacent to what will become in the future a very busy sea route, and they are co-operating with China in some respect on that matter.”
- Canada still does not have new icebreakers, while the Russians are building a fleet of 13 polar icebreakers. Canada’s new Arctic and offshore patrol vessels can’t operate in the Far North during the winter and have limited icebreaking capabilities.
- Gen. Vance would only say he would like to have more search and rescue and surveillance capacity in the Far North, but noted that Canada has underwater sonic technology to detect submarines, and satellites to warn of approaching Russian aircraft. The U.S. and Canada are also in the process of upgrading the aerospace warning systems at North American Aerospace Defence Command, he added.
- Gen. Vance would not be drawn into whether the government should select the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jet that the U.S. and other allies are buying.
- “That is a road I am not going to go down,” he said.
- The Conservative government chose the F-35 to replace Canada’s aging CF-18 Hornets but the Liberals cancelled the contract when they won the 2015 election and opened the competition to Boeing’s Super Hornets

and Saab Gripen.

- Gen. Vance said he is most proud of his efforts to stamp out sexual predatory behaviour in the military and to promote more women to higher ranks.
- Despite being a potential candidate for a coming vacancy as chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau decided against mounting an effort to win him the top military job of the alliance.
- It was a decision that the retiring general says he accepts with good grace.
- “I wasn’t hoping. I was willing and that is a major difference. I am a servant of the state and I will do what I am told,” he said. “You cannot wear this uniform for almost 40 years and not say ‘yes sir.’”

56. [Defence chief warns attacks online could lead to real war](#)

Fiona Hamilton

Times of London, January 11, 2021

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/cyberattacks-risk-starting-a-war-defence-chief-says-0nkg6fgt2>

- Covert warfare by Russia and China, including cyberhacking and disinformation, risks an “uncontrollable state of all-out war”, the head of the armed forces has warned.
- General Sir Nick Carter, chief of the defence staff, said clandestine activity by hostile states did not reach the threshold for war but could quickly “light a fuse” if it were misunderstood or escalated.
- “And, of course, if you look back over history, it’s those moments of miscalculation which often precipitate what ends up being an uncontrollable state of war. And that’s the bit that we really, really have to watch.”
- In a new podcast General Carter and other military and security figures sound the alarm about the risk of interference by hostile states leading to conflict.
- ...

57. [Davidson: INDOPACOM Priorities Will Help Accomplish CNO’s NAVPLAN](#)

Mallory Shelbourne

USNI, January 12, 2021

<https://news.usni.org/2021/01/12/davidson-indopacom-priorities-will-help-accomplish-cnos-navplan>

- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s priorities are paving the way for it to pursue goals laid out in the Navy’s new Navigation Plan, the combatant command’s chief said Tuesday.
- Speaking at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, Adm. Phil Davidson pointed to the capabilities he is concentrating on for the theater when asked how INDOPACOM will attain the objectives in the chief of naval operation’s new strategic blueprint.
- “I’ve articulated some of the capability sets that we need out here when we talk about lethality, when we talk about our design and posture. When we talk about our relationships with allies and partners. And when we talk about what has to get accomplished in exercise, experimentation and innovation,” Davidson said.
- “Those are all elements that will help serve that modernization vision that the CNO started to articulate going forward. And, as I mentioned, demonstrate the capability, capacity and will for us to compete and win going forward. The very difficult challenge – and I hope everybody takes this away from everybody’s comments

– is getting from here to there, right. You don't have the ability to define some ideal end state and say 'we need to get there at the snap of a finger,' right.”

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#### 58. Protecting and Preserving a Free and Open South China Sea

Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State

U.S. Department of State, January 14, 2021

<https://www.state.gov/protecting-and-preserving-a-free-and-open-south-china-sea/>

- The United States and all law-abiding nations share a deep interest in the preservation of a free and open South China Sea. All nations, regardless of military and economic power, should be free to enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed to them under international law, as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, without fear of coercion.
- Today, the United States is taking additional actions to defend these rights and freedoms. Pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of State is imposing visa restrictions on People's Republic of China (PRC) individuals, including executives of state-owned enterprises and officials of the Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC's use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources in the South China Sea. Immediate family members may be subject to these visa restrictions as well.
- In addition, the Department of Commerce has added China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Limited to the Entity List in light of its role in the PRC's campaign of coercion against other claimants of an estimated \$2.5 trillion in South China Sea oil and gas resources. The Chinese Communist Party has used CNOOC and other state enterprises as weapons to attempt to enforce Beijing's unlawful "Nine Dashed Line." CNOOC used its mammoth survey rig HD-981 off the Paracel islands in 2014 in an attempt to intimidate Vietnam. CNOOC's then-chief executive touted that oil rig as "mobile national territory."
- Beijing continues to send fishing fleets and energy survey vessels, along with military escorts, to operate in waters claimed by Southeast Asian nations and to harass claimant state oil and gas development in areas where it has failed to put forth a coherent, lawful maritime claim.
- In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – to which the PRC is a state party – rejected the PRC's South China Sea maritime claims as having no basis in international law. Last July, the United States aligned our position on the PRC's maritime claims in the South China Sea with key aspects of the Tribunal's decision and affirmed once again that we reject the PRC's unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea. We welcome the unprecedented number of countries that have formally protested these claims at the United Nations.
- The United States stands with Southeast Asian claimant states seeking to defend their sovereign rights and interests, consistent with international law. We will continue to act until we see Beijing cease its coercive behavior in the South China Sea.

#### 59. At War Online: South Korea and China

Troy Strangarone

The Diplomat, December 24, 2020

<https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/at-war-online-south-korea-and-china/>

- On the battlefields of social media, conflicts between citizens of China and South Korea are increasingly common.

- Earlier this year, the South Korean boyband BTS faced a backlash from Chinese state media and internet users for allegedly insulting China at a Korea Society event. In prerecord remarks accepting an award for promoting U.S.-Korean relations Kim Nam-joon of BTS said, “We will always remember the history of pain that our two nations shared together and the sacrifices of countless men and women.” The backlash was quick and pushed Samsung to remove BTS branded products from Chinese platforms and other companies moved quickly to remove images of BTS from their Chinese websites to avoid being caught in the backlash.
- What on the surface might seem like a random dispute over the remarks of a K-pop star, however, is becoming increasingly common between South Korea and China as social media changes the way that states and their publics interact. It also taps into China’s adoption of a more confrontational “wolf warrior” attitude.
- Before social media, information was largely consumed passively and separately. But social media allows the citizens of one country to directly engage the citizens of another and try to shape the understanding and acceptance of facts.
- The controversies in part seem to be driven by a new, more aggressive style of diplomacy adopted by China since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic earlier this year. This new “wolf warrior diplomacy” has seen Chinese diplomats more aggressively defend China’s interests on social media with a mixture of confrontational approaches and conspiracy theories. Sometime with the help of their citizens.
- ...

60. [Trouble Finding Partners: Barriers to China’s Overseas Basing](#)

Toshi Yoshihara

The Jamestown Foundation, January 12, 2021

<https://jamestown.org/program/trouble-finding-partners-barriers-to-chinas-overseas-basing/>

- As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) goes global, it will increasingly need reliable access to overseas bases and dual-use facilities to sustain operations in faraway theaters. Recent U.S. defense and intelligence reports indicate that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is prospecting for locations where the PLA could obtain access and logistical support. According to the Department of Defense, Beijing has “likely considered” a dozen candidate countries that could play host to “military logistics facilities.”
- As Beijing explores its options, Chinese analysts have begun to pay attention to potential host nations and their suitability for PLA access and use (China Brief: October 19, 2020; March 22, 2019). This article samples a budding literature on the requirements for China’s overseas military presence. It finds that Chinese observers are realistic about the challenges and costs of obtaining bases and facilities abroad. The literature further demonstrates a keen awareness that capable host nations and adroit Chinese statecraft are both essential to the PLA’s plans to go global.
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## One Belt, One Road Strategy

61. VIDEO – [How China’s Flagship Belt and Road Project Stalled Out](#)

Bloomberg, January 14, 2021

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AU1QvrbawE8&feature=youtu.be>

- The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is one of the most important components of Beijing’s ambitious Belt

and Road Initiative. But so far, just one-third of planned development has been completed.

62. [China sends Africa a signal that Belt and Road Initiative is still open for business](#)

Jevanas Nyabiage

South China Morning Post, January 10, 2021

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3117129/china-sends-africa-signal-belt-and-road-initiative-still-open>

- China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi used his recent visit to Africa to signal that Beijing was still willing to fund infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative despite fears that the multibillion-dollar scheme faces budget cuts.
- During last week's tour, which ranged from the islands of the Seychelles to the continent's most populous country Nigeria, Wang also signalled that China was ready to help boost Africa's industrial capacity and expand trade.
- "China is prepared to help Africa increase its infrastructure, trade and financial connectivity," he told a briefing in Tanzania on Friday.
- He also signalled that Beijing was ready to step up its military and security cooperation with Africa and work towards a political settlement of conflicts, saying: "China is prepared to help Africa enhance peacekeeping and counterterrorism capacity, in a joint effort to build a secure Africa."
- ...

63. [What Does a New White Paper Tell Us About China's International Aid?](#)

Zhang Chao and Tang Yuxuan

The Diplomat, January 13, 2021

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/what-does-a-new-white-paper-tell-us-about-chinas-international-aid/>

- China's new white paper on international development cooperation has spurred a renewed debate around the Chinese government's aid. It's the third such white paper that China has published on its development efforts, and the first since 2014. At around 26,000 Chinese characters, it is even longer than the previous two papers combined.
- The white paper reflects some new developments in China's aid program. For example, it echoes the new initiatives Chinese leaders proposed in the past years, including "a global community of shared future" and the Belt and Road Initiative. Beyond that, three points deserve special attention.
- First, China's aid spending remains modest and its pattern has been evolving. The paper reveals that China invested 270.2 billion renminbi (RMB) in aid programs from 2013 to 2018. Although no detailed spending data is provided, a simple calculation suggests that China's aid averaged around \$7 billion per year (6.5 RMB roughly equals 1 U.S. dollar) during that period. That number would make China the seventh-largest sovereign donor after the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Turkey – but it equates to only around one-fifth of U.S. aid, which totaled \$346 billion in 2019.
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64. [China's Foreign Minister Revives Belt and Road on 5-Country Africa Tour](#)

Eleanor Albert

The Diplomat, January 12, 2021

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/chinas-foreign-minister-revives-belt-and-road-on-5-country-africa-tour/>

- Over the weekend, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded his tour to five countries in Africa, upholding a 30-plus year tradition of China's top diplomat starting the new year with the first international visit to the continent. The trip brought Wang to a disparate group of destinations: Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Botswana, Tanzania, and Seychelles.
- The thrust of the tour was messaging to emphasize the positive trajectory and future of ties between China and its African partners, particularly in the lead-up to the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) leaders' summit to be held this year. Wang laid out a seven-point plan to upgrade China-Africa cooperation for 2021, bolstering health, agricultural, digital, environmental, and military and security cooperation; regional connectivity and free trade; and Africa's industrial capacity.
- Wang's five-country tour was not wanting for deals to tout either. The DRC and Botswana became the 45th and 46th African signatories to join China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). (Nigeria joined the BRI in 2019 and Seychelles in 2018.) Although the spread of the coronavirus raised questions about the future of the BRI, resistance to it and Chinese efforts to recalibrate the initiative manifested long before the pandemic.
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## Opinion Pieces

65. [The Guardian view on Hong Kong's crackdown: an assault on political opposition](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/06/the-guardian-view-on-hong-kongs-crackdown-an-assault-on-political-opposition)  
The Guardian, January 6, 2021

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/06/the-guardian-view-on-hong-kongs-crackdown-an-assault-on-political-opposition>

- China is crushing any shred of resistance in Hong Kong, in breach of its promises to maintain the region's freedoms. The arrest of more than 50 pro-democracy figures in the early hours of Wednesday morning, under the draconian national security law introduced last year, makes it clear that not only peaceful protest but political opposition itself is no longer acceptable.
- To invoke the vaguely defined charge of subversion against people engaging in Hong Kong's severely restricted and hobbled democratic processes would be almost comic were it not so sinister. The suspects held or participated in primaries to pick pro-democracy candidates with the best chance of winning elections to the city's legislative council (LegCo). The intention, said police, was to handicap the government by winning a legislative majority and using it to veto budgets, pushing the chief executive to resign and forcing the government into a shutdown. In short, planning to win office and exercise the legislative right to veto now amounts to a crime against national security. Those convicted could face life in prison.
- LegCo's powers have always been limited. It is only partially elected by ordinary residents, and authorities have disqualified both candidates and elected members – prompting the remaining opposition to quit. They postponed last year's elections, citing the pandemic. They have sufficient ingenuity to ensure a satisfactory result in the delayed vote. So Wednesday's sledgehammer tactics – police boasted that 1,000 officers took part – appear designed to frighten a resistant population into compliance. Beijing knows that the anger, despair and desire for democracy in Hong Kong have only grown since protests exploded in 2019. A tenth of residents voted in the primaries despite official wrath.
- Those arrested include not only high-profile figures such as the legal scholar Benny Tai and the former pro-democracy legislator Claudia Mo, but also civil society activists such as Jeffrey Andrews, a social worker supporting refugees and ethnic minorities, and Lee Chi-yung, who stood in the primary to improve access for wheelchair users.

• ...  
66. [Biden Will Inherit Healthy Indo-Pacific Alliances](https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/01/biden-will-inherit-healthy-indo-pacific-alliances.html)

Derek Grossman

RAND, January 11, 2021

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/01/biden-will-inherit-healthy-indo-pacific-alliances.html>

- Apopular refrain from the incoming Biden administration is that U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific have been atrophying under the past four years of Trump administration mismanagement.
- Antony Blinken, nominated to become Secretary of State, said last July, “We need to rally our allies and partners instead of alienating them” to deal with China. President-elect Joe Biden lamented that President Donald Trump has “belittled, undermined, and in some cases abandoned U.S. allies and partners.”
- To be sure, Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and his trade war threats have done little to ingratiate Washington in the region. His questioning of whether Japan and South Korea are paying enough to make the alliances worthwhile is worrisome. There are certainly other examples that can be raised.
- On the whole, however, the Biden administration might be surprised to discover that U.S. alliances and partnerships are in good shape—the result of a growing Indo-Pacific consensus on the existential economic and security threat China poses. These regional jitters frequently benefit Washington, and in many cases, it is becoming the partner of choice, suggesting the Biden administration will not have to work too hard to repair U.S. alliances and partnerships.
- Of the five formal U.S. treaty allies—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand—four should be considered relatively healthy and bolstered by the China threat. Australia's relationship with China has taken a nosedive following Canberra's support of Hong Kong, brash Chinese influence operations in Australia, trade frictions and Beijing's release of a doctored image of an Australian soldier threatening to kill a baby in Afghanistan. In July, Australia's defense ministry released a defense strategic update and force structure plan aimed at countering China.
- The U.S.-Japan alliance is arguably the strongest in history. Tokyo routinely supports U.S. objectives to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open and participates in joint exercises in disputed waters. Japan has been staring down China at the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu, in the East China Sea for years. And Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, plans to continue prioritizing and enhancing the alliance. He plans to visit Washington to meet with Biden this February.
- Despite its anti-American and pro-China President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines recently demonstrated its intent to stick by Washington. In November, Duterte allowed U.S. troops to continue to freely enter and move around the country, contradicting earlier moves to end the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement. When announcing the decision, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin argued for “clarity and strength” in the face of China's destabilizing actions in the South China Sea. Even Duterte, in a speech to the United Nations last September, rejected China's attempts to undermine a 2016 ruling upholding Manila's territory in the South China Sea.
- South Korea under President Moon Jae-in has been an enthusiastic supporter of Trump's summit diplomacy with North Korea, and thus has overlooked strains in the alliance related to burden-sharing. Moon might like to include China in these engagements, but he probably remains wary of Beijing's intentions following economic retaliation for Seoul's deployment of the THAAD antimissile system.
- Thailand is the only U.S. ally slipping into China's orbit, mostly due to a lack of shared objectives or major



disputes with China.

- Apart from U.S. alliances, there are successes among partners, too. Most notably, the United States and India initiated the two-plus-two ministerial dialogue that led to multiple security agreements. Taiwan is another very bright spot following several pro-Taiwan bills passed by Congress, high-level U.S. official visits, and the routinization of robust arms sales packages. The United States has also done exceptionally well with Vietnam. Trump traveled to Vietnam twice—once for the second North Korea summit—and Hanoi is pleased that the United States is pushing back against China's maritime aggression as well as its damming projects along the upper Mekong River.
- The United States is also diplomatically competitive elsewhere. For example, Indonesia participates in China's Belt and Road Initiative projects, but worries about Chinese designs on the Natuna Sea. The Maldives recently welcomed the opening of a U.S. embassy, and while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Sri Lanka, Colombo affirmed the importance of “maintaining the freedom of navigation in our seas and airspace”—a direct nod to the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Other important partners, such as Singapore and Malaysia, are friendly with the United States even as they maintain deep ties to China.
- Finally, in Oceania, the United States shored up its special relationships with the Freely Associated States—the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau—which provide the U.S. military with exclusive access critical to enabling the military to conduct future operations against China. In a historic first, Trump invited all three FAS leaders to the White House, and the Secretaries of State and Defense visited Micronesia and Palau respectively for the first time. In September, Palau offered to host U.S. air forces, while New Zealand has become increasingly alarmed at China's behavior as well, both in Australia and in the Pacific islands.
- Multilaterally, the United States has at times struggled. The Trump administration did not send sufficiently senior representation to key events such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit—decisions that angered Southeast Asian leaders. However, Washington can claim some success as well. Significantly, in October, participants of the Quad—Australia, Japan, India, and the United States—met for the first-ever stand-alone ministerial meeting in Tokyo to underscore their collective resolve to deal with Indo-Pacific challenges together.
- Certainly there is much work ahead as the United States embarks on the next chapter of competition against China throughout the Indo-Pacific. But the good news is that the incoming Biden administration is likely to inherit alliances and partnerships that are in much better shape than conventional wisdom would suggest.

67. [Decryption of secret document reveals US strategy in the Indo-Pacific](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/decryption-of-secret-document-reveals-real-us-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/)

Rory Medcalf

The Strategist, January 13, 2021

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/decryption-of-secret-document-reveals-real-us-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/>

- The US government has just declassified one of its most sensitive national security documents—its 2018 strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific, which was formally classified SECRET and not for release to foreign nationals.
- The full text, minus a few small redactions, was made public late on 12 January (US east coast time), having originally been cleared for publication on 5 January, prior to the turmoil in Washington.
- The release of this document will be rightly overshadowed in the news cycle by the aftermath of the disgraceful domestic attack on the US Capitol, but for observers interested in the future security of the world beyond American shores, it will be of long-term interest and warrant close reading.

- Long before historians can debate the Trump administration’s legacy in this vital region, this highly unusual step of fast-forward declassification—the text was not due for public release until 2043—brings an authoritative clarity to the public record.
- The slightly reassuring news is that beneath President Donald Trump’s unpredictability, conceit and unilateralism, the policy professionals were striving to advance a more serious and coherent agenda.
- ...

68. [Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge](#)

Martijn Rasser and Megan Lambeth

Center for a New American Security, January 13, 2021

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/taking-the-helm-a-national-technology-strategy-to-meet-the-china-challenge>

- Executive Summary
- The United States faces a challenge like no other in its history: a strategic competition with a highly capable and increasingly resourceful opponent whose worldview and economic and political models are at odds with the interests and values of the world’s democratic states. A rising China poses a fundamental challenge to the economic vitality and national security of the United States and its allies and the currency of liberal democratic values around the world. Technology—a key enabler for economic, political, and military power—is front and center in this competition.
- Technological leadership—how a country invents, innovates, and deploys technologies to compete economically and to secure its interests—will shape the coming years to a remarkable degree. The United States has maintained such leadership for decades. Today, that leadership is at risk. The United States is failing to rise to the occasion—its policies inadequate and disconnected and its response reactive and disjointed. The country needs a new approach to regain the initiative. The stakes are high and the window for action is closing.
- The U.S. government must craft a national technology strategy for an era of sustained competition with a highly capable contender: a comprehensive framework to plan, execute, and update its technology policies. The strategy is a whole-of-nation approach—including human capital, infrastructure, investments, tax and regulatory policies, and institutional and bureaucratic processes—to preserve its current advantages and to create new ones. To be effective, creating and executing the strategy must involve stakeholders from federal and state governments, private industry, academia, and civil society. The overarching goal is to maintain the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its national interests without having to compromise its values or sovereignty.
- The purpose of this report is to provide the intellectual framing for what a national technology strategy is and why the United States needs one. It does not offer a list of prioritized technology areas. Rather, it provides guidelines for how to think about such prioritization and what qualities should inform the resulting policy decisions.
- The overarching goal is to maintain the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its national interests without having to compromise its values or sovereignty.
- A successful U.S. national technology strategy will require a recalibration of government involvement in the country’s science and technology (S&T) base. The report addresses why the United States should revisit key lessons of successful technology policies during World War II and throughout the Cold War and apply them in

the current context. This does not mean heavy-handed interventions of “picking winners and losers” and other unnecessary and damaging market distortions. We recommend a technology policy that focuses on actions to promote American competitiveness, protect American technological advantages, partner with like-minded countries to maximize success, and plan for effective strategy updates.

- The specific recommendations offered form the foundation for this national technology strategy. They are the bedrock for long-term American competitiveness.

69. [China in 2021: agenda setting, anniversaries, and potential for conflict](#)

Valarie Tan

MERICS, December 10, 2020

<https://merics.org/en/briefing/china-2021-agenda-setting-anniversaries-and-potential-conflict>

- Where does China stand at the end of 2020?
  - China has emerged from the Covid-19 crisis stronger and more assertive. While countries worldwide are sliding into recession, the People’s Republic has bounced back to moderate economic growth. In November, exports increased by a record-breaking 21 percent year-on-year. This shows that global demand for products ‘Made in China’ even increased during the crisis. On the political stage, life moving back towards normal after the Covid-19 crisis seems to have encouraged state and Communist Party leader Xi Jinping to once again become assertive. For instance, China recently declared it had reached its goal of overcoming “extreme poverty.” Abroad, China is presenting itself as a cooperative partner in the fight against Covid-19 – although in the diplomatic arena it has started to show its teeth in countering criticism of its Hong Kong policy or in its dealings with Australia.
- What is on the horizon for 2021?
  - The Chinese leadership in 2021 will have important decisions to make – and big parties to throw: The 14th Five-Year Plan is due to be adopted in spring. It will set the agenda for achieving China’s ambition to become more economically independent and for taking the next steps to modernizing China’s industry. Innovation strategies – not least in fields like climate protection and environmental technology – will be at the forefront. At the same time, spending on “national security” and investments in digital surveillance systems are likely to rise significantly. In the runup to the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi will be keen on ensuring stability in the country.
  - The new data security law will bring changes for foreign companies active in China. In addition, the economy will continue to face big challenges, not only because of the sizeable debts of “too-big-to-fail” state-owned companies. The shaky global economy will also bear risks for China, which has granted billions of euros in loans to unstable economies as part of its ambitious Belt & Road Initiative. Beijing looks set for a major adjustment of its geopolitical and economic strategies.
  - Internationally, the APEC summit in February will show whether tensions with Australia will continue to escalate. Other countries also being targeted by China’s ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ - Sweden, but increasingly also Germany and other EU members - will have to keep a close eye on developments.
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70. [Matthew Pottinger exits, but his China strategy is here to stay](#)

Josh Rogin

The Washington Post, January 7, 2021

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/matthew-pottinger-exits-but-his-china-strategy-is-here-to-stay/2021/01/07/0a54df32-512e-11eb-83e3-322644d82356\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/matthew-pottinger-exits-but-his-china-strategy-is-here-to-stay/2021/01/07/0a54df32-512e-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html)

- As President Trump's devotees stormed the U.S. Capitol Wednesday afternoon, several senior administration officials took the opportunity to resign. One of them was deputy national security adviser Matthew Pottinger.
- Most Americans will likely see him as yet another fed-up Trump official, without realizing the greater significance of his four years of White House service. Even though Pottinger's name was largely unknown to the public, his influence on U.S. foreign policy will be felt for years to come. The incoming Biden administration is set to preserve many of the changes in the government's approach to China that Pottinger, along with other like-minded officials, worked to implement.
- "It's impossible to overstate the impact Matt has had on American national security," said Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), who served with Pottinger when they were both Marine intelligence officers in Iraq. "He leaves behind a four-year legacy as impactful as any American strategist before him."
- On Dec. 3, 2016, Pottinger received a call from his former commander in Afghanistan, retired general Michael Flynn, who was set to become President-elect Donald Trump's national security adviser. Pottinger rode a Citi Bike uptown from his office in Manhattan to Trump Tower and joined the transition team. This was one day after Trump had accepted a call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, upending 40 years of precedent and setting off the new era in U.S.-China relations with a bang.
- ...

71. 'China's rulers aren't those we partnered with a decade ago'

Tom Tugendhat

Mail on Sunday, January 9, 2021

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-9129891/Chinas-rulers-arent-partnered-decade-ago-says-TOM-TUGENDHAT.html>

- Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman TOM TUGENDHAT says it's time to confront the reality we've ignored for too long
- The past decade has been kind to China's princes, but its people have paid the price.
- As Beijing's new Communist aristocracy have grown rich and increased their global influence, the rights of the people, particularly those from minority communities, have suffered. The rise in forced labour, arbitrary detention and mass surveillance has turned the nation into a prison for many.
- For millennia, the Chinese emperors built powerful states by conquest and control. Today's heirs to the Forbidden City are using technology and torture to achieve the same.
- This Conservative Party Human Rights Commission report coming out this week details how China's Communist Party has transformed the nature of state power and deployed its repressive tools in recent years. It highlights the violation of rights widely reported in the Xinjiang region, where Uighur culture is being erased, and historic sites bulldozed to the mass incarceration of citizens for Orwellian re-education.
- It goes into detail on the erosion of Tibetan culture and the repression of rights in Hong Kong, ending the self-government promised at handover in 1997. This report pulls no punches in highlighting the mass torture and repression, the disappearances and silencing of any form of dissent in today's Communist state. The catalogue of crimes seems more at home in Stalin's 1930s than in the 2020s. Only the technology has changed.
- And that's where one of the greatest threats lies. As the report points out, the connection between

technology and the state is a key element of its power. Building on infrastructure providers such as Huawei and linking through social media, online payment platforms and more, this state has cast a web so tight that no fly can pass through unnoticed or unpunished.

- There are dissident voices in China, even within the Communist Party, who think General Secretary Xi is taking the country backwards, emulating elements of the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but their voices are being silenced.
- Accusations without evidence are no reason not to convict and thousands have been sentenced, much as Xi's own parents were under the show trials of earlier generations. The law is not an instrument of justice but a tool of repression and Hong Kong's courts risk the same end.
- The question then is what we should do. What can countries like ours, liberal democracies without the repressive power of a tyrannical state, really achieve against an economic dragon? Standing together, we can reject goods made by forced labour, shape global organisations like the WHO that have come under Beijing's shadow, and be a voice for the repressed in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and elsewhere.
- As churches close, mosques are destroyed and those who speak out are locked up, this year we're going to have to reshape our foreign policy to face the reality we've ignored for too long.
- China's rulers aren't those we partnered with a decade ago, and the price we're paying is higher than we could possibly have imagined. We need to use the G7 to change direction, together.

#### 72. [Xi and Putin are exploiting the West's political decadence](#)

Matthew Syed

Times of London, January 10, 2021

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/xi-and-putin-are-exploiting-the-west-s-political-decadence-vzc6ncwi3>

- Trump rightly identified China as a threat to liberal values — too bad he's made its job easier
- My first trip to India, the land of my father's birth, was in 1986. I was 15 and wide-eyed, marvelling at its treasures, buildings and buzz. On the fourth day, I travelled from Delhi to the Taj Mahal, a shining tribute to the Mogul empire, built under Shah Jahan. "Let the splendour of diamond, pearl and ruby vanish," wrote the poet Rabindranath Tagore. "Only let this one teardrop, this Taj Mahal, glisten spotlessly bright on the cheek of time, for ever and ever."
- Two things struck me about this trip, in addition to the wonderful architecture and people. The first was the economic might of India in its imperial heyday.

#### 73. [The Undoing of China's Economic Miracle](#)

Michael Schuman

The Atlantic, January 11, 2021

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/01/xi-jinping-china-economy-jack-ma/617552/>

- China's economic "miracle" wasn't that miraculous. The country's high-octane ascent over the past 40 years is, in reality, a triumph of basic economic principles: As the state gave way to the market, private enterprise and trade flourished, growth quickened, and incomes soared.
- This simple lesson appears, however, to be lost on Xi Jinping. China's leader is rejecting decades of tried-and-true policy by reasserting the power of the Communist Party within the economy and redirecting Chinese business inward. Indeed, faced with escalating hostility in Washington, Xi's pivot seems, if anything, to be

accelerating—with potentially serious consequences for China’s economic progress, and its relations with the world.

- True, Xi isn’t completely drop-kicking free enterprise and free trade. In November, he told the G20 summit that China’s new economic agenda “is by no means a closed-door policy” and “will create more opportunities for the world to benefit from China’s high-quality development.” Beijing also recently joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a 15-nation pact that created a trading bloc with about a third of the world’s population. Hua Chunying, the spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, hailed it as “a reflection of the commitment to free trade & multilateral trading system.”

- But the picture looks much murkier if you’re Jack Ma, China’s tech-entrepreneur grand master. Regulators squelched what would have been a record-breaking initial public offering of Ma’s fintech giant, Ant Group, a mere two days before its November debut on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. The official reason they offered was an altered regulatory environment, but there is widespread concern that Chinese authorities were punishing Ma for criticizing their oversight of the finance industry. Xi reportedly made the call himself. (Beijing subsequently launched an antitrust investigation into Ma’s other creation, the e-commerce company Alibaba Group.) Days later, another prominent entrepreneur, Sun Dawu, was detained for “provoking quarrels and disrupting production,” and the government seized his agriculture company. Sun, who has sometimes been critical of the government, may have been targeted over a land dispute with a state-owned farm.

- ...

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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FOI/PA# 21-cv-572

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From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 6:13:49 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions  
Attachments: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 3, 5

Hi [redacted]  
Hope you are doing well! I know usually I reach out to check in, but this time I am reaching out about a CPM. WFO is putting a CPM for the Inauguration, which was coordinated with you [redacted] had an interest in including some questions. And, this is what I want to chat about.

But, your ColIMC will be chatting with you tomorrow. So, I would prefer you have a chance to chat with [redacted] Ping me afterwards so we can chat.

PS  
Did you get my card? USPS is sioooooow.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:08 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

Hey [redacted] Here is the [redacted] portion.

Thanks so much!

-

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 29, 2020 4:32 PM  
Subject: [redacted] CPM/Questions  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 8:23:53 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Sounds like a plan.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:23 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Thanks [redacted] I will disseminate to ops tomorrow via unet.

On Dec 30, 2020 7:22 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Emailed the CPM on FBI Net to the SAC, SSIA [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:19 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] Here is a SITREP for 6 January

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:17 PM  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

To: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
[redacted]

Hi Team. The following report is being provided for your situational awareness regarding activities pertaining to 6 January. The next update will be on Tuesday 5 January at noon.

Thank you

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:04 PM  
Subject: 6 Jan 2021 Update  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:23:26 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks [redacted] will disseminate to ops tomorrow via unet.

On Dec 30, 2020 7:22 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Emailed the CPM on FBI Net to the SAC, SSIAS [redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:19 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] Here is a SITREP for 6 January

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:17 PM  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

Hi Team. The following report is being provided for your situational awareness regarding activities pertaining to 6 January. The next update will be on Tuesday 5 January at noon.

Thank you

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:04 PM  
Subject: 6 Jan 2021 Update  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

*(U//FOUO) The following list of events is being maintained per request of WFO Executive Management. The items on this list are compiled by FBI partner agencies. FBI WFO does not have any information to suggest these events will involve anything other than first amendment protected activity and is being distributed for situational awareness. Their inclusion here is not intended to associate the protected activity with criminality or a threat to national security, or to infer that such protected activity itself violates federal law. However, based on known intelligence and/or specific, historical observations, it is possible the protected activity could invite a violent reaction towards the subject individual or others in retaliation or with the goal of stopping the protected activity from occurring in the first instance. In the event no violent reaction occurs, FBI policy and federal law dictates that no further record be made of the protected activity.*

The following information is current as of 29 December 2020. This is for FBI internal use only.

Note: Apologies if the formatting is off; I am on Office365.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 8:22:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Emailed the CPM on FBI Net to the SAC, SSIAs [redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:19 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] Here is a SITREP for 6 January

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:17 PM  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

To: [redacted]  
[redacted]

Cc: [redacted]  
[redacted]

Hi Team. The following report is being provided for your situational awareness regarding activities pertaining to 6 January. The next update will be on Tuesday 5 January at noon.

Thank you

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:04 PM  
Subject: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

*(U//FOUO) The following list of events is being maintained per request of WFO Executive Management. The items on this list are compiled by FBI partner agencies. FBI WFO does not have any information to suggest these events will involve anything other than first amendment protected activity and is being distributed for situational awareness. Their inclusion here is not intended to associate the protected activity with criminality or a threat to national security, or to infer that such protected activity itself violates federal law. However, based on known intelligence and/or specific, historical observations, it is possible the protected activity could invite a violent reaction towards the subject individual or others in retaliation or with the goal of stopping the protected activity from occurring in the first instance. In the event no violent reaction occurs, FBI policy and federal law dictates that no further record be made of the protected activity.*

The following information is current as of 29 December 2020. This is for FBI internal use only.

Note: Apologies if the formatting is off; I am on Office365.

Relevant Intelligence:

- Per open source, Hotel Harrington will be closed 4-6 January 2021 and Harry's Pub (located at the hotel) will be closed on the 6<sup>th</sup>.  
(<https://www.washpost.com/local/2020/12/29/downtown-dc-trump-supporter-hangouts-to-be-closed-for-1st-5-days/>)
  - Note: This hotel and pub were previously central locations where violence and clashing occurred during the 12 December rallies.

FBI(21-cv-572)-6703

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 8:24:47 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Adding to the weekly ♦♦

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:24 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Awesome! Thanks [redacted] authored and spearheaded the coordination and effort to get the CPM out the door. Thanks again [redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 7:22 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Emailed the CPM on FBI Net to the SAC, SSIA's, [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 7:19 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] Here is a SITREP for 6 January

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:17 PM  
Subject: Fwd: 6 Jan 2021 Update  
To: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Cc: [redacted]  
[redacted]

Hi Team. The following report is being provided for your situational awareness regarding activities pertaining to 6 January. The next update will be on Tuesday 5 January at noon.

Thank you

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 7:04 PM  
Subject: 6 Jan 2021 Update  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:53:35 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

Ha thanks [redacted] still get the ops squads messed up. Lol

-

On Dec 30, 2020 6:52 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all! One clarification, [redacted] I don't believe [redacted]  
[redacted]

Thanks!

-

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]  
[redacted]

Also [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

-

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:28 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

-

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] just reached out to [redacted]. The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put  
out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted]  
[redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted]  
[redacted] That would be my recommendation.

-

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:52:46 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

Hi all! One clarification [redacted] I don't believe [redacted]  
[redacted]

Thanks!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]  
[redacted]

Also [redacted]

As of now I think we have it covered.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:28 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] just reached out to [redacted] The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] thin [redacted] should put  
out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted]  
[redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted]  
[redacted] That would be my recommendation.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:48:22 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 01n events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,4,5,8

Hey [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]

Also [redacted]

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:28 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation [redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just reached out to [redacted] the CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put  
out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted]  
[redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted]  
[redacted] that would be my recommendation.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----  
From [redacted]



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020, 6:30:00 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Ok great! If they can include a question specific to 6 January that would be great!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:28 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just reached out to [redacted] The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I thin [redacted] should put out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted] [redacted] that would be my recommendation.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.

I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:29:10 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:28 PM, [redacted] wrote:

I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation [redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM, [redacted] wrote:

Hey [redacted] just reached out to [redacted] The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted]

[redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted]  
[redacted] That would be my recommendation.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM, [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.

I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

[redacted]  
SSI [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:28:05 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Thank you! I will pass this along and cc you and [redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just reached out to [redacted] The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put  
out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted]  
[redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted]  
[redacted] that would be my recommendation.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.

I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:06 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Acoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:27:57 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

I'll let you know what [redacted] thinks but what I sent was my recommendation: [redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:26 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just reached out to [redacted] The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted] [redacted] that would be my recommendation.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.

I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:06 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 5:11 PM  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "D'Antonio, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)"

Boss [redacted] and I spoke a few minutes ago on the topic of [redacted] He has a call scheduled with [redacted] I think

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:26:32 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Hey [redacted] just reached out to [redacted]. The CPM [redacted] wanted to put out focused [redacted] I think [redacted] should put out their CPM as it was much more [redacted] I asked [redacted] the same thing. We then put out [redacted] This would have to be coordinated with [redacted] [redacted] That would be my recommendation.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:16 PM [redacted] wrote:

See below. Should we adjust?  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.

I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 6:06 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 5:11 PM  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted], "Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

Boss [redacted] and I spoke a few minutes ago on the topic of [redacted]. He has a call scheduled with [redacted] I think tomorrow [redacted]

--Matt

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:16:25 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
See below. Should we adjust?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc:

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

We have one CPM for Inauguration that should be going out soon; I reviewed it today. Let me get on my computer to send it to you.  
I will discuss with [redacted] on this matter and get back to you Boss.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 6:06 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 5:11 PM  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]; Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Boss [redacted] and I spoke a few minutes ago on the topic of [redacted]. He has a call scheduled with [redacted]. I think tomorrow [redacted]

--Matt

-----  
From: D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 15:59  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]; Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]; Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates

Thank [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:08:28 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions  
Attachments: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Hey [redacted] Here is the [redacted] portion.

Thanks so much!

-

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 29, 2020 4:32 PM  
Subject: [redacted] CPM/Questions  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58:25 AM  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

**Cc:** [redacted]

**Subject:** Inauguration CPM  
**Attachments:** FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf

---

Good morning all,

Please see attached for the final version of the Inauguration CPM that is currently going through the approval chain in Sentinel. This version incorporates requests and suggestions from [redacted] hence the small changes and I believe only 1 additional question. I will be touching base with [redacted] to see if we can disseminate this before it is serialized to get it out the door a it faster, but only after everyone has given the go ahead on this version.

Let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for all the work on this!

Best,

[redacted]



**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59:18 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Inauguration CPM  
**Attachments:** FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_Coordinated\_12.29.docx

---

Good evening all!

After having a chance to review the questions sent over by [redacted] myself and [redacted] came to the decision that they don't align with the goal of our field office CPM. We believe [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 5

[redacted] that being said, please see attached for the CPM with included coordination from [redacted] and various WFO intel and operational components.

Please let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for both of your help with this!

Best,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:34:43 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_Edits.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Good morning [redacted]

Please see attached for the national CPM [redacted] US Presidential Inauguration. I will be sending this draft to [redacted] for distribution next week, but please let me know if you have any questions before hand.

Thank you and happy holidays!

[redacted]

[redacted]

Intelligence Analyst  
FBI Washington Field Office  
Cell [redacted]

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:49:54 PM  
To: Moore, Jennifer L (WFE)(FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Boss,  
Attached is the Inauguration Collection Priorities Message. This CPM focuses [REDACTED]  
disseminated this version on FBINet. I will log in to FBINet and send it your way.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
SEA [REDACTED]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[REDACTED] (WORK)  
[REDACTED] (SAMSUNG)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning all,

Please see attached for the final version of the Inauguration CPM that is currently going through the approval chain in Sentinel. This version incorporates requests and suggestions from [REDACTED] hence the small changes and I believe only 1 additional question. I will be touching base with [REDACTED] to see if we can disseminate this before it is serialized to get it out the door a it faster, but only after everyone has given the go ahead on this version.

Let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for all the work on this!

Best,

[REDACTED]  
[FY21\\_inauguration\\_CPM\\_FINAL\\_29\\_December\\_2020.pdf](#)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 5:27:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Awesome! Great job!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 4:27 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Final CPM update I promise: CPM has been disseminated by [redacted] (woohoo!!) and is just awaiting approvals in sentinel from the co-authors and designated approvers.

Thanks!

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:14 PM [redacted] wrote:  
No, thank you for all the work on this!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:13 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Oh perfect!! I will let [redacted] know. Thank you again!!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM [redacted] wrote:

Hey [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted] Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] SAMSUNG}

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM b7C -1  
it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it. b7E -3,5

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted] as he is not on our branch. But you can definitely nudge him 😊

Thank you!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] SAMSUNG}

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:58 AM [redacted] wrote:  
I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted] our [redacted] A as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was

going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] A last night who is working on their CPM, I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]  
This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] UC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.  
Thanks!  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM  
To [redacted]  
Cc [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good to go on my end.

SS [redacted]  
PM [redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58 AM  
To [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:09:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

-  
On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!

[redacted]

-  
On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted] as he is not on our branch. But you can definitely nudge him 💎💎

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thank you!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:58 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted] our [redacted] IA as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

-  
On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] IA last night who is working on their CPM. I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:07:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted] as he is not on our branch. But you can definitely nudge him ♦♦

Thank you!

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:58 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted] our [redacted] IA as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] IA last night who is working on their CPM. I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:59:45 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted] as he is not on our branch. But you can definitely nudge him ♦♦

Thank you!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:58 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted] our [redacted] IA as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] I will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] IA last night who is working on their CPM. I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] UC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.  
Thanks!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:58:00 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted] our [redacted] IA as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] A last night who is working on their CPM, I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:

This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] UC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.  
Thanks!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM

To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good to go on my end.

[redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:54:26 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Also that was supposed to be Oh that is excellent! (Samsung hates me at times hahaha)

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:53 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] A last night who is working on their CPM, I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:

This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] JC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good to go on my end.

SA [redacted]  
FIN Washington Field Office  
Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:53:33 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Oh that is excellent? Should we try and co-author with them?

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:49 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Not a problem [redacted] I will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] A last night who is working on their CPM, I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]  
This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] UC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.  
Thanks!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good to go on my end.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:49:20 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Not a problem [redacted] I will wait to hear from you. I will let you know after speaking with the [redacted] A last night who is working on their CPM, I offered to send over some helpful tips for writing [redacted] questions and [redacted] questions from the WFO perspective. So hopefully that can help [redacted] even if we won't have a combined CPM.

Thank you!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:19 AM, [redacted] wrote:

This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] UC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.

Thanks!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted]  
(WORK)  
(SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good to go on my end.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Inauguration CPM

Good morning all,

Please see attached for the final version of the Inauguration CPM that is currently going through the approval chain in Sentinel. This version incorporates requests and suggestions from [redacted] hence the small changes and I believe only 1 additional question. I will be touching base with [redacted] to see if we can disseminate this before it is serialized to get it out the door as fast as possible, but only after everyone has given the go ahead on this

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:19:28 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]

This is IPM approved. As soon as I connect with [redacted] JC, I will let you know to reach out to [redacted] to request a pre-Sentinel dissemination. I want to ensure [redacted] and WFO are on the same page before this is disseminated.

Thanks!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 11:17 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good to go on my end.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning all,

Please see attached for the final version of the Inauguration CPM that is currently going through the approval chain in Sentinel. This version incorporates requests and suggestions from [redacted] hence the small changes and I believe only 1 additional question. I will be touching base with [redacted] to see if we can disseminate this before it is serialized to get it out the door as fast as we can, but only after everyone has given the go ahead on this version.

Let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for all the work on this!

Best,

[redacted]

EY21\_inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 4:27:17 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Final CPM update I promise: CPM has been disseminated by [redacted] (woohoo!!) and is just awaiting approvals in sentinel from the co-authors and designated approvers.

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 3:14 PM [redacted] wrote:  
No, thank you for all the work on this!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:13 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Oh perfect!! I will let [redacted] know. Thank you again!!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted] hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 10:30:48 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi [redacted]

Everything looks good to me from the [redacted] side. Copying [redacted] so they are aware that this will be coming out.

Thank you!  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Office, [redacted]  
Desk: [redacted]  
Samsung [redacted]  
Email [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 9:58 AM

To: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

Good morning all,

Please see attached for the final version of the Inauguration CPM that is currently going through the approval chain in Sentinel. This version incorporates requests and suggestions from [redacted] hence the small changes and I believe only 1 additional question. I will be touching base with [redacted] to see if we can disseminate this before it is serialized to get it out the door a it faster, but only after everyone has given the go ahead on this version.

Let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for all the work on this!

Best,  
[redacted]

[FY21 Inauguration CPM FINAL 29 December 2020.pdf](#)



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:29:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thank you both!

On Dec 29, 2020 5:25 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Thank you, [redacted]. That addition works perfectly. Also, I will be chatting with A/UC [redacted] tomorrow. I will report back.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

Hi all,

I have attached a response to [redacted] question, and clarified the first/second questions. [redacted] the intent was for [redacted] so I made sure to make that more clear.

Thanks!

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Hey [redacted] looks good. One question/comment: The first and second questions are very similar. Is one focused on [redacted] and another on any [redacted]

Thanks!

On Dec 29, 2020 5:15 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Team,  
Only one comment attached.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

Good evening all!

After having a chance to review the questions sent over by [redacted] myself and [redacted] came to the decision that they don't align with the goal of our field office CPM. We believe [redacted]

[redacted] That being said, please see attached for the CPM with included coordination from [redacted] and various WFO intel and operational components.

Please let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for both of your help with this!

Best,

[redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,5

[FY21 Inauguration\\_CPM\\_FINAL\\_Coordinated\\_12.29.docx](#)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:28:56 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks [redacted]

On Dec 29, 2020 5:25 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Thank you, [redacted]. That addition works perfectly. Also, I will be chatting with A/UC [redacted] tomorrow. I will report back.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
(WORK)  
(SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Hi all,  
I have attached a response to [redacted] question, and clarified the first/second questions. [redacted] the intent was for [redacted] so I made sure to make that more clear.

Thanks!

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Her [redacted] looks good. One question/comment: The first and second questions are very similar. Is one focused on [redacted] and another on any [redacted]

Thanks!

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

On Dec 29, 2020 5:15 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Team,  
Only one comment attached.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
(WORK)  
(SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 6:25:56 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thank you, [redacted] That addition works perfectly. Also, I will be chatting with A/LC [redacted] tomorrow. I will report back.

[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] WORK  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Hi all,  
  
I have attached a response to [redacted] question, and clarified the first/second questions [redacted] the intent was for [redacted] so I made sure to make that more clear.

Thanks!

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

He [redacted] looks good. One question/comment: The first and second questions are very similar. Is one focused on [redacted] and another on any [redacted]

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 29, 2020 5:15 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Team,  
Only one comment attached.

[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE [redacted]  
[redacted] WORK  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

Good evening all!

After having a chance to review the questions sent over by [redacted] myself and [redacted] came to the decision that they don't align with the goal of our field office CPM. We believe [redacted]

[redacted] That being said, please see attached for the CPM with included coordination from [redacted] and various [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:25:52 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

Thanks!! Looks good!

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 3, 5

On Dec 29, 2020 5:24 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all,

I have attached a response to [redacted] question, and clarified the first/second questions [redacted] the intent was for [redacted] so I made sure to make that more clear.

Thanks!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 3, 5

Hey [redacted] looks good. One question/comment: The first and second questions are very similar. Is one focused on [redacted] and another on any [redacted]

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 29, 2020 5:15 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Team,  
Only one comment attached.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 3, 5

Good evening all!

After having a chance to review the questions sent over by [redacted] myself and [redacted] came to the decision that they don't align with the goal of our field office CPM. We believe [redacted] That being said, please see attached for the CPM with included coordination from [redacted] and various WFO intel and operational components.

Please let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for both of your help with this!

Best,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:24:41 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM  
Attachments: [redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Hi all,

I have attached a response to [redacted] question, and clarified the first/second questions [redacted], the intent was for [redacted] so I made sure to make that more clear.

Thanks!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Hey [redacted] Looks good. One question/comment: The first and second questions are very similar. Is one focused on [redacted] and another on any [redacted]

[redacted]

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 29, 2020 5:15 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Team,  
Only one comment attached.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Good evening all!

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Please let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for both of your help with this!

Best,

[redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 6:15:41 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_IPM Question\_29 December 2020.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Team,  
Only one comment attached.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted]  
(WORK)  
(SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 4:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Good evening all!

After having a chance to review the questions sent over by [redacted] myself and [redacted] came to the decision that they don't align with the goal of our field office CPM. We believe [redacted] That being said, please see attached for the CPM with included coordination from [redacted] and various WFO intel and operational components.

Please let me know if anyone has questions and thank you for both of your help with this!

Best,  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 21-cv-572

Total Deleted Page(s) = 198

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Page 11 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 1,2,9;  
Page 12 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1;  
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Page 238 ~ b6 - 2,3; b7C - 2,3; b7D - 2; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 239 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 240 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1,2,3,4,5;  
Page 241 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1,2,4,5;  
Page 242 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 243 ~ b6 - 2; b7C - 2; b7D - 2; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 244 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 1,2,3,4;  
Page 245 ~ b6 - 2,3; b7C - 2,3; b7D - 2; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 246 ~ b6 - 2,3; b7C - 2,3; b7D - 2; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 247 ~ b6 - 1,3; b7C - 1,3; b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 248 ~ b7E - 1,2,3,4;  
Page 249 ~ b7E - 1,2,3,4;  
Page 250 ~ b7E - 1,2,4;  
Page 251 ~ b7E - 1,2,4;  
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From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 3:46:30 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

You did a fantastic job!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 2:44 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Thanks [redacted] will send the edited version over to [redacted] Monday for distribution.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks again!

On Dec 23, 2020 2:27 PM, [redacted] wrote:

Very well done. Only two tiny edits.  
Thank you!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:38 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Thank you [redacted] ♦♦

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:37 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Hi [redacted]  
Thank you! I will take a look see after my morning meetings and respond back. Please know if it is after hours, I am not expecting you to respond or address it...any feedback or questions I send can be handled on Monday...time to celebrate Christmas ♦♦.  
Merry Christmas!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:34 AM

To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Good morning [redacted]

Please see attached for the national CPM [redacted] US Presidential Inauguration. I will be sending this draft to [redacted] for distribution next week, but please let me know if you have any questions before hand.

Thank you and happy holidays!

[redacted]

[redacted]

Intelligence Analyst  
FBI Washington Field Office  
Cell: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 4:14:33 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

No, thank you for all the work on this!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:13 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Oh perfect!! I will let [redacted] know. Thank you again!!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.  
[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted]. Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 3:27:29 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_IPM Comments\_23 December 2020.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
Very well done. Only two tiny edits.  
Thank you!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
S&A [redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:38 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Thank you [redacted] ◆◆

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:37 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Hi [redacted]  
Thank you! I will take a look see after my morning meetings and respond back. Please know if it is after hours, I am not expecting you to respond or address it...any feedback or questions I send can be handled on Monday...time to celebrate Christmas ◆◆.  
Merry Christmas!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
S&A [redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 10:34 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Good morning [redacted]

Please see attached for the national CPM [redacted] US Presidential Inauguration. I will be sending this draft to [redacted] for distribution next week, but please let me know if you have any questions before hand.

Thank you and happy holidays!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
FBI Washington Field Office  
Cell [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13:37 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Oh perfect!! I will let [redacted] know. Thank you again!!

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted]. Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13:24 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Wohoo alright!

On Dec 30, 2020 3:12 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted] Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] IPM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 4:07:05 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hahaha! You read my mind. I just emailed [redacted] as I haven't heard from him. Waiting on a response now.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 3:05 PM [redacted] wrote:

H [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]

From [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM [redacted] wrote:

I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM [redacted] wrote:

If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM [redacted] wrote:

I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted]

Thank you!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:06:02 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hey [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted] Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
I defer to you.

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted]

Thank you!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:04:03 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

H [redacted]

I just wanted to check in and see where we were standing with [redacted] will be heading out at 4 pm today so I wanted to know if I should hang out and try and catch them for a dissemination this week. I don't believe [redacted] will be in office tomorrow with the holiday.

Thank you! 😊

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 12:11 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Inauguration CPM

Good calls!

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 30, 2020 12:09 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I agree with having [redacted] take a look if we are attached. It's a good catch all for all things DT and with the proposed focus of the [redacted] CPM I think having legal eyes on it couldn't hurt.

On Dec 30, 2020 12:07 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
If [redacted] wants to coauthor im good with it. If he does coauthor with [redacted] we [redacted] will eventually have to at least review and approve the CPM as it would be a WFO product so I'd want our legal folks to again review it.

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 11:59 AM [redacted] wrote:  
I defer to you.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Unfortunately I can't recommend [redacted]

Thank you!

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 11:58 AM [redacted] wrote:  
I think I may stay on the sidelines and just help rather than coauthor. But I was going to suggest [redacted], our [redacted] A as a coauthor as he is a wonderful SME for [redacted] background info. But I'm happy to keep helping. :) I also don't know their time frame for wanting to get this out so I was going to send over my suggestions today for [redacted] to at least kick start it.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 4:29:22 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Awesome! Thanks [redacted] I know [redacted] will be in tomorrow and can sign if the others have signed. If not, I will sign next week. Thanks for all your work on this!!

On Dec 30, 2020 4:27 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Final CPM update I promise: CPM has been disseminated by [redacted] (woohoo!!) and is just awaiting approvals in sentinel from the co-authors and designated approvers.

Thanks!

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 3:14 PM [redacted] wrote:  
No, thank you for all the work on this!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:13 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Oh perfect!! I will let [redacted] know. Thank you again!!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:13 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted] just called. We are good to go. They are fine with doing a separate CPM.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

On Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I just spoke with [redacted] and she was going to ping [redacted] Hopefully we'll be good to go soon.

On Dec 30, 2020 3:04 PM [redacted] wrote:

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 23, 2020 9:31:07 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: IPM Notes: MEO1 and MEO2

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,5

Hey [redacted] updated my MEO1 draft [redacted] Please let me know your thoughts.

Thanks

[redacted]

[redacted]

b5 -1  
b7E -1,2,4

[redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 9:18 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: IPM Notes: MEO1 and MEO2

[redacted]

This email is for tomorrow. Do not address tonight. I am sending now as I will be tied up tomorrow.

I reviewed MEO1 submission [redacted]

[redacted] then my suggestion would be [redacted]

[redacted] So, for now, I suggest, [redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Happy to chat more whenever,

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:59:26 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Copy

On Dec 30, 2020 7:01 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:  
Sorry Boss...one oopsy! We meant [REDACTED] not [REDACTED]. Seems I always have [REDACTED] in my mind, hahaha! That dang backlog.

[REDACTED]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[REDACTED] (WORK)  
[REDACTED] (SAMSUNG)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:57 PM  
To: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5,8

Boss,  
I am told that [REDACTED] CM IA [REDACTED]

Based on this information, we do not recommend an additional CPM for the 6 January 2021 events.

[REDACTED] will be disseminating their own CPM (in coordination and collaboration with WFO). I spoke with the A/UC today. I do not have a timeline for dissemination tho. But, since they are coordinating with us, and if they are disseminating prior to 6 January 2021, we can suggest a specific 6 January 2021 question.

[REDACTED] and I are available if anything is needed.

Thanks!

[REDACTED]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[REDACTED] (WORK)  
[REDACTED] (SAMSUNG)

From: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:06 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

Wouldn't this request be a CEM?

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 5:11 PM  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Cc: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]; "Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

Boss [REDACTED] and I spoke a few minutes ago on the topic of [REDACTED]. He has a call scheduled with [REDACTED] I think tomorrow [REDACTED]

--Matt

From: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 8:05:41 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Copy

On Dec 30, 2020 7:01 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:  
Sorry Boss...one oopsy! We meant [REDACTED] not [REDACTED] Seems I always have [REDACTED] in my mind, hahaha! That dang backlog.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] FBI  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[REDACTED] (WORK)  
[REDACTED] (SAMSUNG)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:57 PM  
To: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5,8

Boss,  
I am told that [REDACTED] CM IA [REDACTED]

Based on this information, we do not recommend an additional CPM for the 6 January 2021 events.

[REDACTED] will be disseminating their own CPM (in coordination and collaboration with WFO). I spoke with the A/UC today. I do not have a timeline for dissemination tho. But, since they are coordinating with us, and if they are disseminating prior to 6 January 2021, we can suggest a specific 6 January 2021 question.

[REDACTED] and I are available if anything is needed.

Thanks!

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] FBI  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[REDACTED] (WORK)  
[REDACTED] (SAMSUNG)

From: Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:06 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Wouldn't this request be a CEM?

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 5:11 PM  
Subject: Re: January 6th events updates  
To: "D'Antonio, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Cc: "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]; Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

Boss [REDACTED] and I spoke a few minutes ago on the topic of [REDACTED] He has a call scheduled with [REDACTED] I think tomorrow [REDACTED]

--Matt



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 2:09:58 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Presidential Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Cool beans!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] 351A [redacted] 277  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 1:08 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Presidential Inauguration CPM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hey [redacted] spoke to [redacted]. She advised that she spoke to the new UC in [redacted] about the CPM and they are good with it. She will reach out to [redacted] and [redacted] to see if both want their folks on it as coauthors. If so [redacted] and [redacted] will need to sign off in Sentinel. If not, the coordination is documented in different emails and I've asked [redacted] to serialize those emails to document the coordination. You and I would then be listed as the only approvers. I will keep you posted as I hear more.

Thanks

[redacted]

-

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:04:20 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5,8

Oh good lord I'm sorry for the miscommunication [redacted]

This is why my team is phenomenal! Not only do they do great work but they keep me out of trouble lol.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:59 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
One last clarification, [redacted] works [redacted] no [redacted].. sorry all!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:58 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I get them confused too. Thank you [redacted]. cc'd you both in my response to the SAC.  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
[redacted] FIELD OFFICE  
(WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:54 PM  
To [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

No worries, I gave you a really fast run down haha

On Dec 30, 2020 6:53 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Ha thanks [redacted] I still get the ops squads messed up. Lol

On Dec 30, 2020 6:52 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all! One clarification, [redacted] I don't believe [redacted]

Thanks!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]  
[redacted] Given all this, at this time there is probably no need to draft up an RFC. Again if [redacted] wants to include a question in their CPM about 6 January that can only help.

Also, [redacted]

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:59:42 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks!!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:58 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I got them confused too. Thank you [redacted] I cc'd you both in my response to the SAC.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8

No worries, I gave you a really fast run down haha

On Dec 30, 2020 6:53 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Ha thanks [redacted] I still get the ops squads messed up. Lol.

On Dec 30, 2020 6:52 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all! One clarification [redacted] I don't believe [redacted]  
[redacted]

Thanks!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Given all this, at this time there is probably no need to draft up an RFC. Again if [redacted] wants to include a question in their CPM about 6 January that can only help.

Also [redacted]

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:59:36 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,4,5

One last clarification.. [redacted] works [redacted] to [redacted].. sorry all!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:58 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I get them confused too. Thank you [redacted] I cc'd you both in my response to the SAC.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:54 PM  
To [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8

No worries, I gave you a really fast run down haha

On Dec 30, 2020 6:53 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Ha thanks [redacted] I still get the ops squads messed up. Lol

On Dec 30, 2020 6:52 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all! One clarification [redacted] I don't believe [redacted]  
[redacted]

Thanks!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]  
[redacted] Given all this, at this time there is probably no need to draft up an RFC. Again if [redacted] wants to include a question in their CPM about 6 January that can only help.

Also [redacted]

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:57:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Re: Re: January 6th events updates

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I get them confused too. Thank you [redacted] I cc'd you both in my response to the SAC.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
WORK  
(SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 6:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: January 6th events updates

No worries, I gave you a really fast run down haha

On Dec 30, 2020 6:53 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Ha thanks [redacted] still get the ops squads messed up. Lol

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

On Dec 30, 2020 6:52 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hi all! One clarification, [redacted] don't believe [redacted]

Thanks!

On Dec 30, 2020 6:48 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] and it sounds like [redacted]

[redacted] Given all this, at this time there is probably no need to draft up an RFC. Again if [redacted] wants to include a question in their CPM about 6 January that can only help.

Also, [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

As of now I think we have it covered.

Please let us know if the SAC has additional questions.

[redacted]

On Dec 30, 2020 6:29 PM [redacted] wrote:  
I need to get on a computer. So not sending yet. I am sure [redacted] will respond shortly.

[redacted] said they are working on one.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:12:48 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Re: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Sounds good! I think everyone is scrambling today so I'm not surprised [redacted] is a bit tied up.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 3:08 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Re: [redacted] CPM/Questions

Awaiting a response. See trail below.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 30, 2020 3:06 PM  
Subject: Re: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Hi [redacted]

I imagine with all the Nashville stuff you are pretty tied up. So here is the BLUF in case it is easier to connect over email.  
BLUF: the submission from [redacted] for incorporation is outside the focus of the WFO CPM, so we are recommending [redacted] does a separate CPM. I believe [redacted] our CMIA, has been in contact with your ColIMC already. So collaboration is ongoing, which is awesome.

[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 29, 2020 5:24 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
No problem! Hit me up when you can tomorrow [redacted] but I am home doing Hand Lettering drills, LOL! Yes, I have taken a #selfcare hand lettering.

LOL! I totally get it. I have three gifts for [redacted] that are somewhere on distribution facilities limbo.

Also, I am glad you are there during this Nashville situation. They need your calm demeanor because I am sure everyone is hairs on file like Skule days 😊.

Chat tomorrow! Can't wait to catch up too!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
SSIA [redacted] PM  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:18 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] CPM/Questions

Hello boss!

I just heard from [redacted] and our IA on the piece. I will definitely reach out tomorrow. I'm fortunate enough to be on this TDY while the Nashville CP is running hot, so I may be in a little later in the day, say 1 or 2 ish.

No card yet, although it may not be entirely USPS's fault (though I have things sent out STILL not at their destination) as I am not exactly the best at checking my mailbox everyday....

b6 -1  
b7C -1

It's a little up hill from the house, so you know, gotta save those calories when it's this cold out!

Talk soon and thank you for the look out with the CPMs!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:14 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi [redacted]

Hope you are doing well! I know usually I reach out to check in, but this time I am reaching out about a CPM. WFO is putting a CPM for the Inauguration, which was coordinated with you [redacted] had an interested in including some questions. And, this is what I want to chat about.

But, your ColIMC will be chatting with you tomorrow. So, I would prefer you have a chance to chat with [redacted] Ping me afterwards so we can chat.

[redacted]

PS  
Did you get my card? USPS is sioooooow.

[redacted]  
[redacted] BY [redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] WORK  
[redacted] SAMSUNG

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:08 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hey [redacted] Here is the [redacted] portion.

Thanks so much!

-

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 29, 2020 4:32 PM  
Subject: [redacted] CPM/Questions  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 6:24:07 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -3,5

No problem! Hit me up when you can tomorrow [redacted] but I am home doing Hand Lettering drills, LOL! Yes, I have taken a #selfcare hand lettering.

LOL! I totally get it. I have three gifts for [redacted] that are somewhere on distribution facilities limbo.

Also, I am glad you are there during this Nashville situation. They need your calm demeanor because I am sure everyone is hairs on fire like Skule days 💎💎.

Chat tomorrow! Can't wait to catch up too!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:18 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hello boss!

I just heard from [redacted] and our IA on the piece. I will definitely reach out tomorrow. I'm fortunate enough to be on this TDY while the Nashville CP is running hot, so I may be in a little later in the day, say 1 or 2 ish.

No card yet, although it may not be entirely USPS's fault (though I have things sent out STILL not at their destination) as I am not exactly the best at checking my mailbox everyday....

It's a little up hill from the house, so you know, gotta save those calories when it's this cold out!

Talk soon and thank you for the look out with the CPMs!

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:14 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fw: [redacted] CPM/Questions

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi [redacted]  
Hope you are doing well! I know usually I reach out to check in, but this time I am reaching out about a CPM. WFO is putting a CPM for the Inauguration, which was coordinated with you [redacted] had an interested in including some questions. And, this is what I want to chat about.  
But, your ColIMC will be chatting with you tomorrow. So, I would prefer you have a chance to chat with [redacted] Ping me afterwards so we can chat.

PS  
Did you get my card? USPS is sioooooow.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [redacted]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE  
[redacted] (WORK)  
[redacted] (SAMSUNG)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 5:08 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted] CPM/Questions



From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:54:49 AM  
To:

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,14

[redacted]

Moore, Jennifer L. (WF)(FBI)

[redacted]

Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: [redacted] Cancelled for 1/6  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf

Good morning all,

Firstly, apologies for a day of cancellation but with the events happening downtown we decided the best course would be to cancel [redacted] this week. The only update from [redacted] is the attached Collection Priorities Message. The CPM is a national collection priority [redacted] [redacted] US Presidential Inauguration being held on 20 January. [redacted] While the questions in the CPM are approved for dissemination, please keep in mind the document itself is NOT approved for dissemination to partner agencies.

If anyone has additional requests or updates please send them along the Red Side [redacted] distro.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,5,14

We will resume [redacted] on 1/20. Thank you and talk with everyone soon!


Best,

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Road Closures

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,8

[redacted]



Stand down. The CP is shutting down for the night. Head home.

Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

On [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]

The parking garage is open and accessible. However perimeter parking and the building museum are not available for parking.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted] advised the road closures emailed yesterday are still in effect. They are attached below.

Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

----- Forwarded message -----

From: WFO FOUC [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 2:30:06  
Subject: Road Closures  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:

b7E -3,5

Due to the First Amendment protected activities, multiple street closures and parking restrictions will be activated in downtown Washington, DC beginning tomorrow January 5 – 7, 2021.

Below is a list of the affected areas:

**Street Closures**

On January 5 – 6, the following streets will be restricted/closed to vehicular traffic from approximately 6:00 AM to 11:59 PM. If safe to do so, vehicles will be allowed to enter the restricted areas if individuals are on essential business or traveling to/from their residence.

- Constitution Ave from Pennsylvania Ave to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- K St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- I St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- H St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- New York Ave from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- New York Ave from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 12<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- F St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- F St from 12<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- F St from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- E St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- E St from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- D St from 5<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 9:51:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: FW: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION: ACTIVATION OF [redacted] ON 01/05/2021.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,8

Additional info on the CP [redacted] so please respond with which days you could do, if any.

Thanks

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 9:37 PM  
Subject: Fwd: FW: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION: ACTIVATION OF [redacted] ON 01/05/2021.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

To: [redacted]

Cc:  
Fysa

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 9:20 PM  
Subject: FW: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION: ACTIVATION OF [redacted] ON 01/05/2021.

To: [redacted]

Cc: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)"

[redacted]

FYSA

[redacted]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
Cell: [redacted]  
Desk: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5,8

From: SIOC [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 9:19 PM  
To: SIOC\_CRITICAL\_INCIDENT [redacted] WFO\_CRITICAL\_INCIDENT [redacted]  
WFO FOUO [redacted]  
Cc: HQ-DIV22-SIOC-DD-ADD-EADS [redacted] IR-EXEC-SC-ASC-UC [redacted]  
[redacted] Beach, George P. (OPE) (FBI) [redacted] Carlisle, Travis D. (DI) (FBI) [redacted] P'Antuono, Steven Michael  
(WF) (FBI) [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted] Onks, Sherri E. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Meador,  
Stanley M. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Smith, James H. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] SIOC [redacted]  
Subject: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION: ACTIVATION OF [redacted] ON 01/05/2021.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
STRATEGIC INFORMATION & OPERATIONS CENTER

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS NOTIFICATION

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Deputy Director David Bowdich

CURRENT SITUATION [redacted]

FBI(21-cv-572)-6893

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: IOC Status...

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: IOC Status...  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** IOC Status...  
**To:** [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Cc:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
All,

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks for all the offers of support. At this point, we are trying to get a sense of what we need to [redacted]  
[redacted]

As of right now [redacted]  
[redacted] FBI and other agencies are evacuating the Capitol and the Mayor has set a 6pm curfew for DC.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

Once we get a better sense of what we are up against, we will send an update.

[redacted]

~~~~~  
[redacted]  
Supervisory Intelligence Analyst  
[redacted]  
WFO [redacted]  
[redacted] (desk)  
[redacted] (cell)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 9:26:59 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Request for Assistance: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,8

[redacted]

Sorry for the late email. Bluf

[redacted]

Please send positive responses only to me by 9 am tomorrow, thanks

[redacted]

-

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 9:02 PM  
Subject: Fwd: Request for Assistance: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

[redacted]

Cc:

Team,

Please see the below. [redacted] It may end earlier depending on the activity. Please let me know your availability and if you have SAs who can fill in as well.

[redacted]

-

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 8:50 PM  
Subject: Request for Assistance: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5,8

To: [redacted]

Cc: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

[redacted]

We've just been informed that the Deputy Director [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Thanks,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Assistant Special Agent in Charge [redacted]

FBI(21-cv-572)-6896

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 6:23 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Road Closures

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

[redacted]

The parking garage is open and accessible. However perimeter parking and the building museum are not available for parking.

[redacted] advised the road closures emailed yesterday are still in effect. They are attached below.

Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** WFO FOUO [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 4, 2021 23:06  
**Subject:** Road Closures  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]

Due to the First Amendment protected activities, multiple street closures and parking restrictions will be activated in downtown Washington, DC beginning tomorrow January 5 – 7, 2021.

Below is a list of the affected areas:

**Street Closures**

On January 5 – 6, the following streets will be restricted/closed to vehicular traffic from approximately 6:00 AM to 11:59 PM. If safe to do so, vehicles will be allowed to enter the restricted areas if individuals are on essential business or traveling to/from their residence.

- Constitution Ave from Pennsylvania Ave to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- K St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- I St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- H St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- New York Ave from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- New York Ave from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 9<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 12<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 15<sup>th</sup> St, NW
- G St from 17<sup>th</sup> St, NW to 18<sup>th</sup> St, NW

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 10:13:48 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: Tomorrow...

Guidance from [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 6, 2021 8:29 PM  
Subject: Tomorrow...  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
All,

Given the events of today, [redacted]  
[redacted] please let me know ASAP and we can plan it out.

As of now, the CP [redacted] we are still trying to figure out what we might need to [redacted] I ask that you all remain flexible and I will update you as I know more.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

Thanks gang,  
[redacted]

Supervisory Intelligence Analyst  
[redacted]  
WFO [redacted]  
[redacted] (desk)  
[redacted] (cell)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:57:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Fwd: URGENT RESPONSE REQUESTED [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

H [redacted]

I am available for the [redacted]

Thank you,

[redacted]

[redacted]

Intelligence Analyst [redacted]  
Washington Field Office, FBI  
Cell [redacted]  
Office [redacted]

On Jan 6, 2021 5:45 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Folks,

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

Please see below. Feel free to contact [redacted] directly if you are interested in supporting this week's command post.

Thanks.

[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 6, 2021 4:45 PM  
Subject: URGENT RESPONSE REQUESTED [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

S/As-

In light of ongoing events, [redacted] Please push this to your squads ASAP.  
Volunteers can contact me directly with their availability. Please note there are [redacted]

Thanks for your assistance!

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

[redacted]



**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 5, 2021 10:28:57 AM  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

**Cc:**  
**Subject:** Next Two Days

Folks,

Happy New Year. Just wanted to update you on my whereabouts for the next couple days. I will be leaving early today (around 2:00pm) [redacted]

[redacted] Let me know if you need anything.

Thanks.

[redacted]  
SIA [redacted]  
Washington Field Office [redacted]  
Desk [redacted]  
Cell [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 11:29:34 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Tomorrow Night

---

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

ALCON,

I just spoke to [redacted] and we are scheduled for the 10p shift tomorrow night. I will let you know if we receive additional guidance during the day tomorrow. Stay tuned.

Thanks,

[redacted]  
Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Tonight

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -3,5,8

[redacted]

I assume everyone has seen the email that the Crisis Response Plan has been activated. I am unsure if [redacted]

[redacted] If I am unable, [redacted] will be A/SSA [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] will determine a meeting location. Please email

[redacted] and I with your status [redacted]

Be prepared for a cold evening and most importantly, stay safe.

Feel free to reach out with any questions

thanks

[redacted]

WFO/NVRA

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: Tonight

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,8

Plan to meet in the [redacted]

For new folks [redacted]

I'll be there early to grab the spot and will let you know if we have to adjust.

Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -3,5,8

On [redacted] wrote:

I assume everyone has seen the email that the Crisis Response Plan has been activated. I am unsure if [redacted] if I am unable [redacted] will be A/SSA [redacted]

[redacted] will determine a meeting location. Please email [redacted] and I with your status [redacted]

Be prepared for a cold evening and most importantly, stay safe.

Feel free to reach out with any questions

thanks

[redacted]

WFO/NVRA

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Tonight

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5,8

Folks,

Sorry I'm going to miss the winter iteration on the streets of D.C. with you. For those there in June, you know the drill: use your heads and look after each other. The one new rule for this iteration: if [redacted] gets cold, someone put him in their pocket.

Good luck.

[redacted]

A/SC [redacted]  
CTD [redacted]  
w/ [redacted]  
c: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8

On Jan 6, 2021 5:58 PM [redacted] wrote:  
Plan to meet in the [redacted]

For new folks [redacted]

I'll be there early to grab the spot and will let you know if we have to adjust.

Thanks,

[redacted]

Special Agent  
FBI | Washington Field  
202-278-2000

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -3,5,8

On Jan 6, 2021 16:22, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted]

I assume everyone has seen the email that the Crisis Response Plan has been activated. I am unsure if [redacted]  
[redacted] if I am unable [redacted] will be A/SSA [redacted]  
[redacted] will determine a meeting location. Please email [redacted] and I with your status [redacted]

Be prepared for a cold evening and most importantly, stay safe.

Feel free to reach out with any questions

thanks

[redacted]  
WFO/NVRA  
[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 31, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: National Collection Priorities Message Regarding Threats to the 2021 US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~  
**Attachments:** FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf  
**SentinelCaseId:** NON-RECORD / PERSONAL EMAIL

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~  
=====

(U) ~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~: The information marked (U//~~LES~~) in this document is the property of FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the ~~LES~~ caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

FYI

Also hats off to [redacted] for handling this beast ;)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 30, 2020 4:21 PM  
**To:** HQ-DIV19-COLLMQ [redacted] HQ-DIV19-IPC [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]

**Subject:** National Collection Priorities Message Regarding Threats to the 2021 US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~LES~~  
-----

(U) ~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~: The information marked (U//~~LES~~) in this document is the property of FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the ~~LES~~ caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

Good Afternoon,

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:57 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: FW: National Collection Priorities Message Regarding Threats to the 2021 US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC — UNCLASSIFIED//LES  
Attachments: FY21\_Inauguration\_CPM\_FINAL\_29\_December\_2020.pdf

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//LES

-----  
Sent for Approval for RECORD//Sentinel Case NON-RECORD / PERSONAL EMAIL

(U) ~~LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), US intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the ~~LES~~ caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

Good Morning, Everyone!

WFO has just sent out its Collection Priorities Message [redacted] to the national field offices. I want to **make** sure you all saw it as well (see attachment above). This is not a tasking and no action is required.

b3 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5,9

Let me know if I can be of any assistance! Thank you!

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
WFO [redacted]  
Desk [redacted]  
Cell [redacted]  
IWICS [redacted]  
UNET [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 2:12 PM  
To: HQ-DIV19-COLLMC [redacted] HQ-DIV19-IPD [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Subject: National Collection Priorities Message Regarding Threats to the 2021 US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC --- UNCLASSIFIED//LES

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//LES

-----  
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Good Afternoon,

[redacted]

b7E -1,2,5,9

From: MOY, STACEY R. (WF) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 3:00:17 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc:  
Subject: SAC Holiday Message — UNCLASSIFIED

b7E -5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

Folks,

*As 2020 comes to a close, I wanted to take just a few moments to connect with you.*

*This year has been anything but easy. The easy stuff was hard, and the hard stuff was near-impossible. Not only have we endured the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic, we were in the epicenter for issues devolving to criminal violence under lawful protests; along with continued, intense public scrutiny and special inquiries impacting the FBI brand and very important work we do in CI Division.*

*We found ourselves in unusual positions, whether it be finding new and innovative solutions to accomplish our vital national security mission in an unclassified, telework environment; or juggling virtual learning, childcare, and the ever-shuttering of the economy leading to job loss, restrictions for travel, and limitations to social gatherings with friends and loved ones. We encountered personal impact at home and in the communities we serve.*

*Throughout it all, you demonstrated grit, resilience, and a tenacity to overcome adversity no matter the obstacle or sacrifice. I am so proud of everyone in the CI Division. I know we are all human and this effort did not come without toll. Many of us gave from empty tanks so I urge you to continue to look after our most vital asset, our people: each other and yourselves. Please don't suffer in silence – it's OK, not to be OK. We will find you the help you need and get through it together. As such, while the Division is 100% back through a staggered, in-office and telework presence to ensure a healthy, full mission-capable workforce, we will continue with our current posture of maximum flexibility in the New Year.*

*While we didn't have frequent opportunities to learn from each other by regular interactions, meetings, and town halls, we will continue to find other means to identify, understand and improve upon our processes to do the right thing, and in the right way. As such, we will be issuing a modified climate survey in the New Year so we may become better, and better serve you.*

*There have been many great things to reflect upon. Even amongst the challenges in 2020, we attacked the enemy and continued many highly impactful actions to push them on their heels. Whether it be through sophisticated recruitment operations, espionage arrests and sentencings, covert entries, and installations, or safeguarding of the elections, you have made a tremendous difference in upholding the FBI mission. You also earned well deserved recognition as recipients for the AG, Director's, and Intel/law enforcement community awards along with many other accolades including career promotions to increased leadership positions. We also celebrated extraordinary bookend milestones in the retirements of some of the finest counterintelligence professionals along with additions of new children (two and four-legged) to our FBI family.*

*It has been a great year because of all of you – thank you with all my heart!*

*Wishing all of you a safe and wonderful Holiday Season. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!*


-Stacey

Stacey R. Moy  
Special Agent in Charge  
Counterintelligence Division  
FBI Washington Field Office  
Office [REDACTED] Mobile [REDACTED]

b7E -3

FBI(21-cv-572)-6940





b6 -1  
b7C -1

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 8:52 AM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: 0800 SITREP

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

V/R

SSA [redacted]  
FBI/WFO [redacted]  
202-278-2000

**From:** Moy, Stacey R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 8:51 AM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: 0800 SITREP

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

FYSA

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:55 AM  
**To:** WF-EXEC-MGMT [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 0800 SITREP

b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

>  
> IOC INTELLIGENCE:  
>

[redacted]

>  
> ACTIVE CROWDS:  
>  
> (U//FOUO) Nothing significant to report.  
>  
> [redacted] UPDATES:

>  
> (U//~~FOUO~~) Nothing significant to report.

>  
> PENDING TARGETS OR SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST :



>  
> PLANNED EVENTS:

b7E -1,2,5



> (U//~~FOUO~~) This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of the investigation. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document without the authorization of a Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of the intended target.

>  
> (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI has received information indicating the possibility that protest activity may occur outside or around U.S. Government property and facilities into January 2021 , and that individuals or groups may exploit this otherwise protected activity to commit or incite civil disorder, riot, or other criminal violations. Transmittal of this report informs appropriate personnel who must account for the safety and security of facilities and personnel. As an individual or groups ability to conduct lawful protests and seek redress from government is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, no investigative activity is to be initiated solely based on such protected conduct unless some indication of criminal or terrorist activity is present .

>  
> Let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 1:38:25 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc:  
Subject: FW: 1000 hours SITREP

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

V/R

SS: [redacted]  
FBI/WFO [redacted]  
202-278-2000

From: Moy, Stacey R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 10:40 AM  
To: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted]

Subject: Fw: 1000 hours SITREP

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 10:04 AM  
To: WF-EXEC-MGM [redacted]  
C: [redacted]  
Subject: 1000 hours SITREP

b7E -1,2,4,5,8

> IOC INTELLIGENCE:

> [redacted]

> ACTIVE CROWDS:

> [redacted]

> [redacted] UPDATES:

> [redacted]

> PENDING TARGETS OR SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST:

b7E -1,2,5

> [redacted]

> PLANNED EVENTS:

> (U//FOUO) Per USSS, POTUS is expected to speak at an event on the Ellipse outside the White House at 1100 hours. POTUS is expected to depart the event at approximately 1215 hours.

> [redacted]



**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 3:21 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fw: 1400 SITREP

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

V/R

SSA [redacted]  
WFO [redacted]  
202-278-2000

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** "Moy, Stacey R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 2:22 PM  
**Subject:** Fw: 1400 SITREP  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**Cc:** [redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 2:18 PM  
**To:** WF-EXEC-MGMT [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 1400 SITREP

b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13

**IOC INTELLIGENCE:**

[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 6:47 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fw: 1800 Hours SITREP  
**Attachments:** Picture (Device Independent Bitmap); Picture (Device Independent Bitmap)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

V/R

SSA [redacted]  
WFO [redacted]  
202-278-2000

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 6:37 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fw: 1800 Hours SITREP  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

CC:

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Moy, Stacey R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 6:35 PM  
**Subject:** Fw: 1800 Hours SITREP  
**To:** [redacted]

CC:

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 6:26 PM  
**To:** WF-EXEC-MGMT [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 1800 Hours SITREP

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

> Law enforcement and partner agencies continue to mobilize necessary resources to address the dynamic situation at the Capitol and throughout the larger DC-area. Efforts to safely evacuate all individuals at the US Capitol and clear the grounds continue to evolve rapidly precluding exact estimates pertaining to crowd size and movement.

>

> IOC INTELLIGENCE:

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 9:51:38 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [redacted]

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,13

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 9:49 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [redacted]

Thank you. Most of my squad is at home today, so I'm tracking on their behalf. If we wanted to take action, we could [redacted]  
[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 9:43 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Here is the more detailed info I received about this last night. There is not much more info and there is nothing I see that we can investigate. Thoughts?

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 10:32 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [redacted]

Just FYSA.

Thanks,

[redacted]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
[redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
[redacted] Office) [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: "Moy, Stacey R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 10:20 PM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [redacted]  
To: "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Thanks Matt

On Jan 4, 2021 10:16 PM, "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]  
Ref below [redacted] If you read closely enough, [redacted]  
[redacted] Nonetheless, [redacted]  
[redacted]

-Matt

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5

Matthew R. Alcoke  
Special Agent in Charge  
FBI Washington Field | CT/Crisis Division

From: [redacted]



Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021, 22:00

To: Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)

Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

FYSA

\*Sent from Samsung Email\*

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
FBI Washington Field Office

Cell: [REDACTED]  
Desk: [REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [REDACTED]

Date: Jan 4, 2021 9:48 PM

Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5

I'm forwarding this threat for your awareness that was received tonight from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I pasted the threat directly below for your awareness.

Can you forward [REDACTED] once you have it?

b6 -2  
b7C -2  
b7E -1

Regards,

[REDACTED]

b6 -2  
b7C -2  
b7E -1

[Redacted]

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2  
b7E -1,3,5

\*Sent from Samsung Email\*

[Redacted]

Assistant Special Agent in Charge  
FBI Washington Field Office

[Redacted]

Cell: [Redacted]  
Desk: [Redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [Redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 9:31 PM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [Redacted]  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: [Redacted]  
For awareness

SSA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,10

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] cell

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [Redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 7:20 PM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [Redacted]  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: [Redacted]  
Thanks [Redacted] I copied my counterpart at [Redacted] for visibility and notification to [Redacted]

[Redacted]  
Supervisory Special Agent  
FBI [Redacted]  
[Redacted] (cell)

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

On Jan 4, 2021 6:44 PM [Redacted] wrote:  
Gentlemen,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Desk  
[Redacted] Cell

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [Redacted]  
Date: Jan 4, 2021 6:32 PM  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fwd: [Redacted]  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: [Redacted]

As per our telephone conversation.

[Redacted]

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

Wednesday, January 6, 2021 5:23 PM

[Redacted]

**Subject:**

Re: [Redacted] FTX

Due to significant Response posture in DC FTX is canceled.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (Cell)

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 3:18 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** WFO Emergency Voice Message

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

WFO has sent you an urgent voice message. If you do not receive this voice message on your home telephone or Samsung, please call [REDACTED] Thank you. [[[ IMPORTANT! Do not change anything below this line in this email. ]]]

To respond to this notification, reply with YES in the top of this email.

[REDACTED]

**From:** [redacted] b6 -1,3  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 6:56 PM b7C -1,3  
**To:** [redacted] b7E -3,4,5  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted] - UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**SentinelCaseId:** TRANSITORY RECORD

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 06, 2021 6:51 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted] - UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -3,4,5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Recipients',

FYSA and any action deemed appropriate. Subject named below is the current subject [redacted]

[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 06, 2021 6:30 PM  
**To:** JENSEN, STEVEN J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7D -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Sir

Wanted to give you a heads up on a [redacted] subject [redacted]  
[redacted] who is reported [redacted]

A check of [redacted] systems revealed [redacted]

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:52:29 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -3,4,5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 06, 2021 6:51 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Recipients',

FYSA and any action deemed appropriate. Subject named below is the current subject [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -3,4,5

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 06, 2021 6:30 PM  
To: JENSEN, STEVEN J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Sir

Wanted to give you a heads up on a [redacted] subject [redacted] who is reported [redacted]

A check of [redacted] systems revealed [redacted]

[redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7D -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5

/// [redacted]  
[redacted] NITIF  
NITIF Desk [redacted]  
Secure [redacted]  
Cell [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 06, 2021 5:56 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [redacted] UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 5:36:17 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: Friday 18, 2020 — UNCLASSIFIED

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -4,5

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

[redacted] Happy Friday ☺  
Thanks so much for covering next week!

Can you please take a look at [redacted] that have a note with your name on it?  
I'm not sure what's happening with [redacted]

Thank you!

Have a Merry Christmas!

[redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 3:31 PM  
To: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,4

Subject: Friday 18, 2020 --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,4,5

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7D -5  
b7E -1,2,4,5

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

Monday, December 28, 2020 10:24 AM

**Cc:**  
**Subject:**  
**Attachments:**

[Redacted]

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[Redacted]

SA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Cell: [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Dec 28, 2020 10:23 AM [Redacted] wrote:  
Good morning folks,

FYI for our TFOs.

[Redacted] please let me know if you have interest.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

[Redacted] passed this to us as the complainant alleges [Redacted]

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[Redacted]

SA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Cell: [Redacted]



----- Forwarded message -----

From: [REDACTED]

Date: Dec 28, 2020 10:10 AM

Subject: FBINET to UNET Uploaded Files

To: [REDACTED]

Cc:

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 21-cv-572

Total Deleted Page(s) = 86

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**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**  
**Subject:**  
**Attachments:**

[Redacted]

Wednesday, December 23, 2020 4:15 PM

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,5,8

[Redacted]

All,

Passed by [Redacted] Some good reads.

b6 -3  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,8,10

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 -3  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,8

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:05:27 PM  
To: Gruber, Jay  
Cc:  
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: January 6th

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,5

Hi Jay,

[REDACTED] But had an inquiry from one of our partners, so wanted to respond.

Hope you are doing well!

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [REDACTED]  
Cell: [REDACTED]

b6 -1,6  
b7C -1,6  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Jan 4, 2021 4:03 PM, Jay Gruber [REDACTED] wrote:  
Thanks [REDACTED]

Hopefully [REDACTED]

On Mon, Jan 4, 2021 at 4:01 PM [REDACTED] wrote:  
Good afternoon,

Happy New Year! Hopefully you all enjoyed a relaxing holiday season.

We are aware of First Amendment protected activity scheduled on January 6th in DC.

[REDACTED]  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

We do anticipate road closures and possible traffic disruptions around the Capitol.

Stay safe.

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [REDACTED]  
Cell: [REDACTED]

--  
Jay Gruber, CPP  
Chief of Police

FBI(21-cv-572)-7084

Associate Vice-President for Public Safety  
Georgetown University  
37th and O Streets, NW  
Village C West.116  
Washington, DC 20057



b6 -6  
b7C -6

Follow the Georgetown University Department of Public Safety on Twitter: @GtownDPS  
Download LiveSafe at <http://dpservices.livesafemobile.com/Georgetown.php>

**Georgetown University Police Department's mission is to protect the Georgetown University community, ensuring a safe and secure learning and living environment through trusting partnerships and professional police services.**

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

Wednesday, January 6, 2021 8:40 AM

b6 -1,3  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,5

**Subject:**

Fwd [Redacted] - January 6, 2021

Not sure if you guys saw this:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Not sure if its a coincidence...

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[Redacted]

SA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
ITTE [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Cell [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [Redacted]  
Date: Jan 6, 2021 5:25 AM  
Subject: [Redacted] - January 6, 2021  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7E -1,5

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

Monday, December 28, 2020 12:09 PM

[Redacted]

**Subject:**

Fwd: FW: [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -4,5

Copy.

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,4,5

SA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
Cell [Redacted]

On Dec 28, 2020 12:06 PM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Hey guys I had sent the below [Redacted] to [Redacted] as I didn't see a [Redacted] nexus.

Looks like [Redacted] had sent an email to me and then [Redacted] separately which led to separate responses.

Will send you the chain now but I would say let [Redacted] handle it.

SSA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] / JTTF  
[Redacted] cell

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,4,5

On Dec 28, 2020 11:54 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
[Redacted]

The results on the red side are related to [Redacted] and this one.

Thanks

[Redacted]



On Dec 28, 2020 11:35 AM, [redacted] wrote: b6 -1  
Copy. We probably [redacted] b7C -1  
[redacted] b7E -1,2,3,4,5

On Dec 28, 2020 11:30 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
For what its worth, [redacted] is in the [redacted] I doesn't see the [redacted] nexus with this one.

Thanks

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,4,5

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Dec 28, 2020 11:00 AM  
Subject: FW: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Copy thanks [redacted]

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,4,5

SA [redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTF [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cell [redacted]

On Dec 28, 2020 10:57 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
Hey [redacted] Yeah, [redacted] and I are out of the office most of this week (I'll be in tomorrow but that's it).

[redacted]  
[redacted] you can transfer to WFO and we can check it out to see if it fits better in the [redacted]

I've cc'ed our [redacted] for awareness.

Thanks

On Dec 28, 2020 10:24 AM, [redacted] wrote:  
[redacted] think you and [redacted] may both be [redacted] til next week. Anyway, LMK if [redacted] would want this one (or put me in touch with whoever is minding the store for you guys this week, [redacted])

SSA [redacted]  
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)  
Squad [redacted]  
[redacted]  
(W) [redacted]  
(C) [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2020 9:37 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: [redacted]

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2  
b7D -2  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5

[redacted]

SSA [redacted]  
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)  
[redacted]  
(W) [redacted]  
(C) [redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 4, 2021 4:03 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: January 6th

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Happy New Year gents!!

Hope it was really nice:)

This is what was passed to our campus partners for Wednesday.

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[redacted]

b6 -1,4,6  
b7C -1,4,6  
b7E -3,5

SA [redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
JTTH [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cell [redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 4, 2021 4:01 PM  
**Subject:** January 6th  
**To:** [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] "Tate, James D." [redacted] "Gruber, Jay"  
[redacted] "Thompson, Robert B"  
<rbthompson@Howard.edu> [redacted] "Dusseau, Daniel"  
<ddusseau@nvcc.edu> "Foster, Marieo" <marieo.foster@udc.edu> [redacted]

**Cc:**  
Good afternoon,

Happy New Year! Hopefully you all enjoyed a relaxing holiday season.

We are aware of First Amendment protected activity scheduled on January 6th in DC.

b7E -1,2

[redacted]

We do anticipate road closures and possible traffic disruptions around the Capitol.

Stay safe.

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[Redacted]

SA [Redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office

JTTF [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Cell: [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:14:19 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted]  
Attachments: [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,5,8

Thank you. Have a great day!

V/R,

[redacted]

SA [redacted]  
FBI Washington Field Office  
[redacted]  
Cell [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 5, 2021 6:13 PM  
Subject: Fwd: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

Here you go!

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From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 5, 2021 11:14 AM  
Subject: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Good morning,

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8

[redacted]

Thanks!

[redacted]

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 3, 2021 10:54 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Fox News: Proud Boys flock to Washington 'incognito' for Jan. 6 protests

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Flagged

b6 -1  
b7C -1

**Proud Boys flock to Washington 'incognito' for Jan. 6 protests**

The far-right, male-only group, the Proud Boys, will descend onto Washington, D.C., in protest the same day Congress plans to certify Electoral College votes, officially confirming President-elect Joe Biden's win.

Read in Fox News: <https://apple.news/ABpoO9iWmT3WonEDpaxDPUw>

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2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - Published January 2

# Proud Boys flock to Washington 'incognito' for Jan. 6 protests

Metropolitan Police brace for massive pro-Trump protests

By Caitlin McFall | Fox News



Fox News Flash top headlines for

## Fox News Flash top headlines for Jan. 2

Fox News Flash top headlines are here. Check out what's clicking on Foxnews.com.

The far-right, male-only group, the Proud Boys, will descend onto Washington, D.C., in protest the same day Congress plans to certify Electoral College votes, officially confirming President-elect Joe Biden's win.

Though the group will not wear its usual black and yellow colors Jan. 6, the Washington Times first reported that the leader of the group, Enrique Tarrío, said members would dress "incognito," in Antifa's traditional all-black apparel.

#### GOP LAWMAKERS REJECT GOP PUSH TO OBJECT TO ELECTORAL COLLEGE RESULTS

"We will spread across downtown DC in smaller teams," Tarrío wrote on the social media platform, Parler.

"And who knows....we might dress in all BLACK for the occasion," he added.

Congress is expected to certify the election's results, despite several GOP lawmakers saying they will object to certain state's votes if an emergency 10-day audit is not first completed.

The calls to object have been spearheaded by Sens. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, and Josh Hawley, R-Mo., and are based on allegations of voter fraud and changes states made to mail-in voting rules during the coronavirus pandemic.

President Trump has continued to allege voter fraud related to mail-in voting, but the Supreme Court has refused two cases from the Trump campaign, and more than 50 lawsuits have been dismissed in lower courts across the nation.

Polls still show, however, that many Republican voters believe the election was "rigged."

Trump in turn has urged supporters to protest the Jan. 6 Senate vote. He has tweeted out rally details and prompted numerous groups to meet in D.C. to pressure Republicans to object to the Electoral College vote.

"The BIG Protest Rally in Washington, D.C., will take place at 11.00 A.M. on January 6th," Trump said Friday. "Locational details to follow. StopTheSteal!"



The Proud Boys made headlines last summer, clashing with Antifa and Black Lives Matter protesters in the aftermath of George Floyd's death while in police custody in Minneapolis.

Some protests across the country turned violent and demonstrations continued for months. Following the election, pro-Trump supporters launched Stop the Steal protests fueled by the president's continued claims that the election was "stolen" from him.

### MAYHEM IN WASHINGTON, DC, AS TRUMP SUPPORTERS, ANTIFA CLASH; AT LEAST 4 STABBED, 23 ARRESTED

Last month, four people were stabbed and 33 arrested after pro-Trump supporters clashed with counterprotesters in the nation's capital as people gathered in front of the Supreme Court and at Freedom Plaza.

Videos surfaced showing D.C. police attempting to control Proud Boys and Antifa fights across the city, resulting in the hospitalization of at least two police officers.

At least four protests are planned on Jan. 6 by different pro-Trump groups, including by Women for America First, and the Eighty Percent Coalition – a new group formed following reports that the majority of Republicans think the election was "rigged."

Threats of violence, and plans to bring firearms into the District and set up an "armed encampment" on the Mall have surfaced in online forums, reported [The Washington Post](#).

[CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP](#)

The Metropolitan Police Department announced road closures from Jan. 5-7 in anticipation of the protests and said vehicles will be restricted for "public safety."

The department also reminded the public Thursday that carrying a firearm "within 1,000 feet of any First Amendment activity," including "members of the public who have been issued a Concealed Carry Permit in the District of Columbia," is strictly prohibited.



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- Page 100 ~ b7E - 1,3;

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**From:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**To:** Cooper, Laura; Wagner, Kimberly; [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Lewis, Kwame (DI) (FBI); [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Talucci, Vince;  
[Redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Cunningham, Terry (IACP); [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Thompson, Jonathan; [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Grever, Louis; Acevedo, Art Chief; [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Carroll, Jeffery W. (MPD); Panoke, Will (ATF);  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Carlisle,  
Travis D. (DI) (FBI); Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI); Morales, Emily H. (DI) (FBI); [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** January 10, 2021 8:06 PM (UTC-05:00)  
**Attached:** Jan10ope-FINAL.pdf, [Redacted]

b7E -1

Good evening,

Please find attached the 10 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. This SITREP contains relevant information from 9 and 10 January 2021.

Please note that this document is ~~Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive~~ (U//LES). The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

[Redacted]


b7E -1

Thank you.

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

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# (U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 10 JANUARY 2021

*(U//~~LES~~) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1700 EST on 10 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.*

*(U) The information marked (U//~~LES~~) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractor), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities, without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the FBI caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.*

*(U//~~LES~~) Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, section (c)(7)*

*(U//~~LES~~) DIOG Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not unreasonably interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation.*

*(U//~~LES~~) Within this legal and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Investigator(s), OIG. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended target.*

*(U) This communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. It is related to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement investigation or investigative activity. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.*

b7E -1



## (U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

*(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.*

*(U//~~LES~~) With the recent threats and civil disturbance at the United States Capitol targeting members of Congress; state, local, and tribal law enforcement jurisdictions are requested to maintain operational awareness of their respective Congressional Representative's district offices and residences for any types of threats or potential criminal activity. At this time, there are no credible threats against any member of Congress.*

### (U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- b7E -1
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI is investigating the death of US Capitol Police (USCP) Officer Brian Sicknick who died from injuries sustained during the US Capitol breach. There were 14 other officers injured during the incident.
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1300 on 10 January,  b7E -1
- b7E -1,2
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 0900 on 10 January, the FBI has received nearly 45,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). The review of the DMT is on-going.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 7 January, an individual was arrested in Washington, DC, driving a white pickup truck pulling a trailer allegedly carrying guns and ammunition. The identified individual discussed plans to shoot the House Speaker and is reported to be mentally unstable.
- (U//~~LES~~) On 6 January, multiple suspicious packages were reported in and around the protest area and two suspicious devices were identified: one near the Republican National Committee (RNC) building and the other near the Democratic National Committee (DNC) building in Washington, DC. The two potential pipe bombs near the RNC and DNC buildings were rendered safe. As of 2100 on 6 January, both devices are at the FBI Laboratory for analysis.

## (U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

### (U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

*(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness -- past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours)*

[Redacted]

b7E -1

#### *(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 -- 24 Hours*

- *(U//~~LES~~)* On 9 January, approximately 100 pro-Trump individuals organized a gathering in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego which prompted anti-Trump individuals to gather and counter-protest in the same area. The opposing individuals pepper sprayed each other, and several physical altercations occurred. There were reports of weapons (knives) and SDPD recovered one fake gun. SDPD arrested three individuals and the individuals eventually dispersed.

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

b7E -1,2

#### *(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 hours*

- [Redacted]


### (U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

[Redacted]

b7E -1

#### *(U) Potential Flashpoints*

*(U) Potential Protests at State Capitols and the US Capitol*



b7E -1,2

*(U) Transition and Inauguration*



b7E -1,2

*(U) Threats related to President-Elect Biden*

- ~~(U//LES)~~ Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

**(U) OTHER**

- ~~(U//LES)~~ As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which is now open to the public. As of 0900 on 10 January, FBI has received nearly 45,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). The review of the DMT is on-going.

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**Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 20, 2021 11:37 AM  
**To:** Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI); Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI); Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI); Sallet, Jeffrey S. (HRB) (FBI); Laycock, Stephen C. (IB) (FBI); Jones, Darrin E. (STB) (FBI); Jones, Jason A. (OGC) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI); [REDACTED] Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI); D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)  
**Subject:** DRAFT public statement on Capitol siege investigation for future release

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Please see the draft statement below. The goal would be to clear and release at some point in the next couple of days. We want to ensure the public understands that people engaged in peaceful protests on Jan. 6<sup>th</sup> are not targets of our investigations. We need to counter any potential false narratives that we are widely investigating all who were at the Capitol on that day.

DRAFT

The FBI holds sacred the rights of individuals to peacefully exercise their First Amendment freedoms. While we know a majority of protesters on January 6, 2021 were peaceful, there were some who used these demonstrations at the U.S. Capitol to commit violence or rioting. Our focus these past weeks has not been on investigating peaceful protesters, but on those who committed violence and criminal activity that constitutes a federal crime or poses a threat to national security. This includes holding accountable those who threatened the safety of law enforcement officers, other citizens and those engaged in destruction of federal property.

The FBI does not focus on particular ideologies or membership in specific groups. The FBI investigates and responds to incidents when an **individual's** activity crosses the line from ideas and constitutionally protected activity to violence.

In furtherance of our mission, the FBI is seeking information that will assist in identifying individuals involved in criminal activity during the events of January 6. Members of the public can provide immeasurable help. If you were at or near the U.S. Capitol that day and/or otherwise witnessed or have potential evidence of unlawful violent actions, we urge you to submit any information, photos, or videos that could be relevant at [fbi.gov/USCapitol](https://www.fbi.gov/USCapitol). You may also provide any additional information via 1-800-CALL-FBI (1-800-225-5324) or at [tips.fbi.gov](https://tips.fbi.gov).

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**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:08 PM  
**To:** Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)  
**Subject:** for John RE his Question

b6 -5  
b7A -1  
b7C -5  
b7E -1,2,9,13

Talked with [redacted] given Capital police declared a riot the [redacted] opening is appropriate and a good starting point for legal process etc... [redacted]

Let me know if he has any other questions.

Jill

**Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:10 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** for John RE his Question

Copy. He is still on the phone I will let him know.

b6 -5  
b7A -1  
b7C -5  
b7E -1,2,3,9,13

-  
On Jan 6, 2021 7:08 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Talked with [redacted] given Capital police declared a riot the [redacted] opening is appropriate and a good  
starting point for legal process etc.. [redacted]  
[redacted]

Let me know if he has any other questions.

Jill

**Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:39 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI);  
[redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

All - As discussed on the 1800 NC3 transition, below is the WF-CTD-DI TSIN which will go out to field DT PCORs and CollMCs.

It has been coord through all applicable parties including [redacted] OGC, and [redacted] and is at DI presently.  
Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 9:22 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL  
**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7E -3

I provided the team with your approval. This is the final version that will go to DT PCORs and FO CollMCs this evening via UNet.

Kevin

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 9:16 PM  
**Subject:** RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

"Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)"

[redacted]

**Cc:** [redacted]  
[redacted]

All-  
Please see TSIN draft below revised to include edits from OGC, [redacted] and the DI. WF File number is now inserted.

-----  
[redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Executive Summary/Background

b6 -1  
b7A -1

(U) Executive Summary

b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,8,9

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January 2021, demonstrators who had taken part in the "Stop the Steal" rally forcibly entered the US Capitol during a joint session of Congress. The FBI Counterterrorism Division prepared this TSIN in an effort to obtain information related to acts of violence and unlawful activity in violation of federal law arising from, associated with, or in response to the forcible entry and destruction of US government property and any follow-up acts of violence in and around the federal district.

(U) Details

(U) On 6 January 2021, demonstrators who had taken part in the "Stop the Steal" rally forcibly entered the US Capitol during a joint session of Congress held to certify Electoral College results from the November 2020 Presidential Election.

[Redacted]

Potential criminal activity exhibited by certain members of a group(s) referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:06 PM

To: [Redacted]

[Redacted] Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Cc: [Redacted]

Subject: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

+ [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,9

[redacted]

On Jan 6, 2021 8:54 PM, [redacted] wrote:

[redacted] Case number is [redacted]

On Jan 6, 2021 8:32 PM, [redacted] wrote:

TSIN DRAFT for review by all recipients (please include [redacted])

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

In response, please include the full list of recipients on any edits.

CTD will forward the final version to DJ [redacted] UC [redacted] once [redacted] has the appropriate WF case file to insert in para 1.

Thank you,

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Executive Summary/Background

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,8

(U) Executive Summary

[redacted]

(U) Details

[redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,8

Potential criminal activity exhibited by certain members of a group(s) referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

-----  
-----

[Redacted]

Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:42 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thank you.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 6, 2021 9:38 PM, "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
All - As discussed on the 1800 NC3 transition, below is the WF-CTD-DI TSIN which will go out to field DT PCORs and CollMCs.

b7E -1,3,5

It has been coord through all applicable parties including [redacted] OGC, and [redacted] and is at DI presently.  
Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 9:22 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL  
**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7E -3

I provided the team with your approval. This is the final version that will go to DT PCORs and FO CollMCs this evening via UNet.

Kevin

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 6, 2021 9:16 PM  
**Subject:** RE: FOR COORD: FBI WF TSIN DRAFT --US CAPITOL  
**To:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted] "Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)"

**Cc:** [redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 6:21-cv-1168

Total Deleted Page(s) = 98

Page 7 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 22 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 23 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 24 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 26 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 27 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 28 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 29 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 30 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 31 ~ Duplicate;  
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Page 76 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 78 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 79 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 80 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 94 ~ b5 - 1;  
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Page 105 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 110 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 111 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 118 ~ b7D - 5; b7E - 1,2,4,5,8,10,13;  
Page 119 ~ b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7D - 5; b7E - 1,2,4,8,13;  
Page 120 ~ b6 - 1,3; b7C - 1,3; b7D - 5; b7E - 1,2,3,4,5,8;  
Page 121 ~ b6 - 1; b7C - 1; b7E - 3,5;  
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**Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 6:05 AM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Overnight Summary

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,4,5,8,9

> Good morning,

>

> From the overnight,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

>

>

>

>

>

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 6:36 AM  
**To:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Overnight Summary

Thx  
Anything on [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3

Will you be around at 730 to chat with me?

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 7, 2021 6:04 AM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8,9

> Good morning,

>

> From the overnight, [redacted]

[Large redacted area]

>

**Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 6:37 AM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Overnight Summary

Yes, and yes. We are sending an email with updated spreadsheet and highlight of [redacted]

b7E -4

-  
On Jan 7, 2021 6:36 AM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Thx  
Anything on [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3

Will you be around at 730 to chat with me?

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 7, 2021 6:04 AM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3,4,5,8,9

> Good morning,  
>

> From the overnight, [redacted]

[Large redacted area]

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 6:57 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** [Redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,5

Good evening ma'am,

We received word from [Redacted] that subject [Redacted] contacted [Redacted] today and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

By way of background, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

v/r,

[Redacted]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 7:11 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** [redacted]

Thank you.

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 7, 2021 6:57 PM, [redacted] wrote:

Good evening ma'am,

We received word from [redacted] that subject [redacted] contacted [redacted] today and [redacted]

[redacted]

By way of background, [redacted]

[redacted]

v/r,

[redacted]

**Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)**

**From:** Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 7:42 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Re: Few Updates

Thank you Ma'am!

Douglas A. Williams Jr.  
Section Chief  
FBI - Office of Congressional Affairs

[Redacted] (Office)  
[Redacted] (Cell)  
[Redacted]

b7E -3

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted] b6 -1  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 19:18 b7C -1  
**To:** Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [Redacted] b7E -3,5  
**Cc:** Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI) [Redacted] Tyson, Jill C.  
(OCA) (FBI) [Redacted] Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI) [Redacted] Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA)  
(FBI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
**Subject:** Few Updates

Boss,

Just two post close out updates worth passing now.... possibly more in the AM.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,5,13

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



**Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 7:46 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Few Updates

Thank you.

Jill C. Tyson  
Assistant Director  
FBI Office of Congressional Affairs

[Redacted]

b7E -3

On Jan 7, 2021 7:18 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [Redacted] wrote:  
Boss,

Just two post close out updates worth passing now.... possibly more in the AM.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,5,13

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

More in the AM if I have it.

Jill

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:07 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: ADIC QA 1.8.21  
**Attachments:** ADIC QA 1.8.21.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Trying again

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 12:44 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** ADIC QA 1.8.21

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:19 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: ADIC QA 1.8.21  
**Attachments:** ADIC QA 1.8.21 edits.docx

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

One tweak from me also attached in track changes

[REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:07 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: ADIC QA 1.8.21

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Trying again

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 12:44 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** ADIC QA 1.8.21

<< File: ADIC QA 1.8.21.docx >>

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:29 PM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] b6 -1  
**Cc:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b7C -1  
[redacted] b7E -5  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

Thank you Jen

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:26 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Jill,

[redacted]

-  
On Jan 8, 2021 12:54 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

Jen and [redacted]  
Can you let me know the answer to this question below: b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3

[redacted]

[redacted]

Jill

**From:** Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 12:50 PM  
**To:** Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI) [redacted] Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted] Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted] D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI) [redacted] Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** Winston, Alvin M. (OPA) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:31 PM  
**To:** Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI)



b7E -1

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:35 PM  
**To:**

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1

**From:**

**To:** Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI); Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI); D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI); Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI); [redacted] Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)

**Cc:** [redacted] Winston, Alvin M. (OPA) (FBI)

**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Brian,

I am working on and answer to this question....

[redacted]

**From:** Hale, Brian Patrick (OPA) (FBI) [redacted]

**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:32 PM

**To:** Shivers, Calvin A. (CID) (FBI) [redacted] D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)  
[redacted] Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI) [redacted] Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI)  
[redacted] Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI) [redacted] Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)  
[redacted] Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)  
[redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

**Cc:** [redacted]

Winston, Alvin M. (OPA) (FBI) [redacted]

**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

Thanks.

-

On Jan 8, 2021 1:28 PM, "Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

Brian,

I will defer to you and the DD on what level of detail is ultimately provided, but below is what was provided yesterday to DOJ:

b7E -1, 2, 3, 5, 8

FBI response to US Capitol and grounds on Wednesday, January 6, 2021:

At approximately [redacted] deployed to the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters, respectively, after receiving reports of [redacted] Ultimately, two suspected pipe bombs were located at each of the committee headquarters. FBI personnel did not assist in rendering safe any of those devices.

Components of the devices were recovered and transported to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia. An additional [redacted]

[redacted]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 3:11 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fw: FBI WFO Update for January 6th Events

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 3, 2021 11:13 AM  
**Subject:** Fw: FBI WFO Update for January 6th Events  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Ritzman, Marlin L. (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

Jill and Marlin,

FYI this is what I sent the Deputy this morning about our preparations for the 6th and intel that we currently have. He had mentioned last night he has a Principals meeting this afternoon.

b7E -1,3,13

Marlin,

Knowing that components of the JCS asked for our SitReps last time I will make sure you and Freddy are both on the SitReps going out. Please, like last time, [redacted]

[redacted]

Happy New Year and here is hoping for a calm democratic process on the 6th.

Steve

Steven M. D'Antuono  
Assistant Director in Charge  
FBI – Washington Field Office

[redacted] (mobile)  
[redacted] (office)

b7E -3

---

**From:** D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 3, 2021 10:49 AM  
**To:** Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** Meador, Stanley M. (DO) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fw: FBI WFO Update for January 6th Events

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5



Sir,

I asked my team last night to put together the intel picture we have at the moment which is what you see below. Hopefully, this provides you with the current picture and assists with your meeting with the Principals. In addition, we will have a [redacted]

Please let me know if you need anything else and I will keep you updated as we get closer to the 6th. [redacted] Let me know if you have any questions or require any more information.

b7E -1, 3, 5, 8

Regards,  
Steve

Steven M. D'Antuono  
Assistant Director in Charge  
FBI – Washington Field Office

[redacted] (mobile)  
[redacted] (office)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1, 2, 3, 5, 8

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 3, 2021 10:01 AM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** FBI WFO Update for January 6th Events

*(U//~~FOUO~~) The following list of events is being maintained per request of WFO Executive Management. The items on this list are compiled by FBI partner agencies. FBI WFO does not have any information to suggest these events will involve anything other than first amendment protected activity and is being distributed for situational awareness. Their inclusion here is not intended to associate the protected activity with criminality or a threat to national security, or to infer that such protected activity itself violates federal law. However, based on known intelligence and/or specific, historical observations, it is possible the protected activity could invite a violent reaction towards the subject individual or others in retaliation or with the goal of stopping the protected activity from occurring in the first instance. In the event no violent reaction occurs, FBI policy and federal law dictates that no further record be made of the protected activity.*

The following information is current as of 3 January 2021 at 0800. This is for FBI internal use only.

[redacted]

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 3:37 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Hello:

Relayed this to the AD earlier, but just to close the loop for everyone else on this chain, [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Thanks,  
[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:01 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Hello:

[Redacted]

Thank you,  
[Redacted]

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 12:55 PM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: FBI background update

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Jen and [Redacted]  
Can you let me know the answer to this question below:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)**

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 5:29 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points

b7E -5,8,10

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 5:18 PM

b7E -3,5,8,10

**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points

**To:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

**Cc:**

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]

**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 3:42 PM

b6 -1,3

**Subject:** Re: [redacted] Talking Points

b7A -1

**To:** "Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]


b7C -1,3

b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13

[redacted] "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)"

**Cc:**


[Large redacted area]




b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8,10,13

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 1:42 PM  
**To:** Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] O'Neill,  
Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] Alcock, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [Redacted] Talking Points

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13





b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8,10,13

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 11:46 AM

To: Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] O'Neill,

Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: Re: [Redacted] Talking Points

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13



From: [Redacted]

Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 9:48 AM

To: Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] O'Neill,

Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Subject: Re: [Redacted] Talking Points

b6 -1,3

b7A -1

b7C -1,3

b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13

[Large Redacted Content]

[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 9:40 PM

To: Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] O'Neill,

Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

<rebornstein@fbi.gov>

Subject: Re: [Redacted] Talking Points

b6 -1

b7C -1

b7E -1,3,5,8,10

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5,8,10

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 7:44 PM

To: Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] O'Neill,  
Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: Re: [REDACTED] Talking Points

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8,10,13

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8,10,13

[Redacted]

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 5:53 PM  
**To:** Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] O'Neill,  
Christine E. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
**Subject:** [Redacted] Talking Points

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8,9,10,13



**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 8:45 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: Special Case Code Request: Washington Field

Jill,

Sorry did you discuss the special case code request upstairs? If so, I can forward this to John or you can...

Best,  
Kristyn

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 5:33 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** Special Case Code Request: Washington Field

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**To:** Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI) [redacted]  
**CC:** [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted]

John,

BLUF: Jensen requests (and Jill concurs) OT for field personnel at Washington Field Office. We need ADD approval for a special case code for the OT . Written ADD approval is required prior to individuals taking OT. Per previous discussions with [redacted] an email approval reply from the ADD will suffice for [redacted] to initiate a special case code. If you concur, we request you seek approval from ADD Abbate. Upon receipt of ADD approval [redacted] will coordinate with [redacted] on establishing and disseminating the special case code to relevant FO entities.

Thank you,  
Kristyn

[Redacted]

**From:**

[Redacted]

**Sent:**

Friday, January 8, 2021 9:11 PM

**To:**

Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)

**Cc:**

[Redacted]

**Subject:**

Approved talking points - ON Background for NBC

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Boss, Can you give me a quick call? Need to approve these talking points on background for NBC.

[Redacted]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 9:17 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Approved talking points - ON Background for NBC

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Modified slightly

[REDACTED]

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

On Jan 8, 2021 9:11 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:  
Boss, Can you give me a quick call? Need to approve these talking points on background for NBC.

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[REDACTED]

**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 9:22 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: Special Case Code Request: Washington Field

Would you want me to tee up the email to kick off the conversation or wait until you get a verbal from John?

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] b7E -3  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 9:18 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]; Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: Special Case Code Request: Washington Field

Not yet.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

On Jan 8, 2021 8:45 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Jill,

Sorry did you discuss the special case code request upstairs? If so, I can forward this to John or you can...

Best,  
Kristyn

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 5:33 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] b6 -1  
**Subject:** Special Case Code Request: Washington Field b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

**To:** Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [redacted]; Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI) [redacted]  
**CC:** [redacted]; Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]; Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted]

John,

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 9:24 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Clean version of talking points

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

These would be on background for NBC

[Redacted]

---

**From:**

**To:**

**Cc:**

**Subject:**

[Redacted]

Clean version of talking points

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

[Redacted]

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 8, 2021 9:23 PM, [Redacted] wrote:

These would be on background for NBC

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[Redacted]

**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 9:58 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5  
**Subject:** Special Case Code Request: Washington Field an HQ

To: Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI) [redacted]  
CC: [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

John,

[redacted] requests OT for field personnel at Washington Field Office. We request that the SCC for the field start from the 6<sup>th</sup> and run through the PVCA command post i.e., 1/21. We also ask that a code be established for HQ personnel who surged to work the events of the 6<sup>th</sup> through this weekend. We need ADD approval for a special case code for the OT. If you concur, we request you seek approval from ADD Abbate. Upon receipt of ADD approval [redacted] will coordinate with [redacted] on establishing and disseminating the special case code to relevant FO entities. Thanks!

Thank you,  
Jill

---

**From:**

**To:** Brown; John A. (CD) (FBI)

Boss

b7E -5

[redacted] requests OT for field personnel at Washington Field Office. We request that the SCC for the field start from the 6th and run through the PVCA command post i.e., 1/21. We also ask that a code be established for HQ personnel who surged to work the events of the 6th through this weekend. We need ADD approval for a special case code for the OT. If you concur, we request you seek approval from ADD Abbate. Upon receipt of ADD approval [redacted] will coordinate with [redacted] on establishing and disseminating the special case code to relevant FO entities. Thanks!

Thank you,

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 10:04 PM  
**To:** D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: OT request for PVCA

Working on this as well. Asked for it to take you through inauguration for now.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 10:02 PM  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA  
**To:** "Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:** "Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[redacted] "Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Jensen,  
Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted]

Boss

[redacted] requests OT for field personnel at Washington Field Office. We request that the Special Case Code for the field start from the 6th and run through the PVCA command post i.e., 1/21. We also ask that a code be established for HQ personnel who surged to work the events of the 6th through this weekend. We need ADD approval for a special case code for the OT.

If you concur, we request you seek approval from ADD Abbate. Upon receipt of ADD approval [redacted] will coordinate with [redacted] on establishing and disseminating the special case code to relevant FO entities. Thanks!

b7E -5

Thank you,

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 10:11 PM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points

Btw. Pretty sure [redacted] can start Mon. He is fabulous. Let me know what else I can do.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8,10

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 8, 2021 5:29 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 5:18 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points  
**To:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7E -3,5,8,10

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 3:42 PM  
**Subject:** Re: [redacted] Talking Points  
**To:** "Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8,10,13

**Cc:**  
[redacted]

**Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)**

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 10:23 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points

b7E -5,8,10

Thank you so much. I owe you huge.

-  
On Jan 8, 2021 10:10 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Btw. Pretty sure [redacted] can start Mon. He is fabulous. Let me know what else I can do.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3

On Jan 8, 2021 5:29 PM, "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 5:18 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re: [redacted] Talking Points  
**To:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7E -3,5,8,10

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 8, 2021 3:42 PM  
**Subject:** Re: [redacted] Talking Points  
**To:** "Dawson, James A. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted] "Oneill, Christine E. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5,8,10

**Cc:**  
[redacted]

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:04 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [Redacted]

I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:37 AM  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q  
**To:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV> [Redacted]

[Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning,

[Redacted] there's not really anything we could/should say at this point beyond what the ADIC said in his remarks.

**From:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:18 AM

**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

**Subject:** Fw: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning,

[Redacted] handled this one last night but you can see below the reporter has come back at us. Let me know if you think there's anything else we should say. But I am not sure what to suggest.

[Redacted] are copied on this chain.

I am in [Redacted] this morning but [Redacted] so I am reachable on cell.

[Redacted]

**From:** Dilanian, Ken (NBCUniversal) <Ken.Dilanian@nbcuni.com>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 8:56 AM

To: NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV>

Cc: [REDACTED]

b7E -3,5

Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Re: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

Thanks. So did the FBI simply miss the posts that my NBC News colleagues found, calling for violence?

For example:

You can go to Washington on Jan 6 and help storm the Capital," said one 8kun user a day before the siege. "As many Patriots as can be. We will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agents, and demand a recount."

<https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/ncna1253499>

Was this an intelligence failure?

During a briefing with reporters on Friday, Steven D'Antuono, FBI Washington Field Office assistant director in charge, told reporters that the bureau's threat assessments leading up to Wednesday's mobbing of the Capitol showed "there was no indication that there was anything other than First Amendment protected activity."

Ken Dilanian  
National Security Correspondent  
NBC News

[REDACTED]  
@KenDilanianNBC

b6 -4  
b7C -4

On Jan 8, 2021, at 11:52 PM, NPO <NPO@fbi.gov> wrote:

Hi, Ken. Your request was forwarded by [REDACTED] for action. Thank you for reaching out. For your use and knowledge we can provide the below information (attributable to the FBI or an FBI spokesperson):

b6 -1  
b7C -1

*The FBI can't initiate an investigation based solely on First Amendment protected activity, and that includes comments made on social media. As offensive as a statement can be, the FBI cannot open an investigation without a threat of violence or alleged criminal activity. However, when that language does turn to a call for violence or criminal activity, the FBI is able to undertake investigative activity.*

*As always, we would encourage you to remember that all FBI investigative activity is conducted in accordance with our Domestic Investigations Operations Guide, the most recent public version of which is available*

*here: <https://www.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29>.*

NPO

*All correspondence contained in this e-mail, to include all names and associated contact information, may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.*

FBI(21cv1168)-3354

**From:** Dilanian, Ken (NBCUniversal) <Ken.Dilanian@nbcuni.com>

**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 2:18 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi, [REDACTED]

So the question is, did the FBI view, analyze and/or report on any of the many social media postings in advance of the Jan. 6 riot in which people vowed to attack the Capitol? Did the FBI warn local authorities, through JTTF, fusion center or some other avenue, about this intelligence?

Background: DC Police Chief Robert Contee said Thursday, "There was no intelligence that suggested there would be a breach of the U.S. Capitol."

But NBC News documented plenty of online threats to the Capitol:

"A digital flyer made public on Instagram and Facebook in December made little secret of the ambitions of some of the people planning to visit Washington on Jan. 6: "Operation Occupy the Capitol."

Washington, D.C., Attorney General Karl A. Racine told MSNBC on Friday that "there were no surprises there" when it came to what extremists prepared to do before Wednesday's siege.

"Everyone who was a law enforcement officer or a reporter knew exactly what these hate groups were planning," Racine said. "They were planning to descend on Washington, D.C., ground center was the Capitol, and they were planning to charge and, as Rudy Giuliani indicated, to do combat justice at the Capitol."

<https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/extremists-made-little-secret-ambitions-occupy-capital-weeks-attack-n1253499>

If you can't comment specifically on this case, can you talk on background about whether and how the FBI uses its digital capabilities to hunt for domestic terror threats and under what circumstances. Does there have to be an open criminal investigation, or can agents and analysts look at publicly posted material even without that on the grounds that it threatens violence?

How is that intelligence passed on to local authorities?

Thanks.

Ken Dilanian

*National Security Correspondent*

**NBC News, Washington**

[REDACTED]

@KenDilanianNBC

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:07 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

Sanborn, Jill (CTD)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

I agree. I don't think there's anything more we can say

-

On Jan 9, 2021 10:04 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:37 AM  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q  
**To:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV> [Redacted]

**Cc:** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning,

[Redacted] there's not really anything we could/should say at this point beyond what the ADIC said in his remarks.

**From:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:18 AM

**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

**Subject:** Fw: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning,

[Redacted] handled this one last night but you can see below the reporter has come back at us. Let me know if you think there's anything else we should say. But I am not sure what to suggest. [Redacted] are copied on this chain.

I am in [Redacted] this morning but [Redacted] so I am reachable on cell.

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:20 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

I agree. [REDACTED]

Thank you

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Jan 9, 2021 10:07 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:  
I agree. I don't think there's anything more we can say

On Jan 9, 2021 10:04 AM, [REDACTED] wrote:  
Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:37 AM  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q  
**To:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV> [REDACTED]

**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good morning,  
[REDACTED] there's not really anything we could/should say at this point beyond what the ADIC said in his remarks.

**From:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV>  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:18 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]



[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:21 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

Agree...

Thank you!

-

On Jan 9, 2021 10:19 AM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. [Redacted] b7E -1,3

Thank you

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 10:07 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. I don't think there's anything more we can say b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

-

On Jan 9, 2021 10:04 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [Redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5  
I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [Redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:37 AM  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q  
**To:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV> [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Good morning,

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:30 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD)  
(FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 10:19 AM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. [Redacted]

b7E -1,3

Thank you

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 10:07 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. I don't think there's anything more we can say

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

-  
On Jan 9, 2021 10:04 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:37 AM  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q  
**To:** NPO <NPO@FBI.GOV> [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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FOI/PA# 6:21-cv-1168

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Page 206 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 207 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 208 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 209 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 210 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 213 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 1,2,4,5,8,13;  
Page 214 ~ b3 - 1; b5 - 1; b7E - 1,2,5,8,13;  
Page 215 ~ b5 - 1; b7E - 1,2,7,13;  
Page 217 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1,2,8,9,13,15;  
Page 218 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7D - 2; b7E - 1,2,4,5,8,9,10,13,15;  
Page 219 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1,2,5,8,9,10;  
Page 220 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1,2,4,5,8,9,10,15;  
Page 221 ~ b6 - 2,3; b7A - 1; b7C - 2,3; b7D - 2,5; b7E - 1,2,4,5,8,9,10,15;  
Page 222 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 223 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 224 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 225 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 226 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 227 ~ b6 - 3; b7A - 1; b7C - 3; b7E - 1;  
Page 228 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 229 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 230 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 231 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 232 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 233 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 234 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 235 ~ b7A - 1; b7E - 1;  
Page 237 ~ b5 - 1; b6 - 3; b7C - 3; b7E - 1,2,8;  
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[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 10:32 AM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: [EXTERNAL] Fw: nbc news q

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Copy

On Jan 9, 2021 10:30 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Its especially difficult to get across in a quote.

[Redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 10:19 AM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. Frustrating as I don't know how to get across what we can and can't do with SM.....

b7E -3

Thank you

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

On Jan 9, 2021 10:07 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
I agree. I don't think there's anything more we can say

On Jan 9, 2021 10:04 AM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Fysa - follow up to NBC inquiry last night that [Redacted] worked with NPO on.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I think we should let our response from last night stand.

WFO reaching out to their management as well.

----- Forwarded message -----

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 1:01 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); Paul, Michael F. (MP) (FBI); Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: PAO/COMMS TDY

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Thanks [Redacted] We are grateful to you, MP, and CTD for the assistance and are looking forward to working with you! We will work with security to ensure you get access to the building, get you access to our distro lists, etc., so you can hit the ground running when you arrive.

-- [Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 12:49 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted] D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] Paul, Michael F. (MP) (FBI); [Redacted] Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: PAO/COMMS TDY

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi, all -

I will be arriving in DC tomorrow around 5pm ET. I will communicate with [Redacted] and Co. regarding logistics for when I hit the ground at DCA. Please feel free to email or call [Redacted] in the meantime if you need anything ahead of my arrival.

Looking forward to lending a hand.

[Redacted]

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 8:52 PM  
**To:** D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [Redacted] Paul, Michael F. (MP) (FBI); [Redacted] Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Subject:** PAO/COMMS TDY

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Steve,  
As we discussed [Redacted] is available and fabulous!!!! and Michael Paul was supportive in helping us.

MP - thank you!!

[Redacted]

Thank you!!! And meet ADIC D'Antuono and SACs Moore and Alcoke.

I'll leave to you all the specifics on report date....but pretty sure [redacted] has his go bag ready!!!

Have a great night

Jill

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 3:03 PM  
**To:** [redacted] D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI) b6 -1  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); Paul, Michael F. (MP) b7C -1  
(FBI); Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] b7E -5  
**Subject:** RE: PAO/COMMS TDY

Thank you!!!

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 12:49 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Paul,  
Michael F. (MP) (FBI); [redacted] Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: PAO/COMMS TDY b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi, all –

I will be arriving in DC tomorrow around 5pm ET. I will communicate with [redacted] and Co. regarding logistics for when I hit the ground at DCA. Please feel free to email or call [redacted] in the meantime if you need anything ahead of my arrival.

Looking forward to lending a hand.

[redacted]

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 8, 2021 8:52 PM  
**To:** D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Cc:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Paul,  
Michael F. (MP) (FBI); [redacted] Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Subject:** PAO/COMMS TDY b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Steve,

As we discussed [redacted] is available and fabulous!!!! and Michael Paul was supportive in helping us.

MP - thank you!!

[redacted]

Thank you!!! And meet ADIC D'Antuono and SACs Moore and Alcoke.

I'll leave to you all the specifics on report date....but pretty sure [redacted] has his go bag ready!!!

Have a great night

Jill

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 3:54 PM  
**To:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

FYI on [redacted] and also [redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 3:42 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI)"  
[redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)"

**Cc:** [redacted]  
All,  
[redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

Please see below. In addition, reporting indicates [redacted]  
[redacted]

Based on the above, [redacted]  
[redacted]

See you Monday.

Paul

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 1:14 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]  
**To:** "Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

**Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 3:57 PM  
**To:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]

Thank you

-

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

On Jan 9, 2021 3:53 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
FYI on [redacted] and also [redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 3:42 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Abbate, Paul M. (DO) (FBI)"  
[redacted] "Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)"

**Cc:** [redacted]  
All, [redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

Please see below. In addition, reporting indicates [redacted]  
[redacted]

Based on the above, [redacted]  
[redacted]

See you Monday.

Paul

-

----- Forwarded message -----

**Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 4:00 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3

Thanks. Think we are good at this time, will depend on what happens Monday.

-  
On Jan 9, 2021 1:52 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Thank you. Let us know if anything is needed or if we can help at all.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,8

On Jan 9, 2021 3:42 PM, "Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
All,

Please see below. In addition, reporting indicates [redacted]  
[redacted]

Based on the above, [redacted]  
[redacted]

See you Monday.

Paul

-  
----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 1:14 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted]  
**To:** "Haertel, Paul H. (SU) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Cc:** FYSA, [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5,9,15

----- Forwarded message -----

**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 4:31 PM  
**To:** Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Holmgren, Hads O. (DN) (FBI)  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi Caroline,

Do you have the details of the special case code? We've been asked for it by WFO [redacted] and [redacted] so I think it might not have gotten wide dissemination. Thanks!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:43 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote: b7E -3  
I'm sorry. SA OT must start on an administrative work week (Sunday), and it cannot be back dated. OGC has reviewed the statute several times, which states AVP should cover unplanned events. The ADD only has the authority to approve OT starting this Sunday moving forward.

Sorry,  
Caroline

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:33 PM, "Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote: b7E -3  
Caroline,

Thank you for the below. Can we start the SA's from the 6th? I am happy to reach out to Paul and discuss. Let us know what you think....thank you.

Regards,  
John

[redacted] (Cell)  
[redacted] (Desk)

b7E -3

On Jan 8, 2021 22:29, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
John and Jill,

I apologize for the confusion. The ADD approved a special case code for WFO and HQ CP. IA/PS will begin on 1/4 and SAs will begin this Sunday (1/10).

**Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 6:18 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] [redacted] Holmgren, Hads O. (DN) (FBI)  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi Kristyn,

We'll issue the SCC on Monday morning. It's not in WebTA yet. Is there a specific question you're receiving that we can help answer?

Thanks,  
Caroline

-

On Jan 9, 2021 4:30 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Hi Caroline,

b7E -3,5

Do you have the details of the special case code? We've been asked for it by WFO, [redacted] and [redacted] so I think it might not have gotten wide dissemination. Thanks!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:43 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
I'm sorry. SA OT must start on an administrative work week (Sunday), and it cannot be back dated. OGC has reviewed the statue several times, which states AVP should cover unplanned events. The ADD only has the authority to approve OT starting this Sunday moving forward.

b7E -3

Sorry,  
Caroline

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:33 PM, "Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Caroline,

b7E -3

Thank you for the below. Can we start the SA's from the 6th? I am happy to reach out to Paul and discuss. Let us know what you think....thank you.

**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 6:21 PM  
**To:** Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] [redacted] Holmgren, Hads O. (DN) (FBI)  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Thanks! Yes people are asking the details of it i.e., when does/did it start, who does it cover, etc. I'm assuming non-agent OT started this week and agent wouldn't start until next based on the Administrative work week thing, but you know what they say about assuming!

-

On Jan 9, 2021 6:17 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote: b7E -3  
Hi Kristyn,

We'll issue the SCC on Monday morning. It's not in WebTA yet. Is there a specific question you're receiving that we can help answer?

Thanks,  
Caroline

-

On Jan 9, 2021 4:30 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote: b7E -3,5  
Hi Caroline,

Do you have the details of the special case code? We've been asked for it by WFO, [redacted] and [redacted] so I think it might not have gotten wide dissemination. Thanks!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:43 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote: b7E -3  
I'm sorry. SA OT must start on an administrative work week (Sunday), and it cannot be back dated. OGC has reviewed the statue several times, which states AVP should cover unplanned events. The ADD only has the authority to approve OT starting this Sunday moving forward.

Sorry,  
Caroline

-

**Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 6:26 PM  
**To:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] [redacted] Holmgren, Hads O. (DN) (FBI)  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

IA/PS OT started on 1/4 and SA OT will start tomorrow (1/10). Both are approved with the biweekly pay cap waiver and apply to WFO, [redacted]

Please let me know if you need additional details.

-

On Jan 9, 2021 6:20 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Thanks! Yes people are asking the details of it i.e., when does/did it start, who does it cover, etc. I'm assuming non-agent OT started this week and agent wouldn't start until next based on the Administrative work week thing, but you know what they say about assuming!

b7E -3

-

On Jan 9, 2021 6:17 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Hi Kristyn,

b7E -3

We'll issue the SCC on Monday morning. It's not in WebTA yet. Is there a specific question you're receiving that we can help answer?

Thanks,  
Caroline

-

On Jan 9, 2021 4:30 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Hi Caroline,

b7E -3, 5

Do you have the details of the special case code? We've been asked for it by WFO [redacted] and [redacted] so I think it might not have gotten wide dissemination. Thanks!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

On Jan 8, 2021 10:43 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

b7E -3



**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI) b6 -1  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 6:27 PM b7C -1  
**To:** Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI) b7E -3,5  
**Cc:** [redacted] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael  
H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Holmgren, Hads O. (DN) (FBI)  
**Subject:** OT request for PVCA

Perfect!

- b7E -3,5  
On Jan 9, 2021 6:25 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
IA/PS OT started on 1/4 and SA OT will start tomorrow (1/10). Both are approved with the biweekly pay cap waiver and apply to WFO, [redacted]

Please let me know if you need additional details.

- b7E -3  
On Jan 9, 2021 6:20 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Thanks! Yes people are asking the details of it i.e., when does/did it start, who does it cover, etc. I'm assuming non-agent OT started this week and agent wouldn't start until next based on the Administrative work week thing, but you know what they say about assuming!

- b7E -3  
On Jan 9, 2021 6:17 PM, "Otto, Caroline F. (RPO) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Hi Kristyn,  
We'll issue the SCC on Monday morning. It's not in WebTA yet. Is there a specific question you're receiving that we can help answer?

Thanks,  
Caroline

- b7E -3,5  
On Jan 9, 2021 4:30 PM, "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Hi Caroline,  
Do you have the details of the special case code? We've been asked for it by WFO, [redacted] and [redacted] so I think it might not have gotten wide dissemination. Thanks!

Best,

**Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:07 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI);  
Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI); [redacted] Kelly, Kristyn  
E. (CTD) (FBI)

**Cc:** [redacted] b6 -1  
b7C -1  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information b7E -1,2,5

Jill/Brian/Steve - please see the RFI below resulting from Senate Judiciary notice to Google EM regarding a report of militia threat to tech executives. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Thoughts? Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted] b6 -5,7  
b7C -5,7  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 8:47 PM b7E -1,2,3  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information  
**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

[Large redacted area]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:12 PM  
**To:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//LES)  
**Attachments:** Overview US Capitol coordination DRAFT 01092021 U\_LES.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,5

All  
Please advise if you were assisting in this? I was unaware of this tasking... also please review for accuracy.

[redacted]

So please let [redacted] and [redacted] know if we should add anything.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:00 PM  
**Subject:** DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//LES)  
**To:** "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gray, Edward J. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted] "Downey, Jeffrey R. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Carlisle, Travis D. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted] "Young, Ryan T. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:** "Meador, Stanley M. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted] "Jones, Jason A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Deleon, Michael D. (CJISD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
For review and concurrence: (respective parts, all pages) [redacted]  
For awareness: [redacted]

b5 -1,2  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Good evening all,

[redacted]

**Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:13 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//~~LES~~)

Copy,  
Brian

On Jan 9, 2021 9:12 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3

All  
Please advise if you were assisting in this? I was unaware of this tasking... also please review for accuracy.

[redacted]  
So please let [redacted] and [redacted] know if we should add anything.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

----- Forwarded message -----

From: [redacted]  
Date: Jan 9, 2021 9:00 PM  
Subject: DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//~~LES~~)  
To: "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gray, Edward J. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted] "Downey, Jeffrey R. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted]

[redacted] "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Carlisle, Travis D. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted] "Young, Ryan T. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Cc: "Meador, Stanley M. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] [redacted] "Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted] "Jones, Jason A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Deleon, Michael D. (CIJSD) (FBI)" [redacted]

For review and concurrence: (respective parts, all pages) [redacted]  
For awareness: [redacted]

Good evening all,

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:16 PM  
**To:** Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI); Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

Sorry for late sat email. Are either of you aware of the below from the hill? Specifically from [redacted]  
We are digging into this....

b6 -5  
b7C -5  
b7E -3

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:06 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[redacted] "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[redacted]  
[redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted] "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]

**Cc:** [redacted]  
Jill/Brian/Steve - please see the RFI below resulting from Senate Judiciary notice to Google EM regarding a report of militia threat to tech executives. [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

Thoughts? Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 8:47 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -5,7  
b7C -5,7  
b7E -1,2,3

**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

[redacted]

**Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:17 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//LES)

Yes, [redacted] called me while I was working with [redacted] on the TPs requested for tomorrow. I gave [redacted] a verbal run down and requested time to verify/ correct the numbers once she had a draft.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3,5

On Jan 9, 2021 9:12 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

All  
Please advise if you were assisting in this? I was unaware of this tasking... also please review for accuracy.

So please let [redacted] and [redacted] know if we should add anything.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:00 PM  
**Subject:** DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//LES)  
**To:** "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gray, Edward J. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted] "Downey, Jeffrey R. (CIRG) (FBI)" [redacted] "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted] "Carlisle, Travis D. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted] "Young, Ryan T. (DI) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:** "Meador, Stanley M. (DO) (FBI)" [redacted] "Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI)" [redacted] "Jones, Jason A. (OGC) (FBI)" [redacted] "Deleon, Michael D. (CJISD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
For review and concurrence: (respective parts, all pages) [redacted]  
For awareness: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:38 PM  
**To:** Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI); Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Gilhooly, Brian T.  
(CTD) (FBI); Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen,  
Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,5

Thanks Pat

All,  
I just talked with SAC Fair to see if he was aware of anything. [redacted]  
[redacted]

I also sent to OCA to see if they have any more from Feinstein's staff.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -1,2,3,5

On Jan 9, 2021 9:06 PM, "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Jill/Brian/Steve - please see the RFI below resulting from Senate Judiciary notice to Google EM regarding a  
report of militia threat to tech executives. [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

Thoughts? Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted] b6 -5,7  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 8:47 PM b7C -5,7  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information b7E -1,2,3  
**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

[redacted]

**Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:42 PM  
**To:** Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

I am not aware of this. First I have heard of it. I will double check with our SJC rep.

b6 -5  
b7C -5  
b7E -3

On Jan 9, 2021 9:15 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Sorry for late sat email. Are either of you aware of the below from the hill? Specifically from [redacted]  
We are digging into this....

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:06 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[redacted] "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[redacted]  
[redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
[redacted], "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]

**Cc:** [redacted]

Jill/Brian/Steve - please see the RFI below resulting from Senate Judiciary notice to Google EM regarding a report of militia threat to tech executives. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Thoughts? Pat

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 8:47 PM  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -5,7  
b7C -5,7  
b7E -1,2,3

**To:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [redacted]

**Cc:** [redacted]

[redacted]



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:43 PM  
**To:** Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI); Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

Thank you.

I also just talked with SAC Fair to see if he was aware of anything. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Jill b7E -1,2,3

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

On Jan 9, 2021 9:41 PM, "Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:  
I am not aware of this. First I have heard of it. I will double check with our SJC rep.

b6 -5  
b7C -5  
b7E -3

On Jan 9, 2021 9:15 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:  
Sorry for late sat email. Are either of you aware of the below from the hill? Specifically from [REDACTED]  
We are digging into this....

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
Date: Jan 9, 2021 9:06 PM  
Subject: Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

To: "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED] "Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[REDACTED] "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED] "Glasheen, Michael H. (CTD) (FBI)"  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] "Virmani, Sanjay (SF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] "Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

**Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:46 PM  
**To:** Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information

Roger. I will let you know if I hear anything.

-

On Jan 9, 2021 9:43 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Thank you.

b7E -1,2,3

I also just talked with SAC Fair to see if he was aware of anything. [redacted]  
[redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 9:41 PM, "Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
I am not aware of this. First I have heard of it. I will double check with our SJC rep.

b6 -5  
b7C -5  
b7E -3

-

On Jan 9, 2021 9:15 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Sorry for late sat email. Are either of you aware of the below from the hill? Specifically from [redacted]  
We are digging into this....

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 9, 2021 9:06 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request for Duty to Warn Information  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] "Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)"

[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:47 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//~~LES~~)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

I just talked to [redacted] neither of us were tracking this request but happy to work with [redacted] on any edits/updates if needed.

Steve, are you able to review and let us know if edits are needed? Is it easier for you just to make them directly? Let us know whatever you need.

[redacted] and I will both be in tomorrow, but since [redacted] needs this by 11, just want to make sure we figure it out tonight.

Thanks,

[redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 9:17 PM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Yes, [redacted] called me while I was working with [redacted] on the TPs requested for tomorrow. I gave [redacted] a verbal run down and requested time to verify/ correct the numbers once she had a draft.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2,3

On Jan 9, 2021 9:12 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
All  
Please advise if you were assisting in this? I was unaware of this tasking... also please review for accuracy.

[redacted]

So please let [redacted] and [redacted] know if we should add anything.

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

**Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:54 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted] (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//~~LES~~)- b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5


Just spoke to [redacted] Game plan in place. A few additions and verification of dates/ numbers based on sitrep

On Jan 9, 2021 9:47 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I just talked to [redacted] neither of us were tracking this request but happy to work with [redacted] on any edits/updates if needed. b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3, 5

Steve, are you able to review and let us know if edits are needed? Is it easier for you just to make them directly? Let us know whatever you need.

[redacted] and I will both be in tomorrow, but since [redacted] needs this by 11, just want to make sure we figure it out tonight.

Thanks,



On Jan 9, 2021 9:17 PM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Yes, [redacted] called me while I was working with [redacted] on the TPs requested for tomorrow. I gave [redacted] a verbal run down and requested time to verify/ correct the numbers once she had a draft.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -2, 3

On Jan 9, 2021 9:12 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
All  
Please advise if you were assisting in this? I was unaware of this tasking... also please review for accuracy.  
[redacted]

So please let [redacted] and [redacted] know if we should add anything.

Jill

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Saturday, January 9, 2021 9:57 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
[redacted] Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Before Morning.... DRAFT for review: Overview of FBI planning, coordination, and response to U.S. Capitol [Dec. 29 - Jan. 9] (U//~~LES~~)

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Let's plan to have edits/comments to [redacted] and [redacted] by 0830 since the doc needs to be at the AG by 1100 and requires EAD review prior.

Also trying to get the taskings to Exec staff out the gate from bosses. Think we can do lots of this and free [redacted] up.

Thanks all.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 9:54 PM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Just spoke to [redacted] Game plan in place. A few additions and verification of dates/ numbers based on sitrep

-

On Jan 9, 2021 9:47 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
I just talked to [redacted] neither of us were tracking this request but happy to work with [redacted] on any edits/updates if needed.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Steve, are you able to review and let us know if edits are needed? Is it easier for you just to make them directly? Let us know whatever you need.

[redacted] and I will both be in tomorrow, but since [redacted] needs this by 11, just want to make sure we figure it out tonight.

Thanks,

[redacted]

On Jan 9, 2021 9:17 PM, "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:40 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: For review: Overview FBI's Planning, Coordination, and Response to U.S. Capitol Breach  
**Attachments:** Overview US Capitol coordination DRAFT 01102021 U\_LES .docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**From:** Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:38 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: For review: Overview FBI's Planning, Coordination, and Response to U.S. Capitol Breach

FYI...

Regards,  
John

[REDACTED] (Cell)  
[REDACTED] (Desk)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:26 PM  
**To:** Brown, John A. (NSB) (FBI) [REDACTED] Wade, Terry (CCRSB) (FBI) [REDACTED] Cohen, Jodi (NSB) (FBI) [REDACTED] Laycock, Stephen C. (IB) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Meador, Stanley M. (DO) (FBI) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** For review: Overview FBI's Planning, Coordination, and Response to U.S. Capitol Breach

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Hi all,

Please find attached the overview of Dec. 29 – January 10, with emphasis on FBI's robust coordination with partners. Your teams [REDACTED] have provided input, in addition to [REDACTED]. The document will be provided to the DAG and the AG later this afternoon, once you and the Deputy Director are good with it.

If you have any edits, questions, concerns, please let me know.

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:40 PM  
**To:** Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: Assistance from CD

Thank you!

**From:** Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:35 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Assistance from CD

b7E -3

Fyi. Anything you need just ask.

Alan E. Kohler, Jr.  
Assistant Director  
FBI Counterintelligence Division  
W: [redacted]  
C: [redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Kohler, Alan E. Jr. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 1:15 PM  
**Subject:** Assistance from CD  
**To:** "Floris, Nikki L. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:** "Levine, Jesse (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; "Benavides, Bradley S. (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted]; "Cole, Katherine (CD) (FBI)" [redacted]; [redacted]

Folks,

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5,8

I just spoke with Jill Sanborn about anything they might need from us to support the work to investigate the Capitol seige as well as protect the inauguration. [redacted]

[redacted]

This is definitely an all hands on deck no fail moment for the FBI. Whatever we need to do to support we will do. I realize the people who will be tapped for these things are already working hard. We will spread this around the division as much as we can. Let's figure out how to surge as needed and still manage to get the important CD work done.

Katherine, please come to the 915 meeting tomorrow in 4017 and we can all discuss the status of CDs resources to this.

Thanks

Alan

Alan E. Kohler, Jr.  
Assistant Director  
FBI Counterintelligence Division

W: [REDACTED]  
C: [REDACTED]

b7E -3



[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 3:18 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** CTD Updates to OCA Capitol Response Letter  
**Attachments:** Capitol Response Letter - Final CTD Edits.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Hi [Redacted]

As we just discussed, I am sending over our final version of the Capitol Response letter approved by AD Sanborn.

Although not typical, could OCA keep the letter dated 9 January 2021?

- [Redacted]

Please let me know if there are any questions. Thank you for your continued coordination with us!

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 3:41 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Fwd: CTD Updates to OCA Capitol Response Letter

Copy. Thanks!

b7E -1,3

On Jan 10, 2021 3:23 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:  
Attached is the letter we discussed Friday. Your folks and mine have been working on it throughout weekend so it could go tomorrow. I think it is good.

One ask from us is [redacted]  
[redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 3:17 PM  
**Subject:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Hi** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

As we just discussed, I am sending over our final version of the Capitol Response letter approved by AD Sanborn.

Although not typical, could OCA keep the letter dated 9 January 2021?

[redacted]

Please let me know if there are any questions. Thank you for your continued coordination with us!

[redacted]

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 3:50 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: CTD Updates to OCA Capitol Response Letter

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Feedback and some potential additions. Nice job Ladies!!!

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 3:42 PM  
**Subject:** Fwd: CTD Updates to OCA Capitol Response Letter  
**To:** "Williams, Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FBI)" [REDACTED] "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)"  
[REDACTED]  
**Cc:**  
Jill:

b7E -1,3

This letter is very good. I appreciate your team's work over the weekend.

My only edit is to add the tip line links and phone number, as well as the most wanted page - to get the message out and hopefully generate helpful tips.

I agree - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Again, many thanks to you and your team.

-JCT

Jill C. Tyson  
Assistant Director  
FBI Office of Congressional Affairs  
[REDACTED]

b7E -3

On Jan 10, 2021 3:23 PM, "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED] wrote:  
Attached is the letter we discussed Friday. Your folks and mine have been working on it throughout weekend

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:00 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** Review - OCA letter

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Hello,

In keeping with generalities, I was asked to review the CTD approved letter by OCA (I think you've cleared it), and find this:

[Redacted]

Thoughts?

Thank you,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Confidentiality Statement: This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The message, along with any attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling [Redacted]

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:20 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: Review - OCA letter

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Hi again,

[Redacted]

Thanks,

[Redacted]

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:07 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Review - OCA letter

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

I am good with it. And this its general enough as well.

[Redacted] thoughts

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 10, 2021 4:00 PM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Hello,

In keeping with generalities, I was asked to review the CTD approved letter by OCA (I think you've cleared it), and find this:

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[Redacted]

Thoughts?

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:28 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: Review - OCA letter

Yes. Thank you!

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:21 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: Review - OCA letter

Yes that is fine. Will you push that in your comments on the letter?

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 10, 2021 4:19 PM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Hi again,

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[Redacted]

Thanks,  
[Redacted]

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 4:07 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Review - OCA letter

I am good with it. And this its general enough as well.

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

[Redacted] thoughts

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted] cell  
[Redacted]

On Jan 10, 2021 4:00 PM, [Redacted] wrote:

**Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 5:43 PM b7C -1,3  
b7D -2  
**To:** [REDACTED] b7E -1,2,5  
**Cc:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI);  
Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** [REDACTED]

On 1/10/2021, a concerned member of the public, who wishes to remain anonymous, contacted writer to advise the following:

[REDACTED]

[redacted]

**From:** [redacted]

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 7:26 PM

**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)

**Cc:** Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI); Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [redacted]

(FBI); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]

[redacted] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [redacted]

**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,5

Just as follow up, the information has been entered for intake. [redacted]

[redacted] The information is being routed accordingly.

Thanks.

J

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]

**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 5:48 PM

**To:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]

**Cc:** Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]

[redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]

[redacted] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)

**Subject:** [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Thanks Pat

Interesting. [redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn

Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7D -2  
b7E -1,2,3

On Jan 10, 2021 5:43 PM, "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

On 1/10/2021, a concerned member of the public, who wishes to remain anonymous, contacted writer to advise the following:

[redacted]



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 7:30 PM b7C -1,3  
b7E -2,5  
**To:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI); Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI); [redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted]

Great thank you.

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b6 -3  
b7A -1  
b7C -3  
b7E -1,2,3

On Jan 10, 2021 7:25 PM, [redacted] wrote:  
Just as follow up, the information has been entered for intake. [redacted]  
[redacted] The information is being routed accordingly.

Thanks.

J

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 5:48 PM  
**To:** Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Cc:** Vorndran, Kevin (CTD) (FBI) [redacted] Alcoke, Matthew R. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted] Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI) [redacted]  
[redacted] Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Subject:** [redacted]

b6 -1,3  
b7A -1  
b7C -1,3  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Thanks Pat

Interesting. [redacted]  
[redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

b7E -3

On Jan 10, 2021 5:43 PM, "Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted] wrote:

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:22 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)  
**Attachments:** Jan10ope-FINAL.pdf

b7E -3,5

Just making sure you all have

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]

**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 8:05 PM

**Subject:** FBI DAILY SITREP (U//LES)

**To:** "Cooper, Laura" [redacted] "Wagner, Kimberly"

<KWagner@mcsheriffs.com>

b6 -1,4,5,6  
b7C -1,4,5,6  
b7E -3,5,13

[redacted]

[redacted] "Lewis, Kwame  
(DI) (FBI)"

[redacted]

[redacted] "Talucci, Vince"

[redacted] "Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI)"

[redacted] "Cunningham,  
Terry (IACP)"

[redacted]

[redacted] "Thompson, Jonathan"

[redacted] "Grever, Louis"

[redacted] "Acevedo, Art Chief"

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] "Carroll, Jeffery W. (MPD)"

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[Redacted]

"Carlisle, Travis D. (DI) (FBI)" "Byron, Pamela (DI)  
(FBI)" "Morales, Emily H. (DI) (FBI)"

[Redacted]

"Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)"

[Redacted]

Good evening,

Please find attached the 10 January 2021 National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) SITREP related to the violence associated with lawful protests. This SITREP contains relevant information from 9 and 10 January 2021.

Please note that this document is ~~Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive (U//LES)~~. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) at FBI Headquarters approves further dissemination with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

In addition, please find attached an FBI Awareness Bulletin dated 10 January 2021 titled, [Redacted]

[Redacted] This bulletin should be further shared with your trusted law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security partners in accordance with the LES handling caveat.

Thank you.

[Redacted]

**Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:25 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: talking points.  
**Attachments:** Capitol and Inauguration Talking Points.docx

Jill, this is so not ready to be distributed to an AD, so my apologies, but in the interest of time – I wanted to push something over to you. I'll forward our internal sitrep shortly.

-----  
Jennifer Leigh Moore  
Special Agent in Charge - Intelligence  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Office

[redacted] desk  
[redacted] cell

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:09 PM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** talking points.

Haven't cleaned them up but here is what i'm working off

-----  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:02 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request from JCCIC and the Hill

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Hey [redacted]

[redacted]

Let me know if you have any questions.

[redacted]

On Jan 10, 2021 12:45, [redacted] wrote:

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Thank you,

[redacted]

[redacted]

---

From: [redacted]

Sent: Sunday, January 10, 2021 12:34 PM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request from JCCIC and the Hill

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,4,5

Talking points:

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

**Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:25 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** FW: 2000 SITREP 10 January 2021  
**Attachments:** SITREP\_2000\_1-10-21.docx

-----  
Jennifer Leigh Moore  
Special Agent in Charge - Intelligence  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Office

[redacted] desk  
[redacted] cell

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:14 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 2000 SITREP 10 January 2021

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Please do not further disseminate.

**Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:27 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:**   
**Attachments:**

b7E -1

Jill, this is rough

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:32 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** [redacted]  
**Attachments:** [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 8:27 PM  
**Subject:** [redacted]  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

b7E -1,3

Jill, this is rough



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:32 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: FW: 2000 SITREP 10 January 2021  
**Attachments:** SITREP\_2000\_1-10-21.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 8:25 PM  
**Subject:** FW: 2000 SITREP 10 January 2021  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Cc:**

b7E -3

-----  
Jennifer Leigh Moore  
Special Agent in Charge - Intelligence  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] desk  
[REDACTED] cell

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:14 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** 2000 SITREP 10 January 2021

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

Please do not further disseminate.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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- Page 13 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 14 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 29 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 152 ~ b7E - 1,2,8,13;
- Page 153 ~ b3 - 1; b7E - 1,2,8,13;
- Page 154 ~ b7E - 1,2,8;
- Page 158 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 159 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 160 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 161 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 163 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 164 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 165 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 167 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 168 ~ Duplicate;
- Page 169 ~ Duplicate;

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X For this Page X  
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**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

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**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:33 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: FW: talking points.  
**Attachments:** Capitol and Inauguration Talking Points.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

b7E -3

**From:** "Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 8:25 PM  
**Subject:** FW: talking points.  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:**

Jill, this is so not ready to be distributed to an AD, so my apologies, but in the interest of time – I wanted to push something over to you. I'll forward our internal sitrep shortly.

-----  
Jennifer Leigh Moore  
Special Agent in Charge - Intelligence  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington Field Office

[redacted] desk  
[redacted] cell

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -3,5

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 8:09 PM  
**To:** Moore, Jennifer L. (WF) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Subject:** talking points.

Haven't cleaned them up but here is what i'm working off

-----  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, January 10, 2021 1:02 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Request from JCCIC and the Hill

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,2,3,5

Hey [redacted]  
[redacted]

**Jill Sanborn**

---

**From:** Jill Sanborn  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 3:56 AM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - From Fox News - Army secretary: At least 25 domestic terrorism cases opened in response to Capitol riot

**Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy says at least 25 domestic terrorism cases have been opened as a result of the assault on the Capitol Building on Jan. 6, according to a released summary of a call with Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., on Sunday.**

<https://www.foxnews.com/us/25-domestic-terrorism-cases-capitol-riot>

Explore the Fox News apps that are right for you at <http://www.foxnews.com/apps-products/index.html>.

Sent from my iPhone

FBI(21cv1168)-3561

**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 5:32 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Briefing schedule

So you all have the times. Let's try to murder board this afternoon can invite [REDACTED] to participate too.

b7E -3,5

Also this will add to the questions I'll get.

Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy says at least 25 domestic terrorism cases have been opened as a result of the assault on the Capitol Building on Jan. 6, according to a released summary of a call with Rep. Jason Crow, D-Colo., on Sunday.

<https://www.foxnews.com/us/25-domestic-terrorism-cases-capitol-riot>

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED] cell  
[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** "Tyson, Jill C. (OCA) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Jan 10, 2021 8:55 PM  
**Subject:** Briefing schedule  
**To:** "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [REDACTED]  
**Cc:**  
Monday 1/11: 1130am at [REDACTED] (DD, you, me). Classified SVTC.

b7E -3,13

Tuesday 1/12: 1130a House; 130p Senate (at FBIHQ). Unclassified conference call.

Jill C. Tyson  
Assistant Director  
FBI Office of Congressional Affairs

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 7:11 PM  
**To:** D'Antuono, Steven Michael (WF) (FBI); Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI); [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Gang of 4 Notes  
**Attachments:** Gang of 4 Briefing Notes.docx

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Folks,

As promised, I am attaching a rough draft write-up of the Director's meeting with the Gang of Four tonight. Hope it helps as you prepare for tomorrow's briefings.

DOJ has also asked that we prepare for questions re: our relationship with USCP before and currently.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

**Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)**

---

**From:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 7:29 PM  
**To:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI); Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Thank You - Resources

b6 -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -5

Jill,

If you get a chance to thank the following ADs for their support to both the Capitol and Inauguration lines of effort it'd be great!

b7E -1,5,8



Huge thanks to all!

Best,  
Kristyn

-

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 8:11 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fw: Re: [Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,5

Thanks [Redacted] makes sense to me. But defer to boss.

SSA [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted] (office)  
[Redacted] (cell)

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

On Jan 11, 2021 8:07 PM, [Redacted] wrote:  
Jill and [Redacted]

[Redacted] I spoke with [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Please let me know if this is okay - we need to get a response out quickly. Also, feel free to call me if you would like to discuss further.

Thank you! [Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 7:59 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Re: [Redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[Redacted]

Great chatting. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Thank you [Redacted]

[Redacted]



**Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)**

**From:** Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 8:13 PM  
**To:** [redacted] Reddan, Patrick E. Jr. (CTD) (FBI); Hwang, Sandra I. (CTD) (DET); Jensen, Steven J. (CTD) (FBI); Gilhooly, Brian T. (CTD) (FBI)  
**Cc:** Kelly, Kristyn E. (CTD) (FBI); [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fw: Re: [redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted]

Jill

Jill Sanborn  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[redacted] cell  
[redacted]

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Jan 11, 2021 8:07 PM  
**Subject:** Fw: Re: [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted] "Sanborn, Jill (CTD) (FBI)" [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
Jill and [redacted]

b5 -1  
b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5

[redacted] I spoke with [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

Please let me know if this is okay - we need to get a response out quickly. Also, feel free to call me if you would like to discuss further.

Thank you! [redacted]

-----  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 11, 2021 7:59 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Re: [redacted]

b6 -1  
b7A -1  
b7C -1  
b7E -1,3,5